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Dimensions of National Securit}^ in 
the SAARG Gountpies 
With thB Shrinkina of our world the oerceotual 
parameters of the term "security" has oaradoKicaliv 
broadened. Security is the predominant concern of everv 
nation which generally implies territorial inteoritv 
stability of the government and realizations of other 
national and internal interest and safety of the life and 
property of their citizens from any threat (External or 
internal) which can damage their national core values. 
There are many threats to the security of a nation. wnich 
come in diverse ways and forms, varying in range and 
intensity of violence and pose risk to the security in 
diversified manner. The concept and nature of security 
differs from nation to nation, and time to time, keeoino in 
view the domestic policies and geo-political considerations. 
As far as national securitv of SAARC countries i= 
concerned, it is more complicated not only because of then-
border disputes, inter-state conflicts, aiding and ebettinc 
of militancy m other states, terrorist and secessionist 
problems, but also the nuclear capability of this region. 
The extra regional threats are posed in the South Asian 
region with the emergence of China as a nuclear power state, 
presence of big power s military bases in Indian ocean ana 
the fall out of a possible nuclear conflict at the olobai 
ievei. and the interventionarv activities of deveioDed 
countries in the internal affairs of SAARC countries. The 
SAARC member countries like other third world countries are 
economically, socially and politically backward. Tnis 
backwardness, has become a source of exDloitation in the 
hand of strong powers, especially the developed countries of 
the West, and the International honetary oroanizations sucn 
as World Bank and IMF, which amount to abridciment of their 
rioht to decide their own ways of economic, political and 
social development. The USA, from the very beciinninci, after 
the decolonization, used its economic assistance prooramme 
as instrument of coercion to effect changes in the policies 
of South Asian Countries as per its foreign policv 
ob.iect ives. 
The other problem is the intei—state conflict and 
mutual apprehensions in the region. India and Pakistan navB 
fought three times and nobody can completelv rule out tne 
possibility of these two countries engaging in an armed 
conflict again. The suspended miniwar in the Siacnin 
Glacier and the continuing tension on Kashmir issue mav be 
kept in mind. So it is said that peace and securitv of tnis 
region depends on India and Pakistan relation. When these 
two countries are at peace with each other South Asia bv and 
large is at peace. If these two countries have troubled 
relations. South Asia is uneasv. 
The third level of security concerns in boutn Asia is 
of internal stability and om».c^. Sowith Ms3:*n rsoion ii R O W 
in the oriD of sectarian and destructive forces, e.o. the 
problems of Kashmir, North-East. Gorkha Land and Pun,iaD in 
India, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, the Chakmas s 
problem in Banciladesh, the terai and hill tribes in Neoal, 
the Nepali orioin in Bhutan and of North-West frontier. 
Baluchistan and Sindh in Pakistan. All these problems ars 
fast assummci orave dimensions and if they are not tackled 
properly and in time, they may tear the South Asian 
Societies aoart. 
There are several views on the securitv of Sou.tn Asian 
countries. But these views differ from state to state. 
keeoinci in view their domestic policies and geo-DOi 111 cai 
locations. This is particularly true for the periPherv 
states. While India, as a core state is inclined to evolve 
a security frame work m regional terms, the peripnery 
states tend to ouided by inter-reoional rivalries leadino to 
trans-reoional linkages. 
Pakistanis security framework is conditioned bv its 
rivalry towards India and by the Afghan problem. Nepal and 
Bhutan have the problems of weak buffer states sandwiche^d 
between India and China and linked traditlona11v to tne 
dominant reoional powers in South Asia. Sanolaaesh almost 
surrounded bv India. is faced with a different set of 
proDositxons. Sri Lanka «nd n«ldJ.v«M *r# iiitnO i^ fiisubi ICB 
whose orientations are bound to be governed not oniv bv 
their status as South Asian states, but also by the Great 
Powers policies in the Indian Ocean, 
It is thus obvious that the basic oroblems of national 
security of the SAARC countries are more of perception. It 
is South Asian reqion where constituents have apprehensions 
and suspicions about each other. The political ieoal and 
territorial aspects of the problem in fact, revolve around 
the psycholoQical problem. The national securitv problems 
of member countries can be settled and resolved if attempts 
B.rB made towards greater regional coooeration, ana 
confidence building in other words, if the SAARC is more 
strenothened. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Security is the foremost need of a nation and it is an 
intanoible asset. Thouoh it is not militarv hardware but it 
is very essential component of militarv force and reauxres 
great attention because development of a nation is directly 
related and based on it. It is vital for the nation s 
survival and ail round welfare. 
National Security is concerned with physical protection 
of the state from external as well internal threat. The 
newly independent nations of the developing world which 
achieved independence, just after the second world war faced 
security threats which were mostly internal rather than 
external. Whereas the security prevailing in the WEstern 
World western country has^faced any severe threat from its 
domestic sides but they are much threatened from external 
sides. 
As far as national securitv of SAARC countries is 
concerned it is more complicated because of their boraer 
dispute, inter-state conflicts. internal disoraer, 
terrorists and secessionist problems, ethnic as well as 
problems of religious fundamentalism, aiding and abetting of 
militancy by the other state and the nuclear capability, 
that has dramatically changed the security scenario and maae 
more complicated the national security of South Asian 
Countries. 
II 
The ob,iect of the oresent studv is to analvze the 
Dimensions of National Secuntv faced bv the SAARC 
countries. 
Chapter I. deals with the conceptual frame work of 
national securitv of South Asian countries. It also deals 
with the way in which a small nation s security differ from 
the national security of big powers, because small countries 
are much threatened from internal disorder rather than 
external threat. 
In Chapter II, it is emphasized that the involvement 
and interventlonary activities of extra-reoional powers m 
the internal affairs of South Asian countries much 
threatened the nation security of SAARC countries. But the 
inter-state disputes as well as interventlonary activities 
among South Asian countries themselves posed threats to 
their national security. 
Chapter III deals with the internal threats faced by 
the SAARC countries. The challencies of caste communal 
reQional and separatist strife and violence are ma.-jor 
factors of internal disorder. In this chapter it has been 
attempted to analyze the internal problems faced by the 
SAARC countries, such as, Kashmir, North-tast Insuroencv and 
Pun.iab problem m India, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Ill 
the Chakma's problem in Banqiadesh, Baluchi, Sindhi and 
Moha.-jir problems in Pakistan etc. 
Chapter IV, deals with security manaciement : National 
as well as Reqional in South Asia, It is time for all 
member countries of SAARC to come together to solve their 
problems amicably. 
The concludino chapter V is the summary and contain 
observations based on the study. In the contemporary world 
order of interdependency no country can afford to remain 
isolated from World Community, and also, it is historical 
fact that neighbourly amity is true key to national peace 
and security and well being of the country. These factor 
would be the significant determinants for South Asian 
countries to make more effective to SAARC. 
Chapter - *l 
A Conceptual Framework of 
National Security in South Asia 
The Security of the nation is a very old conceot as much 
as Nation - State is concerned. Its evolution can be traced 
back from the Hobbesian state of nature, where rule of mxoht 
is riciht' was orevailinci. In such tyoe of danoerous 
situation Deoole started to think to create a such tvoe of 
authority that can ciive security for their lives and 
Drooertv. and that authority came in form of a state. Now we 
find that the security and state are linked tooether. 
However. a serious talks about security Drob 1ems of 
nations and oeoole interests in national security studies 
develoDed .lust after the Second World War. And its scooe has 
widened with the emergence of newly indeoendent states of 
Asia. Africa and Latin America from colonial rule. 
In conventional term. national security means the 
orotection of territorial inteority. But in real term it 
includes the preservation of all kinds of ooerational. 
Political and economic-social systems. 
Today security has become a more comolicated conceot 
because the actual conceot of security in oeneral or 
Darticular is not soecified. The dictionary meaninci of 
security refers to protection from danoer. feelino safe and 
free from doubt . 
John Herz. who introduced the idea of security dilemma, 
states. that the self helo attemots of the nations to look 
1. Barry Busan. "Peoole States and Fears". National Security 
Problems m International Relations. fransitions 
Publisher. P. IB. 
after their own security, lead to the risina insecurity for 
other nations, as each nation interorets its own actions as 
defensive and the actions of others as ootentiallv 
threatenino'". 
Defininci national security. Walter Lioomann said. "a 
nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its 
iBQitimate interests to avoid war and is able if challenoea 
to maintain them by war"". To Michael Louw. national 
security is" the condition of freedom from external ohysical 
' 4 threat" . Accordinci to Louw. although moral and ideolooical 
threats should be included, it is really physical violence 
which is generally perceived as the ultimate leveracie aoainst 
a state and therefore, as the real and tanoible danoer to its 
survival. But if nations were not concerned with the 
orotection of their values other than their survival as 
independent states, most of them, most of the time would not 
have to be seriously concerned about their security . 
Frank Traoer and Frank N. Simonic define security in 
these words - "National Security is that part of government 
Policy having as its ob.-jective the creation of national and 
international political conditions favourable to the 
protection or extension of vital national values against 
existing and potential adversaries". As the vital national 
2. John Herz. Idealist Internationalism Security Dilemma, 
World Politics. Vol. 2. No. 2. January 1950. P."151-180. 
3. Walterlipomann. U.S. Foreign Policy : Shield of the 
Republic (Boston. Mass. 1943) P. 5. 
4. Louw. M. "National Security : A Modern Approach (Pretoria. 
SA. 1978). P. 2. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Frank N. Trager •?< Frank N. Simonie - "An Introduction to 
the National Security S< Society". 1973. P. 3<b. 
values are concerned, thev are related with those fundamental 
princiDles of a nation, on which its social, oolitical and 
physical existence is based. 
Arnold Wolfers maintains "a nation is secured to that 
extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice 
its core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able. if 
7 
challenoed to maintain them by victory in such a war".' 
All these definitions, however, assume that threats to a 
nation's security emerge onlv out of the external 
environment. as Morton Berkovitz and Brooke s defined 
national security as the ability of a nation to orotect its 
Q 
internal values from external threat". 
A more relevant definition to our times offered by 
Robert Mc. Namara is that "Security is not military hardware 
thouoh it may include it. security is not military force 
though it may encomoass it, security is develooment and 
9 
without develooment. there is no security . This 
deveioomentalists oersoective on national security was 
recognised by the United Nations in its twenty fifth session 
of in 1970 and passed a resolution which among other things. 
called for "eliminatino as far as oossible the economic oao 
7. Arnold Walfers. "National Security as an ttmbiguous 
Svmbol", in Political Science. Ouarterlv. December 195U. 
P. 481. 
B, M. Berkowitz and P.6. Booke. "National Securitv" in David 
L. Sills. ed. International Encyclooedia of the Social 
Sciences (London 1968). Vol. 11. PP. 41-45. 
9. Robert Mc. Namara "The Essence of Securitv". NewVork 1968. 
P. 149. 
between deveiooed and deveioDino countries, which is closeiv 
and essentially co-related to the strencithenino of the 
security of all nations and the establishino international 
Deace 
Subrahmanyam defines that "national security does not 
merely mean safeciuardino territorial mtecirity. It means 
also ensurino that the country is industrialized raoidly ana 
has a cohesive eoalitarian and technolociical society. Hnv 
thino which comes in the way of this develooment internaliv 
11 
or externally is a threat to (India's) national security 
AlthouQh this definition was made in reference to India. but 
stands general i sat ion to the vast ma.iority of the Third World 
Nations. 
A nation 5 security is inextricably linked uo with other 
thinos. the resources oosition and the ecolooical balance. 
Threats from nature are a sionificant asoect of national 
security. Declinino reserves of strateciic resources oil and 
ecolooical imbalances now threaten the security of nations 
every where. National security can not be maintained unless 
national economies sustained "^ . 
Thus. the conceot of national securitv is verv comole;; 
10.OD. Cited in K.P. Mishra. "The conceot of Security". India 
International Centre Quarterly (New Delhi), Vol. 3. No2. . 
Januarv 1976. P. 88, 
U.K. Subrahmanvam. "Our National Security (Delhi 1972) P. 
vi i. 
12.Lester Brown. Redefinino National Security, World-watch 
Paper, No. 14. (Washinoton 1977). The Duroose of National 
Security deliberations, says the author should not be to 
maximise military strength but to maximize national 
securitv - PP. 37-38. 
and comorehensive. It is difficult to define and diaonose 
the internal threats in a manner in which external military 
can be threats are defined and identified. 
There are two asoects of national security to counter 
the threat. One is external security and other is internal 
security. The external security is reauired due to external 
threats or challenoes. it could be territorial or threat to 
the country's oower and influence position. It involves 
relations with friends, enemies and neutrals. dioiomatic 
efforts to orevent a conflict or to oreoare for mobilisation 
of external resources, determining ob.-jective and Drooeriv 
handling uncertainties and unexoected set backs 
Where as internal security asoect is concerned it 
includes Socio-economic and industrial caoacity and 
scientific technological developments, orooer mobilization, 
allocations and development of resources and a high degree of 
Dolitical solidarity over national ob.-jectives and domestic 
14 Deace . The internal threats created due to terrorism. 
ethnic, communal ism. casterism and socio economic unrest etc. 
There are both short term and long term threats to 
internal security. Domestic threats mean slowing down or 
slackening and dislocation of economic progress and a 
declining productivity disruptions in the availability of 
economic/natural resources. vulnerability to such shocks. 
loss of domestic cohesion as a result of ethnic. relioious. 
1.3.Ma.ieed A. "National Security" Research Monograph, 
Published. 1989. from Centre for Strateoic Studies A.M.U. 
14.Ibid. 
reoional conflicts. conflicts between various seoments of 
DODulation and fraomentation in to special interests, orowino 
feelino of neolect and beino left out by grouD of oeoDle and 
the conseauent loss of confidence and faith in national 
Dolitical leadershiD. internal terrorism, which aoart from 
other ill effect disrupt the normal functioninci of economic 
processes. mioration of peoole from neiohborinci states 
because of oolitical instabilities there etc. 
The direct internal threat to national securitv in terms 
of scooe and intensity at a larger extent is the insurgencv 
and guerrilla warfare or terrorism that include disruotion of 
normal functioning of governmental institutions and of 
activities of trade and commerce, kidnaoing. hostage taking 
and hijacking of transoortation means extortion. riots, 
assassinations. terrorism. and large scale of grouo 
demonstrations and movements. External intervention in 
fragmented domestic oolitics may further oeroetuate local 
conflicts 
Terrorism is a worldwide ohenomenon. it not only 
effects international politics but also internal domestic, 
politics of a nation. Terrorist violence has become 
increasingly freauent in recent years. Between 1972 and 1992 
there were an average of 500 international terrorist attacks 
a year. Terrorism creates disorder and aims at creating fear 
among the General public throuoh its indiscriminate. random 
15.Edward A. Asar. Protracted Internal conflicts. in E.w, 
Azar S< John Burton International Conflict Resolution : 
Theory and Practice. Briohton 1986. PP. 28. 
and only apDarently irrational use of violence. This i= 
geared UD towards shakino the confidence of the oeoole in the 
capability of the ciovernment in oivino them security and 
protection and thereby destabi1isino the viability and 
leoitimacy of the ciovernment. Similar situation arises, when 
a sionificant oart of the society loses faith for whatever 
reasons in the fairness. Integrity and effectiveness of the 
law and order machinery. This group then realised to take 
law into its own hands for the security of lives and 
property, giving rise to the phenomenon of lumpen elements. 
National Security Problems of Big and Small Powers 
The national survival is the primary aim of big and 
small nations. but their national security problems arB 
different in their and gravity. Big Powers. especially 
nuclear haves, seldom face the danger of their territories of 
being annexed, except in the event of a nuclear war. that is 
not taken place. Their security problems are generally as 
1 h follows . a) Threats to the position of domination and 
hegemony they enjoy in the international system: b) threats 
to the control and influence thev wield, over the decision 
making processes of Regional Powers and Small powers. c> 
threats to the ideology / value system they believe is and 
want to spread among nations in the international domain. d) 
threats to their technological offense and standards of 
livinQ. and e) the security problems of their allies and 
16.Jayaramu, P.S., "India's National Security and Foreign 
Policy". ABC Publishino House. New Delhi. 1987. 
alliance partners at^e also taken as threats to their own 
security 
On the other hand the small nations oenerallv face 
oroblems of their survival as an indeoendent entities m the 
international system. Their short cominos are the factors of 
size, Dolitical instability. economic deoenoence on Bio 
18 Powers, linciuistics and ethnic diversities etc. 
The newly independent nations which achieved 
indeoendence, >iu5t after the Second world war faced security 
threats which were mostly indioenous. Where as the securitv 
prevailino in the western world, ionores its internal asoects 
as no western country has faced any severe threat from its 
domestic sides. While most of Third World countries are seen 
bent on develooing and modernizino their war machines on 
western oriented pattern of security by avoidino and lonorino 
the domestic dimensions of security. As Mohammad Ayoob 
observes, " Desoite the rhetoric of many Third World leaders 
the sense of insecurity from which these states and more 
oarticularly their reoimes suffer to such extent from witn m 
1'=? their boundaries rather than from outside" . Althouah he 
does not rule out the existence of external threats. however 
he maintains that "the mi;; of internal and external sources 
17.The United States and the Soviet Union normally consider 
any threats to the security of their allies m NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact resoectively as threats to their own 
national security. 
18.V.V. Sveices. Small Nation Survival. "Political Defence in 
Uneaual conflicts (New Vork M. Y. 1970). P. 26. See al=o 
David Vital. The Survival of Small states. Studies in 
small Power/Great Power conflict (London. 1971;. 
19.Mohammad Ayoob. Reoional Security in Third World, the Worm 
about to Turn ? in International Affairs (London;*. Vol • 
60. No. 1. Winter. 1983/84. P. 43. 
of threats to Third World states structures, and oarticuiarlv 
to their regimes, is quite often heavily weighted in favour 
of internal sources'^". The Third World countries mav be able 
to defend themselves in greater or lesser degree from 
external threats but almost all of them remain vuineraDie to 
internal threats. External threats mostly helo augment the 
Droblems of insecurity that exist with in the state 
boundaries. 
The militarv hardware based security is not aoolicable 
to the third world countries. It has come under vehement 
attack from different Quarters'^ . The greatest oroblems of 
the securitv of the third world countries are politico 
economic and social in character'^'". The economic 
insecurities manifest in draconian ooverty, rising of 
unemployment, massive external debt. endemic sense of 
economic deorivations among the comoeting grouDS are 
oeroetuating this vulnerability of these states. 
The Dolitical and social oroblems are no less 
insignificant than the economic ones. Such tyoes of 
stupendous problems of security concerns of third world are 
not identical with western world but entirely different. As 
a result, since the early 1970s national security began to be 
redefined in the context of the third world countries. It 
was realized that the abstract values of sovereignty and 
territorial inteoritv can not have endurino appeal for hunorv 
20.Ibid. 
21.Michael Renner. "National Securitv the economic ana 
environment Dimensions". World-Watch Paper 1999. 
22.Ibid. 
masses and it is Dovertv not the lack of militarv haraware 
that is resDonsible for insecurity across the southern half 
of the Dlanef^"'. 
Due to such type of orim situation, there is need of 
development in every sphere like, economic, political and 
social and throuoh these developments aporooriate security 
arranciements can be achieved. It is also necessary to revise 
the democratic political order to promote social. political 
and economic institutions, which has collapsed. This is also 
important because our past experience reveals that hioh 
percaoital income is no Guarantee that access of resources 
and opportunities are eoual or eauitabie for ail citizens and 
thus economic orowth. in narrow sense has neither ushered in 
24 democratic political order nor made it secure 
In the aoe of science and technolOQV the concent of 
securitv is not onlv confined to internal or external aspects 
but it has expanded to include environmental crisis, that has 
become a ma.ior threat to the survival of human beinos. The 
environmental niohtmares aoe such as deforestation. soil 
erosion, acidification. desertification, global warmino 
induced by green house effect: depletion of the ozone layer, 
etc. Recently Rio-De-Jonerio summit on environment 
protection portraved the oreat concern of humanity towaras 
23.Mohammad Avoob - oo.cit. 
24. Ahmad Musaffer. Economic Development. F'olitical 
Modernisation and internal securitv: A Review if certain 
conceptual issues in M.Abdul Hafis and M. Izammur Rehman 
Khan (ed.) Development Politics and Security the Third 
World Context (Dhka) P. 15 B11.33. 1990. 
10 
this threat. Now it seems that threats to securitv mav arise 
less from the relationshio of nation to nation and more from 
25 the relationshio of man to nature ". 
Sacurity In South Asia 
The term South Asia is used for the countries iymo 
South of Himalayas and Hindukush mountain and surrounded by 
the Indian Ocean from three sides'^ . It comorises India, 
(the second most DODUIOUS nation on the earth and Pakistan. 
Banciladesh, Neoal. Sri Lanka. Bhutan and Maldives. Some also 
include even rtfohanistan. while the countries of this reciion 
are differ from each other with reoard to climate race. 
reiiqion and history but they constitute a sinoie reoion and 
Dossess some common features. 1) Most of the countries are 
economically verv poor and majoritv of their oeoDle live 
under poverty line 2) Reliction is a ore-dominant factor in 
these states. Because some of the states like Pakistan and 
Banciladesh was created on relioious basis 3) These countries 
are facinq problems of unemployment. illiteracy. over 
population, ethnicity, communalism, castism. secessionist, 
etc. 4) These countries basically are aoricultural and 
industrially backward. 
Despite the presence of a number of common features the 
countries of South Asia ha.ve not been able to evolve 
cooperative relations and their relations are restrained due 
25.Lester. R. Brown. "Human Needs and Securitv of the 
Nations", Head Line. Series 238, Feb. 1978. PP. 6. 
26.Chandra. Prakash. "Conflict and Cooperation in South Asia 
" Booknives International Relations. 1992. New Delhi. PP. 
425. 
11 
to numerous conflicts. The security of South Asia have over 
the years been adversely affected by the India-Pakistan wars 
and India - China war. The Soviet oresense in Afohanistan 
also affected the region on the otherside. the US naval 
militarv bases in Indian ocean, the Chinese move into Tibet 
have had their imoact on the security of the South Asia. 
As far as national security of SAARC countries is 
concerned, it is more comolicated not only because of their 
border disDutes. inter—State conflicts, aidino and abettino 
of militancy for the violence in other states, terrorits and 
secessionist oroblems. but the nuclear caoability. that has 
dramatically chanoed the security scenario and made more 
complicated the national security of South Asian countries. 
The Extra-Regional threats 
As the extra reoional threats oerceotion is concerned, 
these threats Are oosed with the emeroence of China as a 
nuclear DOwer state, presence of bici powers military bases in 
Indian ocean and the fall out of a oossible nuclear conflict 
at the cilobal level. 
The interventionarv activities of develoo countries in 
the internal affairs of South Asian countries are more 
orominent. The South Asian countries like other Third World 
countries at^e economically socially and oolitically backward, 
and this backwardness has become a source of exoloitat ion in 
the hands of stronci cowers, oarticularly the developed 
countries of West and the International Monetary 
Oroanisations such as IMF and world bank, which amounted to 
abridoment of their rioht to decide their own ways of 
economic, political and social develooment. The USA from the 
very beqinning after the decolonization used its economic 
assistance prooramme as instrument of coercion to effect 
chances in the oolicies of South Asia countries as cer its 
foreign DO1 icy objectives. 
The transfer of sophisticated arms to Pakistan bv the 
USA and China has influenced the National Security of India. 
China's arms deals and trainino facilities to Pakistan. 
Banciladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka have rised mistrust aoainst 
India's national security as well as whole reoion. 
Intel—State Conflict 
There is hardly any reoion in the World whose countries 
en>ioy. harmonious relations with each other at all times. It 
IB due to fundamental differences m ideas. outlook 
composition, attitudes, capacities, capabilities, hooes and 
expectations. It is an Indian proverb, when there s.re manv 
pots in the kitchen, they will make noise, but when the 
dissonance arise over and above what is normal and natural 
and desirable one must needs look into its orioin. 
The South Asian reoion is consist of innumerable 
languages, diverse habits, customs and traditions, all the 
ma.lor religions of the World and countless ethnic groups etc. 
while the SAARC constituting countries represent an 
integrated civi1isationai area and a single geographical 
landmass except Sri Lanka and Maldives. 
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Thev are linked tooether in relioions. lanouaQes. 
cultural traditions and blood and racial ties. India. 
Pakistan and Banoladesh share similar historical exoeriencee 
and memories arisinci out of the colonial oeriod. All these 
factors constitute as manv inputs in the Generation of intra 
27 
reoional conflicts and tensions 
The intei—State oroblems arise due to demarcations of 
boundaries and distributions of assets and liabilities, and 
cieooraphical contiouity. When there are natural resources 
such as rivers, on which the aoriculture and industry of more 
than one countrv are based it create suspicion over the 
monopoly, as the case of the river Ganoes which crossed 
India.Nepal and Banoladesh. There are other issues such as 
trade and commerce, immioration, employment opportunities and 
of course, refugees movino across borders, seek m o a better 
1 i fe. 
As the core of inter-state conflicts in South Asia lies 
the Indo-Pak oroblems. India and Pakistan have fouoht three 
times and nobody can compietely rule out the possibility of 
these two countries engaginQ in an armed conflict again. The 
just suspended miniwar in the Siachin glacier and the 
continuing tension on Kashmir issue may be keot in mind. The 
Kashmir dispute is the only issue which has complicated the 
Indo-Pak relations. Even after the cold war and the 
conseauent chanoes in world order have not been able to 
27.Acharva. Alka, "Regional Conflict and Securitv in the 
1990s, The Case of South Asia". Strategic Analvsis. Feb. 
1991, Vol. XIII, No. 11, PP. 1251. 
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normalize the issue. The Pakistanis treat the Kashmir 
disDute as evidence of the broken oledcies and Indian 
28 duDlicity'^ . While the Indians consider Kashmir as an 
inteoral part of India and all Pakistani's attemots to raise 
the Kashmir issue at international level. invoke strono 
Indian reactions. With the oassaoe of forty si;-; years, the 
issue has become so comolicated that neither oovernment can 
afford nor to assert its resoective inter oretations. The 
Indian believe that the holdinci of plebiscite couid result in 
the separation of Kashmir from the Indian Union which in turn 
would have an extremely adverse imoact on India'^  . It would 
encouraoe the separatist tendicies in other parts of India 
and also destroy the existing fragile communal harmony. 
The Simla Pact between India and Pakistan outlines the 
basis of settling down the issue. It pledges both sides not 
to resort to force to resolve the issue. But the gradual 
gradual escalation of violence and acrimony which could at 
any time reach the point of no return. given the vested 
interest in maintaining a high level of hostility and an 
inciting violence across borders. 
Other major issue invoking security concern is the 
nuclear issue. Recentlv announcement of former Prime 
Minister, Nawaz Sharif, and other farmer military officers. 
that Pakistan having nuclear capabilities has affirmed that 
28.Cheema. labal Pervais. "Security in South Asia, An 
Approach", South Asia Journal, Vol. 4. No. 3 1991. 
29,Ibid. 
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Pakistan is close to develooino and testing a bomb while on 
the other side India's nuclear caoability is for oeaceful 
DurDose. But many hioh priests of non-oroliferation have 
already convinced both of them for endanoerino the world. 
Neither Qovernment has ever admitted any plans to tread on 
the forbidden oath, yet both accuse each other for advancinp 
towards the eventual weapons acauisition" . 
India exoloded nuclear device in May 1974. and publiciv 
declared that it was a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE* . 
Where as Pakistan's response to the Indian exolosion was a 
combination of both frustrations and aspirations. Since then 
both countries have actively involved in pursuit of nuclear 
capability while publicly denyinci any intentions of weapons 
acquisition. Another determinino factor for the Indian 
nuclear pursuit is the Chinese nuclear policies which is 
already declared nuclear power. 
The Third level of security concerns in South Asia is of 
internal stability and oeace. South Asian reoion is now m 
the prio of sectarian and destructive forces. These are as 
ffluch problems of kashmir. North East Gorkha land and Punjab 
communal ism and castism in India: the ethnic conflict m Sri 
Lankas the Chakmas s problems in Banciladesh. the tarai and 
hill tribes in Nepal, the Nepali orioin in Bhutan and of 
North- West frontier. Baluchistan and Sindhi. Moha.iirs and 
Shia fy. Sunni ethnic violence is Pakisan. All these problems 
30.Ibid. 
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are fast assuming orave dimensions and if thev are not 
tackled properly and in time, they may tear the South Asian 
Societies aoart. 
The SAARC Route to Security 
DesDite the orevalence of internal disturbance and 
external conflict efforts have been under way to obtain a 
deoree of cooperation and harmony in the repion. 
As far as matter of security is concerned, the Steohen 
Cohen describes. "The South Asian security system is an 
insecurity system and the trade offs for each reoional 
Dovernment involve minimizino in Security, not maKimisino 
security. Insecurity, whether due to internal disorder or 
external conflict, has become the norm after 50's and one can 
not honestly say that the situation will radically chanoe for 
better in the foreseable future. Military bureaucracies have 
become an enterenched component of the oolitical order even 
where thev have not taken it over, their civilian allies are 
numerous and oowerful and outside oowers have done orecious 
little to ameliorate the situation'"' , 
The transformation of the insecurity syndrome in South 
Asia into a security system may occur xf the two situations 
emeroe. with suoeroower acouiescence. One of them is if 
India flexes its military muscles to such an extent that its 
nsiohbors do not have much of an ootion other than to accept 
31.Steohen P. Cohen. "Securitv issues in South Asia" Asian 
SurvBV •; Berks lev^ Vol. 15. No. 3. March 19 75. P. 214. 
the heciemonv of India in the reoion. the second is. if India 
aorees to a reoional solution of the oroblems of the area 
bilaterally, and aorees to sacrifice, its vantaoe position in 
dealinci with those oroblems bilaterally. 
As the first oossibility is concerned, India aooears to 
be still half-hearted about attainino a power status 
decidedlv unmatched in the reoion. As k. Subrahmanyam and 
others have oointed out that to attain this, this India must 
oet rid of its reoion oriented military posture. For this 
there is need of acquisition of a military mioht, includino a 
nuclear arsenal and a suitable delivery system, which would 
helD India's imaoe as a oreat oower. It would also, 
neutralise the China factor which olays an important role 
with some of her neiohbors as leveraoe aoainst India. And it 
would earn for India respectability with the ouardians of the 
dominant system of the world there by makino the process of 
•TO 
an India dominated reoional system much simpler'"''". This 
model is more complicated and could .leooardise the reoional 
process. 
Pran Choora in his thesis concerninq "the SAARC route to 
security" emphasized that Pakistan's proposal for a "No War 
Pact" and India s counter proposal for a Friendship Treatv 
could be oeneralised into a reoional securitv svstem to which 
;.2.Richard Niwon interview in Time. which concedino the 
Strategic and diplomatic values of nuclear weapons, 
testified how China is emeroino as a nuclear power 
enhanced latter's respectability with Washinoton. The 
belief that a country of 700 million oeoole with a nuclear 
tooth could no ionoer be ianored worked as a catalyst for 
U.S. review of its China Policy which culminated in 
Nixon s visit to China in 1971. See Time (Chicago;. 
IS 
all SAARC member countries would subscribe with the important 
Drovision that such a system would also contain orovisions 
for mutual inspection for the nuclear facilities of India and 
Pak istan. 
The SAARC oroDOsals ciive importance to non-interventions 
and non-interference in internal affairs amono members 
countries. This orovide a suitable security system in the 
reoion. It is also emohasized that if the provision relatino 
to mutual inspection of nuclear facilities is accepted bv 
India and Paksitan in rioht perspective it would save the 
reoion from makino Naoasaki ?< Hiroshima or Chernobill. 
As the demooraphic and ethnic problems cause disharmony 
amono the reoional states thev also havinci positive elements 
which could contribute to buildino reoional consciousness and 
cooperation. One may recall in this connection the reaction 
of Pakistani Prime Minister Liaoat Ali Khan when his military 
advisor suooested that time was opportune to take military 
action aoainst India. Brushing aside the suooestion. Liaaat 
Ali Khan said, "While you have in mind only militarv and 
strateciic considerations. 1 have to think of the whole of the 
subcontinent. Have you ever realised what would happen to 
the Muslim on the other side in case of an all out war ?""""' 
6eoqraphical situation is another factor that creates 
problems. India is located, at the heart of the reoion. 
33.Quoted by Diwan Barindranath, "Islam as a factor in Indo-
Pak relations, "in T. Lokhanwala. India and contemporary 
Islam Proceedinos of a Seminar. Simla. Indian Institute of 
Advanced Studies. 1971. P. 348. 
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touches almost all the countries of the repion while no two 
other countries have common borders. Beinci the multi-ethnic 
and multi reliciious society that India is. almost all the 
countries in the region find peoole belonoino to their own 
ethnic and relioious cirouo. While no two other countries 
have cross national ethnic orouDs sizable enouoh to be of anv 
conseauence. 
As the South Asian states have followed different tvoe 
of strateciies of nation buildino and have different staoes of 
political development. JAjhile these strateoies. are not oniv 
mutually comolementary but also conflictinp. One s strateoy 
tends to thrive on another's failure. So. it is a need of 
mutual consideration on develoomental strategy. 
After the dramatic chanoes in world scenario, the inter-
state and intra-state relations have shown a marked of 
imorovement. there is no ma.ior inter state conflict in the 
Indian subcontinent after 1971 and war like situations have 
been auicklv defused. As the Indo-Pak confrontation in the 
Siachen Glaciers during 1980's and 1984 and in Kashmir in 
1990. Qn both occasions the situations ware never allowed to 
go out of hand and oolitical leadership steooed uo auicklv to 
ooen a dialooue to resolve disoute. 
At last we can say that the geo-oolitical imoortance of 
the South Asian region is as such, the constituent states 
would eventually have to agree to a security doctrine that 
would helD in view the whole reoion as a sinoie strateoic 
area. At the same time, they would have to realize that if 
they try to make, oolitical caoital out of one another s 
inteorational oroblems they themselves will have to bear the 
fall out. Such tyoe of attitude would lead to a confederacv 
of South Asian States-
2i 
Chapter - 2! 
External Threats to National Security 
AlthouQh National Survival is the orime concern of 
nations, big or small, their national securitv oroblems at^B 
certainlv different. Bio powers. oarticuiarlv nuclear 
Dowers. seldom face the danoer of their territorial national 
sovereignty exceot in the event of a nuclear war. But their 
security oroblems are generalIv affected due to t 
I. threats to the Dosition of domination and hegemonv thev 
en^ iov m the International system. 
II. threats to the control and influence thev manage over 
the decision making orocesses of regional powers and 
smai1 Dowers. 
III. threats to the ideology/value svstem thev believe in 
and want to soread among nations m the international 
domain. 
IV. the securitv orodlems of their allies and alliance 
oartners are also taken as a threat to their own 
security. 
Where as small nations generally face threats to their 
survival as independent entities in the international 
svstem. because of their size. Doiitical instability, 
dependence on the big powers for economic aid and science 
and technological help, linguistic religious and ethnic 
diversities, etc. 
The great powers are the ma.ior component of the world 
politics. who not onlv moderate world politics for tneir 
self interests but also influence the reoionai ooiitics. In 
the course of their Dolitical strategic militarv 
suoerioritv. economic, social, scientific and technolopical 
advancement. thev dominate the world scenario. and tneir 
attachment towards anv specific reoion vanes from time to 
time according to the reoions oeo-oolitical and strateoic 
imoortancB. 
The cieo-strateoic imoortance of South Asia. and its 
ad>ioinino regions of the strategical Iv crucial oil rich gulf 
on the West and the economicalIv burgeoning Asia - Pacific 
on the east and the Indian ocean on the South contmuousiv 
affected regional Dolitics. but direct and indirect 
interventions by the great Dowers have greativ comolicated 
intra-regional relations. 
During the cold War oeriod both two suoer oowers were 
involved in expanding their oower and influence in the 
Southern Asia. However, the South Asia was not given so 
much imoortance bv the United States. But. the exoansion of 
Communist blocks towards South led the United States ana 
other capitalist countries to form its defensive alliances 
with reoionai countries like CEATO. CENTO. Baghdad Fact and 
ANJOS. etc. 
On the other side, it is permanent nature of intra ana 
inter states military, ethnic, religious conflicts and the 
under development of the third world provided opportunities 
to the big oowers to exploit these situations to protect and 
ej'itend their resoective ooliticai and economic values in the 
third world. 
External threats and interventionary Activities 
The real threats to security in South Asia with the 
chanoed atmosohere do not arises so much from a direct 
oroanised reoular inter state war as from other forms of 
conflict such as oroxv war. The fifteen years old Afohan 
war and cold war dimensions have produced two fall out 
effects on the security situations which has e>;tenaed to the 
whole reciion: the remarkable orowth of druo traffickino ana 
Droliferations of small arms and minor weaoons. 
Both the U.S. and Soviet Union ooured huoe Quantities 
of weaoonrv into the reoion. Other countries inciuaino 
China and Israel also suDolied large Quantities of weaoons. 
These were Kalashmikov assault rifles, oowerful machine Quns 
and rocket launchers, orenades and exolosive and land mines, 
lethal shoulder fired surface to air missiles <SAMs) like 
Stmoers. strella and BlowDioes. A laroe orooortion of 
these weaoons have found their way into the hand of non-
state actors in Pakistan and Afohanistan which is oeneraliv 
referred as Kalashnikov culture . Whatever the US. Pakistan 
and their allies were doino inreoard to Afghanistan has now 
1. Jas.iit Sinoh, "Post Cold War Security Situations in 
Southern Asia". Strategic Analysis Aoril 1994. 
been adoDtea by F'akistan as its strateov to destablize 
India. throucih trans border train inci. infiltration and 
suDOort of militancy, violence and terrorism throuoh the 
use of these weaoons. The threat to the security of the 
state and civil societv has been further aooravated tav the 
iinkaoes of weaoons oroliferations with drug traffickmo. 
monev and oatronaoe. 
Ma.iority of the Third World countries became victims. 
directly or indirectlv of the U.S. and Soviet domination in 
the international politics. And their Cold War struDoie 
gave the birth of a process which initiated, encouraged ana 
contributed to the arms build-uo activities in the inaian 
sub-continent. The oermanent conflicting nature of the 
region has given suooort to the armament activities and 
ODDortuni t ies to the great oowers to e;;tend their oowers and 
influence in South Asia. The arms sale and assistance 
became the permanent instrument of their foreign Poiicies." 
Other ma.ior oowers like France. Britains. Israel and China 
are also involved m arms build UD activities in the region. 
Both the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union deliberately 
initiated an arms race in the region by oroviding the laroe 
Quantity of scohisticated Weaoons to the mam orotagonists 
of the region, oroviding military aid to Pakistan had oeen 
the Drincioal instrument of U.S. oolicy m the region". Not 
2. R. Rama Rao. "Arms Supolies as an instrument of Foreion 
Policy". USI Journal. April-June. 1975. P. 125-146. 
3. Jayantanuja Bandvaoadhvava. "Makino of India s Foreion 
Policy". New Delhi. 1980. D. 14. 
onlv this, the U.S.A. also souoht Pakistan to .-join miiitarv 
alliances as oart of its Global strugole to restrain the 
exDansion o-f Soviet influence m the reoion. fhe Soviet 
intervention in Afohanistan in 1979 and the same time 
Iranian revolution led to the U.S. Soviet comoetition in the 
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reoion . therebv creatino not onlv an acute sense ot 
insecurity, tension, mutual su.soicion amono the countries of 
South Asia, but also to the oroiiferation of miiitarv nara 
ware in the region. 
Where as the United States oursued the DDIICV of 
military aid and alliance with Pakistan, it also endeavored 
for estabiishinci its military bases in the region. The U.S. 
established a miiitarv base at Peshawar m West Pakistan for 
miiitarv intelligence operations, particuiarlv to monitor 
the Soviet nuclear and missile testing". Though the base 
was closed down m late 1960s the U.S. desire for 
establishing bases in the region continued. Sri Lanka s 
strateoic locations in the Indian ocean esoeciailv its 
natural harbour Trincomaiee became the oart of U.b. 
Strateoic manoeuvdenno in the region. It alreadv had a 
broad casting facilities in Sri Lanka. 
For Soviet Union the South Asia is one of the most 
imoortant region is third world. India olaved an important 
Dolitical and economic role in Soviet s considerations. 
4. A.I. Akram. "Securitv and Stabilitv in South Asia". m 
Steohen P. Cohen t.ed.) The Securitv of South Asia: 
American and Asian Persoectives. Vistaar Pub. 1988. P. 
171-172. 
5. Jayantanu^a Bandvaoodhava. OD. cit. P. 285. 
While there has been some reservations in the enthusisnism 
of the Indo-Soviet connections, it remains imoortant and has 
been the subject of more attentions than anv other tniro 
world tie. The Soviets also had imoortant interest m 
Pakistan, Even durino the Afcihanistan crises. Moscow was 
careful to keeo channels ooen to Islamabad. On the 
authorised. Pakistan also recoonises the value of QOOO 
relations with Russia and eKoected to resoond to new Soviet 
overtures m the DOst fiohtmci in Afohanistan. No douDt 
Russia will remain an imoortant presence. Probablv the most 
imoortant external security presence in South Asia. 
The China presence in this sub-continent as a military 
power is another threat to the securitv to the South Asia, 
esoeciallv for India. After 1962. Sino-lndo war. China 
started suooort to neiohborino countries aoainst Inaia. 
The external regional oowers have not directIv threatened or 
intervened militarv aoainst the securitv of 3AARC countries. 
But they have intervened indirectly: Drovidmg assistance 
to the SBoaratist movements in the reoions, collaboratinc in 
couD deetates and some times throuQh the demonstrative use 
of armed forces aoainst the action of a hostile countrv or 
to assure suooort to a friendly countrv for its action. 
Since verv beoinnincf the United States is involved in 
such activities, but its level of involvement could not be 
confirmed authenticaiIv because their covert activitv are 
not well recorded. 
The strateoic imoortance of Pakistan du.rino the cold 
war and after that hardly went down in the eye of Pentaoon, 
Pakistan is more imoortant to check anv deveiooment in 
central Asia and the Persian 6u.lf zone against to Unitea 
States. And within Pakistan, it is the militsrv Junta which 
in Washington 5 oerceotions orovides both stability-' and 
reliability. The offer to release a fresh fleet of F-i6 
along with other eouioment to uograde the Pak. Air Force 
serves the double ouroose of Dacifyino America s most 
trusted and durable element with Pakistan and also 
strengthenino a very imoortant watch tower for the US 
strategy in this important region. The suooly of 
SDDhisticated weaoons and financial aid to Pakistan by the 
U.S. has threatened the security of the region. 
The external regional involvement in India a ever 
troubled north eastern region came on the surface with the 
Dublication of some reoorts. A reoort on tne Western 
involvement in India s north-eastern region ana a circular 
from the US Information Aoencv on the same theme indicate 
that there were efforts to create a United and Independent 
Benoal comDrising East Pakistan. West Bengal. Assam. 
Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Sikkim and Bhutan. Accordino to 
the report "the Separatists were counting upon the United 
States and other western powers to give them necessarv 
assistance. Thev were confident that these powers wouia be 
interested in establishing an mdeoendent state in Soutn 
East Asia, which could heio to normalize situation their ana 
would Drovide a shield apainst the Chinese aooression"""'. 
The circular entitled "Pro.iect BranmaDutra", issued bv the 
United States International communication Aoencv stated that 
the Boeciai research ceil of the Georoe Washinpton 
Universitv with the aoDroval of the State Deoartment had 
detailed a number of teams of investioations to conduct 
research in North Eastern India, Sikkim. Bhutan with the aim 
of throwino lioht on the the public ooinion m these reoions 
to establish in what measures, the present status of these 
reoions remain acceotabie or whether they are indications 
that the formation of a new state is a current oroblem . 
Whatever be the authenticitv of these reoorts. it would not 
be ruled out that the United States was not that isolarea in 
involvino in the conflict of India s north eastern reoion. 
India in her white oaoer, issued on Pun.iao oroblem. 
blamed Pakistan and other unnamed external DOwers for aidino 
S 
and abettinci to the militants in Pun,iab . Some of the 
leaders of Sikh separatist oroanisations who were ooeratinp 
abroad claimed the suooort of the United states for 
separatist cause in Punjab'. Once, the U.S. Ambassador m 
India. Harrv Bames eouated the Sikh terrorist demand for 
Khalistan with the freedom struople of the people of Puerto 
6. V.L.K. Sarin. "India's North East in Flames. Vikas, Pub. 
House, N. Delhi 1980, P. 24-26. 
7. Nirmal Nibedon, N.-E India : The Ethnic EMoiosion. 
Lancer International - New Delhi, 1981, P. 170, Urmila 
Phadnis, Ethnic itv and Nations - Bui Id m o m 3. Hsia. 
Saoe Pub. New Delhi 1990, 
8. White Paper on Pun.iab Aciitation. Government of India 
Press, New Delhi. 1984. P. 54-58. 
9. Ibid. 
RiCD ". Recently, in 1994 the U.S. Presiaent Mr. MI 11 
Clinton e>!Dressed his anxietv in resDonse to American 
Parliamentarian Pick Fo.-j.'jeio and Garrv Codit s letter on 
human riohts violence in Pun,iab. All these reoorts Ar-B the 
indication of U.S. suoport in Pun.-jab crisis. 
On Kashmir issue, A oroDramme titled "Seed of Terror" 
brouDht out by the Canadian Broadcastino Corooration some 
time aciO. in 1994, clearly linked terrorism in the Kashmir 
state with the U.S.. deaiino with the ISI (Inter Services 
Intelligence) to intensify the Afghan war. The Drooramme 
had the U.S. ambassador. Mr. Edward Peck statino that tne 
CIA knew a fair amount of details reoardino Pakistan s 
terrorist activities. The former Deoutv Director of CIA and 
later, its Director. Mr. Robert Gates, disclosea that in 
1990. the Pakistan President was asked to close camos 
oroviding training to oeoole for carrvino out ooerations in 
Kashmir and Pun.iab. In same Drooramme a former US commando 
trainer revealed some informations reoardino Sikh s 
terrorist Dlans. The above mentioned matter are enouoh to 
indicate that the Americans who were aware of the 151 s 
terrorist activities were oreoared to overlook these as lono 
as Pakistan 131 served the US interest in the Afohan war. 
The Clinton administration s view that the j •:-: K State 
is a disputed area, as US Assistant Secretarv of state for 
10. Satoa.l Dana, oo.cit. 
South Asia. rlE. Robin Raohei has eouatea that Kashmir is a 
disDuted area and Kino Hari Smoh s "instrument of 
accession" has no relevance: and also iinkmo the Kasnmir 
Droblem with Afohanistan and Bosnia, confirmed that she has 
invited to international communitv to interfere in Kashmir. 
Not onlv Ms. Raohel expressed her view on Kashmir. taut U5 
President Mr. Bill Clinton has also declared kashmir DroDlem 
among world ma.ior oroblems. and in his resoonse to a 
Kashmiri leader Gulam Nabi Furds letter he said that the 
showed much anxietv over the "violation of riohts to 
Kashmiries bv the securitv forces. The CiintDn 
administration s comments on the Kashmir issue have. 
encDuraoed the terrorists in the vallev. and hurt the cause 
of human riohts in India. By failino to criticise Pakistan 
for its suDDort to terrorism in the state, the US seems to 
have ciiven Pakistan a clean chit as well. 
Other than these covert U.S. involvement it has used 
its armed forces two times in the region first in 1962. the 
nuclear air craft carrier U.S.S. Enterorise was dispatched 
to the Bay of Benoal to demonstrate suDoort for India in its 
war with China. .lust after nine years in l971. the 
enterorise again reached into the Bav of Benoai. out tnis 
time It was aoainst India and in suoDort of Pakistan as well 
as to imoress uoon China that the U.S. would suooort its 
allies . In the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka. besides 
11. Steohen. P. Cohen. "India With in the REoion", Seminar 
No. 287, Julv 1983. P. 33. 
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the involvement of the U.S.A., it's imoortant a.ilv Israel 
helDS ethnic QPOUDB throuoh its mtel1loence aoencies hossad 
and Shinbeth. The former memDers of the Britain = elite 
SDecial Air Service Reoiment are also involved ^. 
A secessionist movement was mstioated bv Britain in 
1960's m Maldives "'. A olot was oroanised to overthrow the 
DDvernment of Maldives in 1989 COUD. in wnich some 
DDDDSition orouDS suDDorted by some eMternai aoencies were 
14 involved 
The covert interventlonarv activities bv the Soviet 
Union is not as much as that of U.S.A. s involvement in 
South Asia. But its involvement Afohanistan and oresence in 
Indian ocean has threaten South Asian security. The Soviet 
Union s attitude reciardino the Baluch and Pakhtoon 
seoaratist movements in Pakistan is not much incorrioible. 
Its close allies Afohanistan and Irao were orovidea Doth 
economic and military suooort for the Pakistani seoaratist 
15 Pakhtoon and Baluchi movement . in the Banoladesh crisis 
of 1971, the Soviet Union suDDorted India apamst 
Pakistan 
12. For detail - G.P.V. Samaratne. "Test of Friendsnxo s Sri 
Lanka - Israel Relations", Aauinas Journal, '-i/oi, 6. No. 
1. P. 84. 14. Jane Henter. "Sri Lanka and Israeli 
Connection". Lanka Guardian Vol. 11. No, 2. 15 mav. 
1988. 
13. J. P. Anand, "The Maldives and Gan Staomo Post". 
Vikrant. New Delhi, Feb. 1975. P. IS. Uma Snankar 
F'hadnis. Maldives. The Land of Worders and Woes. 
Hindustan Times, May 4. 1981. 
14. Urmilas Padnis - OD. cit. 
15. Urmila Padnis - Ibid. 
16. Summit Ganouly, "The Roots of conflicts in South Asia, 
p 1 "•';"' 
China's interest in South Asia is determined bv its 
olobal tactical and strategic considerations m context of 
its relations with the U.S.A.. Russia and India. 
If any extra-reciional Dower has threatened the national 
securitv of South Asia, that is China. After Sino-Indo war 
of 1962, China started intervenino m the affairs of South 
Asian countries. esDeciaily aoainst India, The Sino-Inoian 
hostility for boundary disDute is one of the constant 
features of the oiobai scene. 
The Chinese. threat to India s national security is 
manifested in three broad patterns ' : 
a) the acauisition of nuclear caoabiiitv followed bv 
conventional military strength, 
b) buildino UD a network of roads and communication 
systems m the strateoic Tibet-Zinklano region, olacino 
missiles and deoiovment of troons in Tibet ana 
construction of the strategic Karakkoram Hiohwav 
iinkmo it with Pakistan throuon occuoied Kashmi r'FOK.) 
region. 
c) and. finally, the foroino of a strateoic relation snio 
with Pakistan. The Pak-Sino boundary treaty of 19o3, 
the suDport to Pakistan in the Indo-Pak conflicts of 
1965. and 1971 and arms transfers to Pakistan, 
17. P.S. Javaramu. "India's National Security and Foreion 
Policv". 
The Nuclear threat:- Humiliation of India at the hana= of 
tRi Chinese in 1962 deveiooed a strono sense of insecuntv 
in the minds of its leaders, that increased much D V the 
acDUisition of nuclear caoabilitv by China. But the Chinese 
pDvernment's statement that the develooment of the nuclear 
weaoon was intended to orotect it-selt trDm the aanoers of a 
1ft 
nuclear war oosed by the United btates and Soviet Union ~, 
The Qrowmo conventional militarv strenpth in cDmoarison to 
India is also a ma,ior threat to the securitv of India. 
India s former E'efence Minister Swaran S m o h told tne 
Parliament that the main threat to India from China 
continued to be not so much from her nuclear deveioDment as 
19 from her conventional weaoons and armv . The Dorder 
clashes that took olace between India and China m the DOst-
Nehru oeriod'^". pointed to serious danoer that India faced 
from a militarilv powerful China. 
The Chinese threat reached at a oreater extent in the 
Seventies when China advanced her nuclear arms and deoloved 
some of them in Tibet, Reoorts of installation of a raaB.r 
comolex in Western Tibet in Teethuno Viilaoe. an area which 
constituted a securitv belt for India aiono the Tibet Nepal 
21 border settino up of a laroe number of bases with missile 
carrvino capabilities'"". and the construction of the 
18. The Chinese Government Statement. Bei.linp Review, vol, 
7. Nos. 42. 16 Oct.. 1964. PP. ii~iii. 
19. India 5 Nuclear Dilemma - G.C. Mirchandani, Citea m , 
P.S. Javaramu•s India's National Securitv and Foreion 
Policv. 
20. Report. 1966-o7. India s Ministrv of Defence. 
21. The Hindustan Times \N. Eielhi). 4 March 1973. 
22. Ibid. 
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Htrateoic KDnoaka bridoe across the BrahmaDutra rxver. oniv 
eiQht miles from the Indian border of Arunachal F'radesh'" ' 
were some of the develoDments which affected Inaia s 
environment in the reoion. 
Another deveioDment in the seventies in which aftectea 
India's secu.ritv was the comoletion of the Karakoram hionwav 
bv China iinkino it with Pakistan Dassinp throuoh the PaK 
OccuDied Kashmir. 
The boundarv Drobiem constitutes a ma.ior disoute 
between India and China. The two sides have been oivinp 
diveroent views reoardinci the boundarv. The Indian side 
insisted on the Mc Mohan line as its boundarv in the eastern 
sector. The Chinese claimed the foot of the hills as their 
boundary. Instead of ail these oroblems. China started 
heloincj to the seoaratist movements in the north-eastern 
repion of India. China established its relation with Naos 
seoaratists in mid 1960s and provided them miiitarv trainino 
especially the art of Guerrilla tactics aoainst the moaern 
24 
weaoonrv' . It was reoorted m 1933 about Naoors miiitarv 
•7'5 
traminp camo at Yunan in China'^ . Durinp the Banpiadesh 
crisis in 1971. China provided extensive diolomatic. 
economic and military support and even threatened to 
intervene miiitarv the crisis in favour of Pakistan 
23. Amrita Basar Patrika '.Calcutta) IS. Peb.. 19~^. 
24. Neville Maxv-jeil India, The Naoas and the North East. New 
Edition. Minoritv Rioht Groups, London, 1988. P'P. 12-13. 
Nirmal Nibedon, OD.cit. PF'. 51-54. 
25. India Today. 30 Sep. 1983. P. 24-25. 
26. Barrv N. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, D P . ci t. F', 203. 
Another ma.ior securitv Droblem to South Asia since the 
sixties 15 the imoact of bici Dower rivalry m Indian ocean 
on India s securitv Stratepic environment. TraoitlonaiIv 
Indian ocean constituted the oassape for India s trade and 
other its neiohbors with the external worlds but its 
imoortance increased after the oil crisis of 1973. when 
imoort of the crude oil from the Sulf rep ion ranoed to two 
thirds of nations total oil imoorts. The Indian securitv 
also came into focus in 1965. when Indonesia offered to 
Pakistan to carry out diversionarv naval attacks on the 
Indian territories of Andamans and Nicobar islands"" . A 
aominant U.S.A. oresence in the Indian ocean. Evmoathetic to 
Pakistan adverselv affected India s securitv. The U.S.A. 
decision to move its naval aircraft carrier. Enterorise into 
Bay of Benpal m December 1971 m favour of Pakistan 
confirmed Indian fears, that led India to olav active role 
for convertinp the Indian ocean into a Zone of Peace. 
The securitv of the South Asian countries is also 
threatened due to economic exoloitat ion by the biQ oowers. 
As Chester Bowles observed, the US economic aid to Third 
World countries, since the Second World War. had been Qiven 
for the lepitimate Duroose of defence but in effect as a 
bribe to oersuade the recioient povernment to suooort U.S. 
29 foreian DDIICV . He ooints out the incident of India s 
27. OD.c1t. 
2S. Javari tamu.ia Bandvooadhvaya, ''Makinp of India s Foreion 
Policv". New Delhi, 1980, oo.cit. 287-86. 
foDd crisis of 1965-66. when the U.S. President Johnson used 
Wheat shioments as a ieveraae to oressurise India to take a 
tolerant view of the U.S. military activities in Vietnam""'. 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi once said that "aithouoh oriomailv 
conceived of as external assistance for suoolementino the 
self helD measures of develoDino countries we tiB.ye found 
that it is often used by some donor oovernments as an 
instrument to enforce their short term Doiicv objectives and 
to secure Dolitical and economic concessions unrelated to 
our develooment"'• . The U.S.A. has also attemoted to coerce 
Sri Lanka to abrooate its rubben for rice. F'act of 1952 
. " • , 1 
with China 
Other than the use of economic assistance for ooiiticai 
ob.iectives, the U.S. on many occasions has aoolied economic 
sanctions ooenlv to put pressure on the taroet states to 
effect changes is their oolicies in accordance with the U.S. 
foreion policy ob-jectives. In the 19605 the U.S. economic 
leveraoe was brouoht to bears aoamst Sri Lanka to force 
compensation for the eMorooriation of assets of U.S. 
petroleum'"'"", The economic sanctions were also imposea on 
India. (1979-82). Pakistan il979-S0) for their refusal to 
siQn the Nuclear Non Proliferation 'Treatv i. NPT j "'••' aoain m 
29. Ibid. 
•50. Ibid. 
31. Gamini Navaratne. West Happy with SAARC Fiasco. The 
Times of India Nov. 11. 1991. 
32. Kimberiv A Elliott. "Economic sanctions'". In Peter J, 
Schracder. oo.cit.. P. 187. 
33. Ibid. 
1990 Pakistan faced such lolt under Pressiev Act. In 19^2 
U.S. imDDsed sanctions aoainst India under Suoer 301 and 
soecial 301 which was eased in 1994. but sanctions reiatinc 
to duty free imoorts under the Generalised Soecial 
Preference <63P) law imoosed earlier on about 80 mi 11 ion 
34 
worth of goods per year will remain 
The GSP benefits affect Indian druos and chemicals ana 
thev vjould continue to be costlier in the U.S., Duttina 
Indian manufacturers at a disadvantaoe. On Mav 11. 19v2. 
the U.S. imposed sanctions for two years aoamst. Indian 
Soace Researcn Oroanisation <ISRC0 and the Russian Soace 
agency Glavkosmos for their refusal to comolv with the U.S. 
demands to cancel a deal involvino the sale of Russian 
advanced cryogenic rocket motor technology to India, and out 
Dressure on India not to deoiov the short ranoe Pritnvi 
missile and also stoo all further develooment of the medium 
ranoe Aoni missile. The U.S. also took the lead in uromg 
other western cowers to call on India to give UD its missile 
Drogramme""-. Other ounitive steo undertaken Dv the US in 
the last few year against India were its ODDOsition to the 
sale of Inaian rice to Cuba. sale oi nuclear researcn 
reactor to Iran and erection of barriers against tne entrv 
of Indian Fharmacenticai and chemical Droduct ana sionon 
cloth into the U.S. market. 
34. Sunday Times, Seo.. 1994. 
iSi The Hindustan Times. Auoust 30. 1994. 
The U.S. sanctions aoainst ISROS Dlovkosmos and aoamst 
China and Pakistan on M-li issue are^ m consonance with its 
Diotaal stratBQv for denv technoiooies to the third world 
countries in order to keeo them under develooed and with in 
the control of the develooed first world. Thev are also in 
tune with its desire to rule over the olobe to shaoe the 
world accordinci to its likino and to assume tne role of a 
plobal COD to orotect and oromote its interests in the 
world 
The economic weaKness of the Soviet Union and China 
orobabiv restrained them to use economic assistance as a 
means for coercino the SAARC countries. But the 
interventionarv activities bv these two countries in 
economic affairs of SAARC could not be ruled out. The 
Soviet Union orovided economic assistance iarpelv to Inaia. 
and China to Pakistan to keen them under their resoective 
influence. 
The South Asian countries, at one time or the other, 
have also faced the oroblems while seekino loans from the 
IME. World Bank and other world financial apencies. The 
conditions which BXS imoosed directiv or indirectly and 
which lead to the curtailment of loan seekino country = 
36. It was with this intention that the Western Countries 
led by the U.S. established a COCOM in 1949 in order to 
restrict the export of a laroe number of materials and 
technologies to the third world countries. Tne Br-etton 
Wood GATT MTCR etc. were also established keeoinci in 
view the same intentions. See the Third World 
Resuroence, No. 9, 1991, Chark ravarthi Raohavan oo.cit. 
economic indeDendence are clearlv interventionarv activities 
as the elements of coercion and comoulsion which thev exert 
fall within the realm of economic intervention. 
The IMF loans to India in 1974 and 19S1 were sub,iect to 
conditions relatino to the introduction of liberalization in 
Indian ec on omv ~ • 
The new exchanoe role oolicv trade policv. inoustrial 
policy and bu.doet for 1991-92 were the documents drafted at 
the instance of the IMF for oettmo loans from MAF under the 
structural ad.iustment Dropramms to meet balance of oavment 
crisis. The devaluation of Indian currencv is also 
attributable to the pressure e;;erted bv the IMF and the 
World Bank. Sri Lanka also reelino under the impact of the 
IMF conditional i ties displacinci all subsidies on food. fuel, 
fertilizer and wealth service. It was forced bv the IMF and 
7. p. 
the World Bank combined to liberalise its economic oolicv'". 
The existence of World Trade Oroanisation ^wTu> chanoea 
form of 6ATT, (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs foi- s 
Fair International Svstem of Trade ) has been sioned, there 
IS a stronq feelino of insurity and u.ncertamtv about the 
nature of the svstem set of emeroe. It is no hidden tnat a 
hand full of WTO's rich members have much of a sav in it= 
37. Ritu Sharma. "India s Autonomv and American Foreion 
Assistance. Politics, of Uneven Eouation. "Strateoic 
Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 7. Oct.. 1991. p. 827. Caroline 
Thomas. Third World Attitude to the Non-Intervention 
Norm. "The Non~Alipned World. Vol. 11, No. 4. Oct, Dec. 
1984.. P. 489-90. 
38. Gamini Navaratne, "West HaoDV with SAARC Fiasco''. The 
Times of India. New Delhi. 11 Nov,. 199. 
decision makmo and dorninte it= DroceedinQS. witn the rest 
of its members will alwavs mute listeners who end LID 
acceotino the decisions and deals favored bv the :--icn 
minoritv. South Asian countries also will not be free from 
its imoact. 
If the 1iberalisations of economv Does not show an 
UDshowinq in the immediate futures, that could have serious 
reoercuESions. The cut in oubiic exoenditure could lead to 
a worseninci of the unemoloyment oroblem. The fall is the 
real income of the oeoole in the poorer strata could lead to 
serious aoitations culminatinp in riots. So it is oreet 
need to follow a suitable economic oolicv that can lead to 
all SAARC members countries towards develoomentai 
activities. 
DruD traffickino is a new ohenomenon that nas 
threatened South Asian security. Beino one of the world s 
three laroest aruc orowinci areas, the Golden Crescent 
(Pakistan Afohanistan. Iran border) and second the Golden 
Triangle. \Mvannmor. Thai lands. Loas border) has created 
problem, E>ruQ cultivations and trafficking enoanded 
dramatically in Pakistan - Afghanistan region since the late 
1970s. Drug money issued by Pakistan s inter Servnces 
Intel licence tISI) to finance terrorism in Kasnmir, provide 
weaoons to the anti Robbaini factions in Afonanistan and 
also to acauire v^eaoons for three services. Accord i no to a 
report of U.S. Drug Control Programme, the most orobiem 
level of narcotics Droduction is about 2200 tonnes a ^ear 
"1 
and the number of manutactunno units near about 5O4 locate 
a mostlv in F'akistan . It is an alarmino view of tne 
Droblem and need to take immediate action^ 
Otherthan external threats and the^  intervent lonarv 
activities undertaken bv the extra-reolonsl Dowers in SAARC, 
the member countries are themselves involved in such tvoe of 
activities. Now it has become a common ohenomenon to blame 
each other for their internal troubles and Drob 1 ems. 
The qeo-Dol1tical imoortance has provided a oredominant 
status to India, followed bv Pakistan, while others remaineo 
like the oerioheral countries in the reoion. F'akistan witn 
ail its animositv towards India was verv keen from the verv 
beoinnino in disturbino the reoional status QUO m which the 
balance of Dower was m favour of India. In doino so 
Pakistan sought the external assistance <.u.S.£< China,' for 
comoensatinci its inferioritv in reciional balance of oower ' " , 
It also oot involved in India s internal crobiems bv 
encouraqinci, instigatinci and Drovidino assistance to the 
cessionist forces. 
On the authorised India's interest is in Dreservino and 
DBroetuating the regionai status QUO. So the strenotnenino 
Dt its oreoonderant oiacement in the reoion became a maoor 
39. The Hindustan Times. 'US Concern over Druo Trade". iS 
December. 1994. 
40. S.D. Muni, DD.c1t.. Steohen P. Cohen 'Pakistan. CDDIDD 
with Reoional Dominance, Multiole crisis and oreat oower 
confrontations in Ra.iu G.C. Thoman ea. the oreat Power 
Triangle and Asian Secu.ritv". Lexmoton Books. Toronto. 
1983. P. 47-64. 
foreion Doiicv ofc/iBctive. For dDino so it cherishea the 
ooal of keeoiriD the recnon free from e>;i;ra reoionsl 
influence and interference. In order to keeo the reciion 
free from externa1 powers. India conceived the oarameters of 
defence not actualiv ivinp at its own boundaries but at the 
41 boundaries of its neiphbors 
Indo-Pak. War 
Since partitions. both countries have fouoht three 
wars, two on Kashmir issue in 1947-43 and another in 1965 
and third in 1971 on East Pakistan issue. Within a few 
months after partition. India and Pakistan were locked in a 
conflict resultino from an invasion of the Kashmir vailev m 
October 1947. by the armed tribesmen with the suDOort of 
42 Pakistan Government » The then Mahara.ia reauested for ne-lo 
from India. India responded to his reauest and sent troops 
to save Kashmir^ Because of its peooraDhical position with 
its frontiers with three countries the Soviet Union. 
China and Afphanistan, Kashmir is intimatelv connected with 
securitv and the international contracts of India. Securitv 
41. Pratha S. Ghosh. Conflict and Cooperation in South Asia 
P.221. Manohar Publications. New Delhi. 
42. See. J.C.L. Nehru's Broadcast to the nation on 2 Nov.. 
1947 his statement to the constituent Assemblv. New 
EJelhi. 25 Nov.. 1947 and 7 Sep. 194S. where in he 
referred to the belated admission bv Pakistan of its 
role m the railers. invasion in Nehru. No. 24. PF,, 157-
5S and 191-200, The Times '-.London.' reported on i3 
Januarv 1948. "That Pakistan is unofficialIv involved in 
aiiflino the raiders is certain, lour corresponaent has 
first hand evidence that arms, ammunition ana supplies 
are beino made valuable to the Asad Kashmir Forces"'. 
Quoted in SIS or Gupta. Kashmir - A Studv in India 
Pakistan Relations <BDmbav, 196c) P. 116. 
and econD/Tiic interests led the orocess of Kashmir s 
accession to India and Kashmir is an inteoral oart of India. 
When in 1943 crisis ended. F'akistan occuDied about 5000 SQ 
miles of Indian territory, that came to be known as "Azad 
Kashmir. Accession of Kashmir, accordino to Pakistan. is 
illeoal and she demands for self determinations of the 
oeoDle of J ?-: K on the basis of successive UN resDlutions 
callino for a free and impartial olebiscite. After 1971 
war. which fouoht bv India apainst Pakistan was in favour of 
Banoladesh. After end of war. The 1972 Shimla Aoreement 
was Sioned. that committed India and Pakistan to out an end 
to the confrontation between them and to work towards a 
durable oeace. it bound them to refrain from the threat or 
use of force in violations of the new line of control (LOG) 
in Jammu and Kashmir, and to meet and discuss to settle 
their dispute bilateral with out suDoort of anv third oartv 
and Kasnmir issue will not be internationalized. But 
Pakistan alwavs raises Kashmir issue on international forum 
such as UN securitv council. General Assembiv. Human Rioht 
Commission meetincis, QIC. Islamic Summit etc.. but she nss 
failed to oet international suDDort. Recentlv. F'akistan 
Prime Minister Mrs. Benazir Bhutto issued a threat to India 
to unleash a third war to anne>! Kasnmir. Her statement to 
London, based Alwasat, is an attemot to boost the saooinD 
47. 
morale of the militants m Kashmir ". 
43. The Hindustan Times - New Delhi. 7 Jan. 1995. 
Since 1964. India and Pakistan have enoaoea in sDoraaic 
battles over the control of the Sxachen Glacier in 
44 Kashmir . In December 1987, DOor communicatiDns and mutual 
misoerceotion almost led to war, and by the sorina of 199C> 
manv exoected a subcontinental nuclear war between tne 
two 
The most important issue at present facino South Asia 
13 the nuclear proliferation in the reoion and its imoact on 
the security environment. The Southern Asian reoion nas 
nuclearised since 1964 when China, became nuclear weaoon 
state, an other deveioDment to wards nuceiarisation started 
when both U.S. t-. U.S.S.R. started their militarv dases in 
the Indian ocean loaded with nuclear weaoon in missiles, but 
after dissolution of U.S.S.R.. nuclear threat to Soutnern 
Asian Security increased because some indeoenaent states of 
U.S.S.R. located in Central Asia havino nuclear ootentiai. 
and their linkaaes with Islamic World has oiven Doostmo to 
Qo to have nuclear weaoon. As far as South Asia is 
concerned, its two oiants Pakistan i-. India. both have 
acauired the technolooical caoabilitv to orotiuce nuclear 
weaoon5. India tested an atomic device in 1974. but 
refrained there after from oroceedino with a nuclear weaoons 
DroQramme. Its nuclear Drooramme is for oeaceful ourooses. 
On the other hand. Pakistan has acauired nuclear caoabilitv 
44. J. Mohan Malik. "India Cooes with the Kremlines Fail. 
"Orb IS Vol. 37. No. 1. tWinter 93) PP. 78-79. 
45. Sumit 6anpulv. "Avoidmo a war m Kashmir. Foreion 
Affairs" Vol. fa9. No. 5. ^ 1990-9. Winter*. PP. 57-7-3, 
as well as nuclear weapons as 1.1 was revealed bv the •tormef-
Pakistani Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif and other nioh 
nuclear scientists like Dr, Oudir Khan that PaKistan is 
havinq nuclear bomb, but Pakistan Qovernment savs. it is 
baseless recort and Pakistan is not havino any nuciear 
weaoon. If it is true, then a Question arises that wnv US 
has cut down militarv aid to Pakistan under Pressler Act of 
1990 ? 
Althouoh there is no real basis for affirmino that 
either Pakistan is close to develooinci and testino a bomb or 
India is well on its way to nuclear weaoons acauisition, 
manv hioh oriests of non-oroliferation have alreaav 
convicted both of them for endanoerinci the World. Neitner 
ODvernment has ever admitted any Dla.ns to tread on the 
forbidden oath. vet both countries accuse each other for 
advancino towards the eventual weaoons acauisition. 
in South Asian repionai Doiiticai dvnamics. it has 
become auite common amono the countries to accuse one 
another for their resoective internal orobiems, Pakistan 
from time to time blamed India for its internal orobiems 
aavmo that assistance is being provided bv India to Saluch. 
Pakhtoons, Sindhis and Muha.iirs di sinteorat i ve forces in 
Pakistan ', The most recent instance the then Sinah Chief 
46. On manv occasions Pakistan has blamed India for its 
orobiems- in north West frontier orovince. Baluchistan 
Sindh In 1987 the reoime of Gen Zia accused India of 
instioatmo dissidence in Sindh bv amono other thinos. 
housmo S7 militarv training camos for seoaratist m 
neiohbourinD Pa.iasthan. Far Eastern Economic Review. 12 
March 1987. P. 36. 
Miriister Abdullah Shah accused RAW s '^ An i'naian Intel 1 loence 
Aciencv.' involvement in S m d h di sturoances. and also once 
DDwerful MOM 5 of beino involved with the MAI*) . Kamran 
Khan a noted investioative .lournaiist has iisted innumeraDle 
instance and oiven a oraohic account of Pakistan s odsession 
48 
with India 5 RAW . Recentiv, Pakistan s ODvernment taiiure 
in tacklinci Karachi violence, it accused India and announced 
its decision to close down the Indian consulate. General in 
Karachi with immediate effect. The Pakistan foreion 
secretary Mr. Wa.imuddin Shaikh alleoed that thev cannor 
allow a centre for sabotaoe. subversion and terrorism vc 
continue to ooerate within Pakistan , He aoain said tnat 
Pakistan desired "Peaceful and Normal relations witn India 
on the basis of mutual resoect for sB.ch other = sovereiont • 
and territorial inteoriTv and non interference in internal 
SO 
affairs' . But these alleoations tiave been total I-
re.iected tav India as baseless. 
The other countries like Banoiadesh and Sri LanKa nave 
also blamed India for its involvement m their internal 
troubles. while it is true that India has a concern for its 
own security arisinD from develooment in these countries the 
accusations of its neiohbors could not be authenticated. 
47. Diolomacv ~ v.T. Joshi. RAW. ISI are two -idee of 
coin, the Hindustan Times. Jan. 1995. 
48. Ibid. 
49. The Hindustan Time. 27 Dec. 1994 \Deihi.', 
50. Ibid. 
The conflict beoan in East Pakistan in 1*^ 6^0=, At thst 
time it was limited to the demands of reoionai autonomv witn 
in the federal structure of Pakistan. The Indian oovernrnenT 
Dress and the outalic ooinion were sv-moathetic to East 
51 
Pakistan m its struoole for autonomv . With the 
intensification of the conflict accomoanied bv Pakistan s 
military repression in 1971, refupees and oolitical 
activists were oound to flee into India for heio ana 
sanctuary, keeoinq in view the Qeooraohical locations of 
East Pakistan which is almost like an enclave surrounaea bv 
,India. on thv^ee sides. It was estimated that from late Marcn 
to eariv Decemoer 1971, about 9.5 million refuoees crossea 
into India to escape, the penocidal fiontmo in East 
Pakistan^'^, Inaia s involvement in the conflict of East 
Pakistan which became separatist from autonomist in r-^'71 . 
has been divided into four ohases by Urmila Phaoni s'"'"'. a> 
exoressions of concern ana moral suooort, b) augmentation of 
moral suooort with militarv trainino to East Pakistanis. c; 
aiolomatic initiative with the intensification of militarv 
activities and d) the Indo-Pakistani war ieadino to the 
emeroence of Banoiadesh. 
Durino the first ohase the Indian Parliament on March 
31, 1971 expressed its symoathv and solidaritv with the 
oeoDle of East Pakistan m their struoole for the democratic 
51. Urmila Phadnis - O ethnic conflicts and National 
Inteoration in South Asia, Saoe Publication Hew Delhi. 
1989. PP, 212. 
52. Barrv M. Blechman and Stephen P'. Kaplan, OP . c 11. P. 189, 
53. Ibid. 
cause. Finaliv around the middie of Aoril 1971, when the 
leaders of East F'ak istani movement declared indeoendence ot 
Banoiadesh torminci a ciovernment in e>;iie in India, a close 
interactions beoan between the members of Qovernment in 
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e;;ile and Indian Government . Both militarv t rami no and 
eauiDments which Indian oovernment orovidea to the 
separatist forces in East Pakistan was an interventlonarv 
activitv in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Inoia s 
involvement m the Banoiadesh crisis was laroelv motivated 
bv the objective of overcomino the economic conseouencev- of 
the refu.ciees influ;-; into its territories . Besides tnis. 
there were some other factors like outtino an ena to tne 
Pakistani suooort to the disinteorative forces m nortn-
ex^stern reoion. creatmo a friendIv Banoiadesh which woulc 
become an stratepic asset, utilizmo the ODOortunitv to 
shaoe the subcontinent s Daiance of Dower in its favour ana 
belyinci the two nation theorv which ooverned India s 
behaviour towards the crisis"" . 
Thouah India Dlaved a vital role m the inaeoenaence of 
Banciladesn and their relations started on a coraiai note, 
certain conflictino situations aooearea m the course of 
54. Ib1d-
55. Barrv M, Blechman and Steohen P. k.a.Dian. oo.cit., P. 
189. 
56. Wavne Wilco>;. the Emeroence of Banoiadesh American 
Enterorise in State for Public Policv researcn, 
washinciton D.C.. 1973, pp> 54-55.. 6,W, Chaudharv, 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the ma,ior Power r 
Politics of Divided Sub continent. New York. 1975. PP. 
210-214, A.iit Bhatta Charya. "Stakes in Banoiadesh. in 
subskasvaD. eo. Banoiadesh. Bank Ground and Persoective, 
E»elhi, 1971, S,D, Muni, OD , c i t. P. 53. 
time and Droduced strains in their relations. The main 
issues which strained relations between the two countries 
were clashes over borders, the dispute over snarino of 
Ganoes water and sovereionty over the Moore Island and borai 
river and the Teen Biona issue, now that has oiven to 
Banoladesh on lease for 999 years. 
In the first olace the border dispute nas orsarlv 
strained their relations. The two countries were reached 
amicable to settle their border ana otner C I S D U T S C 
territories in tiav 1974, but border incidents contmuea m 
Garo Hill ares,, because of Chackma tribes. 
Another disDute is the duestion of Farakka Barraoe and 
Sharinci of oanges water. Thouoh both two countries 
concluded an interim aoreement in Aoril 1975 reoardino 
Shan no of water, .Banoladesh ieadershio of ten inauloeo in 
misleadinp camoaion about the adverse effects of the 
aoreement on Banoiaoesh with a view to divert tne attention 
of the oeoDle from the short cominos and laDses in the 
domestic field. Thev tried to orciect that Inoia was tr/ino 
to ruin their economv DV divertino the Ganoa water. Tnev 
also internationalized this issue bv raismo at the United 
Nations. Present Bangladesh Prime Minister Mrs Knaleda Zia 
also has raised the issue at the United Nations ana tne 
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commonwealth Summit . ihis met with oreat resentment from 
57. Link News Week 1 v. 26 June 1994. 
India, In 1977, a Joint Rivers Commissi on was set to find 
out a lono term solution, and now some now this aisDute? nas 
settled. 
The DDSsession of a new leiana in the Bav of Benoai 
called New Moore bv India and South Taioattv island Dv 
Banoladesh has created tension. This island is iocatec m 
the estuarv of the F'liver Kasibhanoa and midstream of tne 
mam channel. which formed the border betv^een India ana 
Baoladesh. 
In hav 1981, when Indian naval shiD Sandhyak orchard on 
the Island and the Indian Personnels landed tnere the 
QOvernment of Banoladesh orotested and alleoea that the shio 
was 15 Banoladesh territorial waters. India .lustified the 
oresence of Sanahvak in the area of oointino out that tne 
shio was uDdatino the data which Banoiadesh haa souoht. and 
coliectino necessarv statistics for a .loint survev which the 
two Qovernments had a.Dreed to undertake. But Banoiadesh w?3 
not satisfied and sent certain Gum £4oat= whicn threatenea 
Sandhvak. As a result India also sent a frioste to rescue 
its shiD. The anti-India feeiinq in BanQiaaesh was 
demonstrated outside the office of Indian hion commission in 
Dacca. The demonstrators also attacked the Indian Air lines 
office at Dacca, and caused serious damaoed. In Calcutta 
also demonstrations were held outside the Office of 
Banoiadesh Deoutv Hiph Commissioner s Office. In the midst 
of ail these develDoments the Banola Pari lament adoDtea a 
resolutions on 20 Mav. 1981. E'emandino immediate witn drawl 
of «iii Indian oersonnel from the island, Inaia made a nia 
to reduce tension bv an invitations to Banoaldesh Foreion 
Minister to remcve the misoivinos, out this discute still 
remain unsolved. 
It 1= thus evident that the relations between inaia anc 
Banoladesh were disturbed due to certain confrontations out 
thev did not assume serious dimensions at anv staoe. 
India's perceived involvement in Sri Lanka is also a 
ma.ior factor of disturbance in South Asia. After the 
communal frensv of Julv 1983 in Sri Lanka, the Tamil of Sri 
Lanka started Dourino m-to India as refuoees. the intra 
Tamil affinitv between the Tamils of the two counti^ies 
invoked a sharo reactions in India esoeciaiiv m Tamil Naau. 
India's denials, it was believed that the Tamil militants 
were en/iovino the oatronaoe and suoDort of various oarties 
includinp the rulina AIAE'MK in Tamil Nadu and were Deino 
given traininci and other militarv facilities" . Reoardino 
India 5 involvement in militarv trainino and armmo tc Tamil 
militants on its territory. Sri Lanka Foreion Minister ACS 
Hameed soeakino before the UN oeneral assemblv in Nov., 1994 
said that the communal disturbances of Julv 1983 were a 
traoic develooment m the life of his country. It is a saa 
commentary in international relations that the aberrations 
53. K.M. Desilva. "Manapino Ethnic Tensions in Nu1ti Etnnic 
Societies'', 5ri LanK.a, University Press of America, 
Lannam, 1986. PP. 34fc-48, 
of small states are sensat lonai ized ana blown UD to :=. 
massive DroDortions. "Witn out nammo India soeciailv ne 
DOinted out tnat the terrorist s orouDS find refuQee 
traininci. svmDathv and encouraoement in foreion xsTritofv 
DDsino threat of destab 1 i sat ion m the countrv'""' . 
Moreover, the Sri Lankan authorities nave DinDomtea Tamil 
training camos in Coimbatore, tiettanoevan and Coonoor in 
Tamil Nadu and transDortations of.Tamil arms, ammunition anc 
,•-•.1 I 
exolosives from South India across the Palk - straits"". 
The Intra-Tamil affinitv between the Tamils of India and Sri 
Lanka was orobably the motivatina force. behind India ~ 
involvement in Sri Lankan ethnic crisis. India s Qb.iecTives 
were basicallv two folds : first to find Navs and means to 
svoid the DDSsibilitv of the involvement of external forces 
in Sri Lankan conflict and second to settle the Droblems 
throuon neootiations which would entail due autonomv to the 
Tamils of Sri Lanka withm the Sri Lankan svstem. Witn 
these objectives. India initiated the Deace orocess m Sri 
Lanka in 1987, bv brinpino the oarties in conflict to the 
neciDtiatina table. However Sri Lanka alleoed that India was 
Dursuinp a two oronged DO!icy. mediatorv and militant 
BUDDortive, there bv harassino it to reach an agreement 
>--l 
a c c e o t a b l e t o I n d i a 
5 9 . E^oth t h e S t a t e m e n t s . S o o t l i g n t on F>:eoiQnal a f f a i r s 
OD. C i t . . P« 19 , 
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The Tamil militant cDntinued ODeratinQ from Tamil NaaLu 
But the situation sliohtlv chanoed after Mrs. Inaira 
Gandhi's assassinat ions, Mr, Raiiv Ganahi became F^ -ime 
Minister and took some steos to curb the activities of Tamil 
militants in India. When in 1987. the situations act 
worsined. Sri Lanka imoosed an economic embaroo on Jaffna 
Dresumablv to foreetall the oroDosed unilateral declarations: 
for the formations of mdeoendence. Tamil homeland bv the 
Tamil militants on Januarv ist. 1987. The economic embaroo 
led to the acute scarcitv of essential commodities m the 
war ravaoed Jaffna area. These develooments mvokea share 
reactions m India. India offered food and medical SUDDIISH 
under the aeioies of Red Cross, but was refused bv Sri 
Lankan Government. India, in orotest. air droooed these 
suDDlies bv overnioht Eaoel ooeration in Jaffna in June 
198 7 •^. The action of air droDDino was a violation of the 
SDveriontv of Sri Lankan air soace, while India defended ner 
action arouinci that it was deemed necessarv because the 
innocent oeoole were m dire need of relief SUDD lies. the 
hidden messaoe was .lust to oass the sional that India should 
not be treated as ,iust another unconcerned countrv. In the 
wake of India = action a peace accora was sionea amono the 
two countries and LITE-. Even after sionmo the accord. the 
Tamil militants continued receivino Datronaoe m india, t^ uT 
the oeace accord failed to be imoiementeo dii.e to refi'sai of 
62. Ibid. 
LTTE. The Indian Peace keeoino Force vIPKF; was =enr to 
mainatains oeace in the reQion. The IPKF Dressnce m 5ri 
Lanka irritated to LTTE. The aHsassination of Raiiv Ganahi 
m 1991 Committed bv LTTE was the result of thsir 
suDDression bv IPKF, Here is to be noted that the 
assistance in the form of miiitarv trainino eauioment and 
finances which the Tamil militants received whether at the 
behest of Indian Government or not. was an internatlonarv 
actiVItv. 
Activitv. India s suDDort for the reoresentative 
Qovernments in its neiohborhood has also caused susDicion 
amonp the 3AARC members countriss. esoeciallv Pakistan ana 
Neoai. India suDoorted democratic movement aoainst miiitarv 
rule in Pakistan m 1983 '". Furthermore. India E uoerations; 
Cactus of November in 1988 in Maldives was also viewed DV 
64 
some as interventionarv . which mav described so, but it 
was not a coercive measure directed to chanoe internal or 
external Dolicies of Maldives. India s Maldives ooerations 
created a feelino that India would not have anv hesitations 
m intervenino in the internal develooments of a Soutn Asian 
country if such intervention was reoarded as within Inais s 
means and oromotino its interests 
63. Bhabani Sen Quota. South Asian Perspectives s Seven 
Nations. in conflict and coooeration. S.R.. Fubiisnino 
coro. Delhi. 1988. P. 39. 
64. Iftekharuzzaman. "Maldives s Small Beautiful and 
Vulnerable". E'haka Courier, 11-17, Nov. 19SS, 
65. Bhabani Sen Guota. Maldives Confirms India s Leadino 
Role in South Asia. Dhaka Coureir. 18-24 November. 1938. 
Due to such tvoe of India s DrorriDt and Bminentiv 
successful military interventions in Maldives to fail a COUD 
attemot has focused attention on an imDortant stra.tsoic 
issue : Does India seek to ensure reoional heoemonv in South 
Asia and does it reoard the region as one from wnicn outside 
Dowers should keeo off ? 
BY virtue of its DeooraDhicai distinction as the 
iaroest democracv in South Asia. India is entitled to 
exercise repionai heoemonv. While this countrv has no 
territorial ambitions, it certamlv does not wish to ax low 
outside DDwers to exercise undue influence over anv 
independents countrv in the reoion. Since its emeroence as 
a sovereion countrv in 1947. India has made it a oolicv to 
keeo a more than customarv watch on ooiitical develooments 
in the reoion. And its eminent oosition in the NAM ano 
effort in neootiations over the NIEO and membershio of the 
Antarctic club her success in 1971 war aoainst Pak. her 
militarv "Exercise Bras-stocks" in 1986. her intervention in 
Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the acauisition of a nuclear 
submarine from the Soviet Union, and the Aoni missile r\er 
Doiitical and economic stabilitv and industrial orooress and 
her technolooical achievement it oosed as a strono nations 
in South Asia as to suDDOsedly present a threat to other 
members of SAARC. So thev desire to delink from India and 
to avoid anv oeDendence uoon Inoia. each one them seeKs 
extra reoional ooiitical. economic and militarv ImKaoes. 
F'akistan. Sri Lanka, Banoladesh and Neoai have linkea UD 
with the USA AND cHINA. 
These misunderstanairios of Neoai. 3ri Lsnka and 
Etanoladesh have made them look uoto Pakistan to counter tns 
Indian heoemonv and Pakistan has aireaav wanted to take it= 
revenpe apainst India. At the time of indo Neoaiese 
difference on Trade and Transit Treaty, Pakistan Drovidea 
Qoods to Nepal. Mrs. Bhutto suooorted Premdasa the tnen 
President of Sri Lanka for the demand of withdrawai of IPKP 
from Sri Lanka. 
While on the other side, India wants reciionai stabiiitv 
and believes that foreion interventions never ouarantees 
reoional stabiiitv. And we have examoie of Soviet 
involvement m Afohanistan and Americans m Vietnam. but 
India does not want to CDDV the either, in South Asia. 
Pakistan 5 interventlonarv activities the Soutn Asian 
reoion : Pakistan from the Dartition has been interested m 
orovidinp covert suooort to the dismteorat i ve focus in 
India, m order to weaken and destablise its oiant reoionai 
neiohbour India, with which it maintains hostile relations. 
Besides the covert suDDort to the secessionist forces. 
Pakistan alwavs used the Islamic card to embarrass India Dv 
unsuccessfulIv claimino the role of the Guardian of the 
Indian Muslims esoeciallv on the occasions of communal 
disturbances m India. After the demoiition of Sadri 
Mosaue. these activities increased. 
Before the creation of Banoiadesri the territDrv of 
East F'akistan was a safe sanctuary for the seoaratist forces 
of north eastern reoions of India. suoDorted bv F'akistan. 
The members of Mizo National Front <MNF'' were oroviaed 
militarv trainino and other facilities in the east Pakistan. 
Recent reoorts show that the Pakistani ISi is verv 
active in the North Eastern States ano oivino everv 
assistance mcludinci traininp to insuroent orouDS there. 
Talkinci to newsmen at the Fort William. GOC-in C. Eastern 
command. LT. Gen. R.N. Batra. said that the ISI had oeen 
Drovidino trainino to the NSCN in Naoaiand. the ULF'A is 
Assam and F'LA in Maniour as well as to certain element- in 
lower Assam in some neicihbou.rino countries"~"~. 
Pakistan oot involved in the Pun.iab orobiems where tne 
Sikh seoaratists were demandina Khalistan. Tnev no onlv oet 
Siheiter but also facilities for militarv trainino and SUQDIV 
of arms. But recent BSF sources revealed tnat eleven 
trainino camos for terrorists are still in ooerations m 
Pakistan and ISI is makino desoerate attemots to revive 
terrorism m Puniab""'. The CIA and Pakistan mtellioence 
(ISI) were actively involved in the trainmo of anti India 
terrorists m scecializBd camos m Pakistan, for e^amDle in 
&fe. ISl trainino Ultras m North East. The Hindustan Times. 
Dec. 18. 1994. 
6 7. Ibid. 
Oasur, EmmaDad. Surdwara in i3u.jranwaia district. Rariim t s.r 
Khan near the Ra.iasthan border. Attack Fcjrt. Dau.d Fort ana 
She 1 k h UD u r a c i t v 
Preliminarv introoations of an extremist arrested Dv 
the armv from the Bolden Temole revealed that he was a 
Pakistani who had S U D D lied sDeciaiised aetonators to the 
extremists Dositioned inside the temole. disclosed Lt. Gen, 
K- Sundar.li - 60C - in C- WEstern command at a pf^ess 
conference after ooerators Blue btar 
Another sources ana said Pun.iab militants were trainina 
toQsther with Kashmir militants in the camos. some of wnich 
are located at Lahore. Farukhadad. E'era Ismail ^^han, Chunc. 
Sai,iowal. Okara. Gu.Kianwala. liultan and Bahadiircism. 
situated south of Kasur 
The sources said militants who had fled Pun.iad ana oone 
to western countries on foroed documents. at-B also oeino 
traoDed bv Pakistan s ISI and sent back to Pun.iab with the 
direction to set uo hide outs and review old contacts with 
militants inside and outside the state' . 
Other than Pun.vad. Pakistan is also orovidino all kinds 
of suDDort from diolomatic to military t r a i n m o ana srms 
S U D D I V to Kasnmiri militants for the demanos of inaeoendence 
68. N.D. Choora. R.K, rlishra &. Nirmai S m o h '-.ea.) ^'Aaonv of 
Pun..iab". US-Pak Collusion s The Pun.iata tnrsat Patriot 
Publisher. New Delhi. 1984. PP. 125. 
69. The Telearaoh, Calcutta. June 19. 1984. 
70. "131 aims at revivina terrorism in PuniaD". The 
Hindustan Times. 24 Jan 1995. 
71. Ibid. 
of Kashmir tr-Dm India. It has consi stent Iv been workmo -for 
solicit m o the suoDort of international community bv raisino 
the issue of Kashmir in United Nations as well as the 
suDDort of Muslims countries and their oroanization QIC 
(Oroaniration of Islamic countries; for the self 
determinations of the oeoDle of Jammu and Kashmir. It has 
Got covertly involved itself in Kashmir oroblem esDeciallv 
since 19B7. 
There are oelieved to be about thirtv subversive orouos 
Doerative in Kashmir vallev. These are oart of the 
seoaratists movement which has oaineo strength as a result 
of financial and other suDOort given dv F'akistan and 
Kashmiris settled abroad. With some available information 
to BSF. there at-e fortv battle hardened Afohan "llu.iah ideen" 
in the vallev imoartino traininci to the Kashmir militants 
and fiphtinp alono with them. Besides, there arB Sudanese. 
Bahrain is» Pakistani s and Saudi Nations etc."". 
Pakistan s Islamic Democratic Alliance l^E'A.i actino m 
coooerations with the Pakistan based h-.ashmir LiDeration = 
Front (KLF). Like IDA other orQanisations train rashmiri 
Youths m the use of arms. Pakistan s Field inteliioence 
Unit \F"IU.* and Pakistan Inter service Intel lioence ',131) 
have been suoDlvino arms to militants. 
72. The Times of India. New Delhi. 7th Mav 1993. 
Former Pakistan F-'rime Minister Nawas Sharif = admissiDn 
that while in office, he had funded the fundamentalist 
Jamat-e~Isiami in a bio wav for trainiriD and a.rmino 
terrorists for seoarations in Kashmir has e^Dosed 
Islamabad s sinister nlans to orovide material suDocrt to 
militants desoite official denials'"'. 
Present Prime Minister Ms. Benazir Bhutto nas oecome 
more bellioerent in her u.lterances and Dromiseo full suDoort 
to terrorists to end Indian rule in Jammu ?•; Kashmir, not 
onlv this she has Qone one more steo ov threatenino to India 
to face third war for Kashmir rule . Ihe aidmo and 
abettino of seoaratist forces m Indian states bv Pakistan 
are the interventionarv activities in the internal affairs 
of India. 
Bombay Blasts With the arrest Menons brother it ha= 
cleared that Pakistan was fullv involved m bomoav Biast= 
case. The Menons brotner accented that thev were oiven 
shelter in Pakistan bv the ISI agents. The mine members of 
the Menon familv travelled to Karachi from Du.oai on March 1'•• 
and March 20. with in ten davs of the blasts beino executea 
i n Bomb av on PIA f 1 i oh t PK 214. 
73. "Pak suDDort to Ultras e>!Dosed". The Hindustan Time; 
AuQust 26, 1994, 
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The exDiosivBS used in Bombav onpinated from Pakistan, 
The boKSK used to transoort the RDX. when chemical Iv 
analyzed were found to bear Fakistani marketinoE of 
"ExDlosive. class 6, Division B. Wash Nobel Pvt. Lta.. 
"Wahcantt". 
Vokub has oiven oaoe numDers of reoister in which the 
oroDertv deed for their Karachi house. C 201. Karachi 
Develooment scheme was registered under the Resettlement of 
Witness Act Va.kub has also handed over the business 
DartnershiD deed aionp with income tax clearance to the C&i. 
Ail these are oointers to Pakistan s involvement m Bombav 
blasts. 
In case of India and Banoladesh were both the countries 
alleoe involvement of one another is Drovidino assistance to 
the seoaratist movements ooino on Doth side of borders for 
veav-s. the seoaratists them-seives develoD iinkaoes across 
the borders. The cross-border tribal affinities make tne 
interaction of seoaratist prouDs feasible. Since 1983. tne 
T'riDura GJovernment has been alleoinci that tribal from 
Banoladesh are linkinci UD with a tribal rebel orouD in 
TriDura to destablise the Indian states 
It has been reoorted that the separatist forces of Mi so 
National Front and the Tribal National Volunteers are based 
75. Bhabani Sen GuDta« oD.cit.. F'. 21, 
in the ChittaoDno Hill Tracts of Banoladesh and s.re neino 
aided and abetted bv Banoladesh 
In South Asia due the tact that the countries are 
locked in a hostile relationship of blamino and counter 
blammp each other for their resoective troubles, there nave 
been certain occasions when thev have actualiv oroviaed 
EUDDort both covertiv and ooeniv to the disinteprative 
forces in the reciion. While India aided and the 
secessionist forces of East Pakistan. Pakistan nas 
consistently been involved in India s internal affairs. 
Besides diolomatic suooort to the Kashmir Drobiem it has 
been Drovidino suooort to the separatists both in Pun.iao ana 
Kashmir. Banoiadesh invoivement in the internal affairs of 
India has been comoarativeiv at low ebb. 
The other countries of the 3AARC like Neoal. Bhutan., 
Sri Lanka and Maldives have not anv border dasnes and nave 
not resorted to interventlonarv activities m the reoion. 
76. F.N. Kothoaiia. ''Internal Security and C.I. ODerations 
in Urban Areas". Indian Defence Review. Vol. 11. Jan 
1987. P. 49. 
Chapter - 3 
Domestic Unrest and Internal 
Security Problems 
In the aulticultural societies of South Asia ethnic 
religious and linguistic overlap has affected not only 
internal political developaent in each regional state, but 
also inter state inter actions in profound Banner. The 
societal aspect of life has got political element. 
Moreover, donestic systematic challenges often take the form 
of violence which not only affects the political and 
societal stability but also disrupts the pattern of regional 
security. One of the worlds most enduring institutions, 
that is modern nation-state building, which is the base of 
stability prosperity and advancement of a country and a 
source of binding nations together is facing a major 
challenge in the last of the twentieth century which has not 
only altered the political map of world but also transformed 
the notions of sovereignty and nationhood. Nation-states 
are being forced in different unpredictable and politically 
violent ways by ethnic, religious or political groups 
seeking self determination in the forms of autonomous rights 
with In existing one's their separate countries or 
reunification with home land across their borders, e.g. 
creation of Bangladesh in 1971 question of Kashmir, demands 
of Tamil State in Sri Lanka, demands of Gorkhaland, 
Bodoland, Khalistan in India, Baluchi and Sindhi demand in 
Pakistan etc. But it is not only face by third world 
countries alone, It also faced by western world, such as, 
collapse of Soviet Union and division of Czechoslovakia in 
Czech and Slove, Yugoslavia unrest etc. 
Donestic unrest in South Asia 
South Asian countries have been in the aidst of a laajor 
crisis in state and nation building. Ethnic separatist 
Boveraents Increased day by day in the region, especially in 
Sri Lanka in the form of a demand for a Taail State. The 
sectarian, religious and ethnic violence has influenced the 
Indian as well as Pakistan politics. In fact the threat to 
the security of the two states is posed more by internal 
turnoil than by any external power. 
The donestic unrest has been categorised in different 
forms and types. Runnel - puts then into three categories 
namely turmoil, revolutionary conflicts and subversive 
conflicts. Eckstein also adopted similar parameter in 
categorisation such as turmoil, conspiracy and internal 
war . 
The domestic unrest in South Asian Countries is due to 
two different factors. One is systemic and other is ethnic 
(regional, linguistic, religion and communal) conflicts. 
Economic conflict can also be linked with either of a 
systemic or ethnic conflict because economy is a root cause 
of all problems and conflicts. 
As the systemic conflicts is concerned, there are two 
distinct political objective of it, one is short term, that 
1. Harry Eckstein, on the Etiology of internal Wars", 
History and theory. Vol. IV, No. 2, 1965, P. 133-163, 
also Harry Eckstein (ed.) Internal War problems and 
approaches - New York Free Press, 1966. 
is the sharing of power within the given constitutional and 
political structure, another is long tern, objective of 
transforming the fundamentals of political system by 
changing the basic power relations and equations and also 
political procedures and constitutional parameters in a 
given society. The Akali and Kashmiri agitations in Punjab 
and kashmir, Political conflicts resulting from opposition 
activities at the centre or state levels in India, Military 
coups In Paksitan and Bangladesh, Surya Bahadur Thapa's 
attacks on the Panchayat government in Nepal and the Sri 
Lanka freedom party's opposition to Jayawardene regime and 
Vice Versa In Sri Lanka are all example of systemic 
conflicts created by limited short term objectives. 
On the other hand, the movement for the restoration of 
democracy (MRC) agitation in Pakistan, movement of the 
opposition alliances against the martial law rule in 
Bangladesh, struggle in Nepal for a multi party system based 
on democracy which has now came to existen in Nepal, 
Naxalite uprising in India and Nepal and the CheGuvera 
style, revolt by April 1971 in Sri Lanka all are examples 
that are aimed at bringing broadbased and basic changes in 
political structures as a condition or a means for acquiring 
power. 
The second form of conflicts are related to ethnic and 
other forms of sectarian identities, which lead to political 
conflict. The Baluchi, Sindhi & Mohajir uprising in 
Pakistan and Tamil struggle, for a separate state in Sri 
c^a 
Lanka, Sri Lanka's JVP insurgency of 1971, which sought to 
over throw the bourgeois parliamentary system and its 
reactionary government led by Mrs. Bhandarnalke of SLEP, 
comprised low caste Sinhalies youth. The Naga and Mizo 
insurgency of North East India also have an overlap of 
political turmoil caused by ethnic uprising. 
The main cause of ethnic or other sectarian conflicts 
is the sense of deprivation and discrimination in sharing of 
political, administrative and economic power, suffered by a 
communal, castelsm, religious, linguistic or regional groups 
which begin to protest and agitate. The sense of 
deprivation is related to societal status where one finda 
the gap between a particular group aspirations and 
achievements. 
It is very difficult to evaluate the degree of 
deprivation or discrimination because its nature varies from 
one situation to another. With regard to employment upward 
mobility access to the avenues for achieving prosperity etCi 
Politics and practics regarding language, recruitment to 
various jobs opportunities for establishing and expanding 
trade and industrial establishment etc. But when social 
consciousness among people develops against their 
deprivations, it becomes an engine for social mobilization 
and conflict generation. The community consciouanese» Bl5.fi 
and cohesion group leadership and responses of dominating 
groups play an important role in creating ethnic turmoil and 
a. 
lits political impact. 
The ethnic conflicts have a fostering quality that 
leads to become separatists and secessionists forces as in 
the case of Tiger Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka, Kashmir and 
Khalistan in India. It is due to continued negligence or 
improper handling of the initial modest demands of 
linguistic recognition, regional autonomy or equality of 
economic opportunities that gradually alienate the 
dissatisfied ethnic or regional group to the extent of 
seeking complete separation. There are also political and 
economic vested interested in search of preservation or 
prosperity resort to precipitating conflicts on ethnic 
issues. All these reasons can be seen behind the ethnic 
turmoil in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India & Nepal. 
External Powers interferences are also play major role 
in domestic disturbances, in which they tend to exploit the 
problems to serve their desired strategic and economic 
Interests, for example, Pakistan's support to Kashmiri and 
Punjabi militants. Having this background, it is essential 
to take some aspects of Internal Security problems of the 
SAARC countries, which are generated by domestic unrests 
Maldives : 
Maldives is located in the central Indian Ocean, 143 Km 
South of Lakshadeep and Minicoy Islands. Spanning an area Qt 
750 Km, with a land area of 280 Km. most of the Islands vary 
in length from 600 m. to 1.6 Km. in length being fairly 
68 
narrow In width. It's figures on the map is like a chain, 
with several Islands grouped in cluster of atolls. 
Historically a Buddhist country it got converted to Islam in 
12th century. Islan is the declared state religion with 
justice based on "Shariat-1 aw", while the population is of 
2 
the Sunni faith . 
Like other South Asian countries Maldives is also 
facing the problems of Socio Economic and ethnic religion 
and linguistic configuration. 
The country's resources are very limited. It has a 
weak agricultural sector leading to its dependences for 
basic food stuffs on external resources. Health and 
hygienic conditions have remained at low level low life 
expectancy rate, indicates the poor health of the Maldivian 
people. The low level of education reflects the scarcity of 
3 
trained and skilled manpower . 
This tiny state is also not free from ethnic problem. 
In 16th century Maldives was freed from Purtugueses rule by 
the two Adduan chiefs, who became Sultans. But in IQth 
Century during the Tenous negotiation between the British 
and Maldlvians for greater political autonomy some Adduans 
asked for a separate state which they wanted to name. 
2. Strategic Analysis - Vol. XV, No. 12, P. 1229, March 
1993. 
3. Bajpai, U.S. "Indian and its Neighbourhood", New Delhi, 
1986, P. 223. 
Suvadiva republic. Since the British withdrawn in 1976, the 
Adduans have deprived of certains economic advantages. The 
coup of 1988 against president Mauaoon Abdul Gayoom with the 
help of external agencies was a part of Adduanians 
grievances . 
An other major threat to the Maldives's security is 
arising out of environmental crisis, inrising of sea level 
by a few millimeters a year, threatening to submerge the 
1200 odd coral Islands. It is a very serious threat since 
all of the land is less than 3.5 meters above mean sea 
level^. 
Global warming from the "Green House Effect" is the 
main cause of the rising seas menacing the Maldives, mainly 
known as an exclusive vacation destination offering palm 
fringed white sand beaches and crystal clear waters . 
Therefore it is need to save Maldives from a watery grave 
next century, and Indusrlal laed nation »ust bring HTlfiP? 
control their emissions of greenhouse gases-mainly carbon 
dioxide - which destroy the Ozone layer. 
Bhutan : 
Bhutan is a mountain state in the Himalayas, with China 
on the north and India on the south. It has three diatinot 
4. 1. Phadnis Urmila, "Ethnic Conflicts and National 
Integration in South Asia", 2. Bhabanisen Gupta, 
"Regional Cooperation in South Asia, Vol. onei 
5. Maldives la sinking, The Hindustan Times, 30 Dec. 1994, 
New Delhi, 
6. Ibid. 
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geographical features, the southern foot hills, the inner 
Himalayas and the upper Hinalayas. Bhutan is a agricultural 
state. Its ethnic and cultural diversity and econoaic 
backwardness and its geographical and demographic content 
have contributed to the domestic crisis. 
But the ethnic composition is one besides the 
geographical economic and political factors. Though the 
Drukpas forms the core of the people, the Nepalese who began 
settling on southern slope of Bhutan a hundred years ago 
claimed parity in number today. By religion they are Hindu, 
restricted in their political and economic representation. 
Since no political activity is permitted in Bhutan, there ifi 
hardly any outlet for their grievances. The Bhutanis king's 
efforts to integrate their nationals in national main stream 
he alienated Nepalese by introducing common uniforms to 
Bhutanese people for their cultural identity. Many 
reactionary organizations came to existence against the 
Bhutan government's activities like Bhutan Peopie Psft^ 
(BPP), Bhutan National Democratic Party (BNDP), HUROB and 
SUB etc. They carried out prodemocracy movement. Other 
Nepalese leaders took terrorist move from the bases in 
Nepal. Their contend that the royal regime of Bhutan if. 
actively pursuing a policy of ethnic cleaning. According to 
Bhutan People Party (BPP) of the ethnic Nepal is more than 
one lakh people have fled the country on account of the 
reign of terror let loose by the Bhutanese administration . 
7. The Times of India, 4 September, 1992. 
The refugees, who began to leave Bhutan in 1990, say they 
feed because of a brutal carapain of 'ethnic cleaning' after 
the first census in 1988 attempted to classify nationals and 
illegal aliens" . Where as Bhutanese administration claimed 
that the people in the camps are being mobilised by anti-
nation who under the banner of democracy, are trying to 
9 
undermine the bases of the "drukpa" identity . 
Flanked by giant neighbors without a large resources 
base or army, national identity is an important force of 
cohesion in Bhutan. Thus, the promotion of the Bhutanese 
languages, dress and way of life are regarded as vital 
components of the dragon Kingdom's transition to modernity, 
although some may feel that such a policy will keep Bhutan 
rooted in the feudal age. The problem with the southern 
Bhutanese dissidents who are ethnic Nepali and Hindu rather 
than "drukpa" or Buddhist is that they are trying to upset 
the pace at which a traditional kingdom is trying to change 
the system without sliding into anarchy. Yet the refugees 
issue has focussed attention on the need for Bhutan to 
develop a more pluralistic identity. But the fled of one 
lakh refugees who now live in camps in Jhapa and other 
places in eastern Nepal, has created grim situation, that 
effect Bhutan and Nepal relations. 
Where as the economic position is concerned Bhutan is 
8. "The Refugees Tanlge in Bhutan & Nepal", The Times of 
India, New Delhi, 24 August, 1993-
9. Ibid. 
entirely mountainous country, its agricultural potentials 
are limited and has nothing to export to the outside world 
and it is dependent almost totally for its basic import and 
economic growth on outside powers. 
Bhutan faces some other problems such as, technical and 
managerial manpower and mannual labour shortage, low 
productivity, the tarraince and inadequate communication 
networks, serious shortage and gaps in material and 
financial resources and increasing dependence on foreign 
aid. So to achieve ambitious economic goals Bhutan's 
dependence will increase- It's dependence on India for 
markets, for all of its products and man power la also 
obvious. But ill conceived external assistance could be 
serious for the security of the country. 
Nepal 1 
Nepal is a land locked country in the Southern slope of 
the Himalayas, situated between India and China. The 
geostrateglc location of Nepal is itself a major challenge 
to security. As Rose and Scholz described Nepal's position 
in these words "small countries situated is highly strategic 
areas between larger and more powerful neighbours must, by 
necessity, formulate strategies and policies that reduce 
their vulnerability and exploit opportunitiee. In Qri§^^ 
Bituatlon the objective is not merely the advancement of 
national interests, but not infrequently, the surviVdi fit 
the society as an independent polity. Nepal finds itself in 
this unfortunate altuation^^. 
The country is facing political instability for which 
social and ethnic factors are responsible. The predominant 
group in Nepal today, both in numerical and political terns 
ia the Hindus with the different groups of caste, such as 
Kahatriyaa, Bhahmina, and Mewars. They dominated the armed 
forces and civil services, furnished the majority of the 
kings principal advisors and enjoyed disproportionate 
representation in the Rashtriya Panchayat. Due to this 
imbalance the social problems were created and the king was 
triyed to redress the balance somewhat through nomination of 
Panchayat and supported in election to candidates from 
backward groups. However, the politicians of Panchayat 
system encouraged the growth of separate identities , that 
led to the dramatic change in Nepali politics in 1990, in 
support of Democratic form of government and finally after 
32 years of dictatorship its multiparty system elections 
held in 1991. More over in December 1994, for the first in 
Nepal's history a communist government installed and its 
head Man Mohan Adhikari is very much a leader of the BaBfiefii 
He promised that "it is his commitment to serve the poor 
people, of Nepal and no worker should ever ignore the 
essence of this sacred mission, he says, "All of them should 
12 keep in touch with those who have elected them to power". 
10. Leo E. Rose and John, T. Scholz, Nepal profile of a 
Himalayan Kingdom (New Delhi, 1980), p. 117. 
11. U.S. Bajpai, op.cit. p.81. 
12. K.S- Tomar, Interviews with Man Mohan Adhikari - "Firm 
on Nepal's adhikar. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 
December, 1994. 
Nepal's internal siecurity is threatened due to its 
multi structural society where ethnic composition, religion, 
language and regional difference. The main ethnic groups of 
the hills are Brahmin, Chettri, Mewar, Rai, Limbu, Sherpa 
etc. are well off and dominated in Nepal's politics. Where 
as In Tarai region Brahmih Rajput, Rajbansi, Sutar, Muslim. 
Tharu & Bodo are main comnunities. The linguistic diversity 
is higher in Tarai than hills, and as backward in 
comparision to Hills people. 
Since the last decade the ethnic and regional movements 
started among Kiratis, Bishwakamas and Tarai people for a 
greater share in political and economic power of the 
movement, the Tarai movement is based upon ligitiodte 
grievances. As the Tarai region is the backbone of the 
Kingdom, it accounts for nearly 55% of nation's agricultural 
production and 65% to 70% of industry. The hill people 
dominate the economic life of the Tarai and create problems 
for the Madheshis as the local inhabitants constitute more 
13 than 65% of the population 
Thus the economic hardship created a sense of 
diacrifflination and neglect in Tarai people. They had poor 
representation in civil services, army and police, many ot 
them had been denied citizenship. 
13. V.P. Pant, "Population growth and Employment 
opportunities in Nepal, New Delhi, 1983, p. 12-13. 
Such type of negiegence and deprivation developed 
consciousness among backward groups and forned the 
revolutionary cadres or the extremist raarxist Lennist group. 
These groups have succeeded in mobl11ising support from the 
backward groups, and now In December 1994 election they 
formed the government. 
Although, the democratic form of government has cone to 
existence in Nepal. Yet socio economic problems are 
remained to solve such as nepotism and castisra in 
bureaucracy, problems of economy. It is one of the poorest 
countries in the world with a nominal percapita GNP of only 
about US $ 200. So it is great need to change, the economic 
condition of the country. 
In course of change in political system the Nepalese. 
People particularly the political leaders must prepared to 
cooperate with each other in establishing and strengthening 
the institution basis for democracy in the country in the 
interest of national security. 
Sri Lanka : 
Sri Lanka having circular location of the coast of 
South East India, is an island in Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka 
became an independent, state in 1948 after centuries of 
foreign rule. Like India, Sri Lanka also ie a ffluU.i ethOtfl; 
multl-re1Igious and muiti lingual country. 
Sri Lanka is in midst of dangerous crisis m its post 
independence history in the form of ethnic conflict between 
the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority which had 
reached a crucial point. The ethnic antagonism to the 
greater extent, remained non-violent till the early IQBOs 
with only three major ethnic outburst, first in 1958, 1977, 
and last in July 1983 . There are multidimensional 
problems between two communities such as ethnic, religious 
dnd iingulatlc. The physical location, social structure, 
economic interests historical myths and natural resources 
are deepening the crisis and playing a crucial role in 
economy, polity, ethnic relations and defence strategies. 
The protected conflict has caused a massive loss of the 
life and property leading to the deterioration of the 
nation's traditionally democratic structure. 
The ethnic and political troubles of Sri Lanka can be 
traced back to 1948, when the Island was granted 
independence from colonial rule. The crisis originated due 
to racial discrimination policy of Singhalese majority 
against the minority of Tamils. The Tamils have been 
degraded and humiliated during the past four decades. 
Discriminatory laws deprived them from their jobs and 
business opportunities. The Tamil youth adversely affected 
with that policy, and they had no option except to revolt 
14. James Manor (ed.) Sri Lanka in Change and Crisis, Groom 
Helm, London, 1984. 
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against it, and started pressing their demand for a 
separate Tamil State in the Norhtern areas where they are in 
majority, under the militant organization Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Elam (LTTE) headed by Velupillai Prabhakaran. 
The Sri Lankan Tamils are Indian origin, so they have 
close link with the people of Tanilnadu in India, they apeak 
the same language. By religion they are Hindu where as 
Singhalese who are Sri Lankan origin having Buddhist faith. 
Due to this there is intense bitterness between the 
Singhalese and the Tamils. 
The Singhalese think Sri Lanka as a sanctuary for 
Buddhism, therefore they be live that it la their duty to 
protect Buddhism in Sri Lanka, and this commitment has lead 
to civil war in Sri Lanka. The Singhalese also argue that 
the Tamils have their own state in India, where as they have 
only Sri Lanka. While the Tamils of the Jaffna Peninsula 
refused from accepting this view and claimed that they also 
arrived in Sri Lanka from Southern India at about the sane 
time as the Singhalase came from Northern India more than 
2,500 years ago. 
The other internal unrest which brought the unprecedent 
consequences for the Island were the armed insurrections led 
by radicalised Shlnghalese youths first in 1971 and later in 
1987. In 1971 a militant organization Janatha Vlmukhti 
Peramuna (JVP) staged and insurrection to sleze power which 
was defeated by Sri Lankan armed forces with the help at 
outside support. The organization reemerged in 1987 soon 
after the signing of India Sri Lanka accord in July 1987. 
Sri Lanka after the two and half years of bloody civil war 
and extrene political uncertainty finally managed to score a 
military victory, over the JVP. By the end of 1989, the 
organization lost its entire leadership caputured and killed 
15 by the Sri Lankan armed forces 
The bloody civil strife between the Singhalese and 
Tamils in Sri Lanka war interrupted by an accord signed by 
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lanka President 
J.R. Jayawardane in 1987, which provided for the deapatoh at 
Indian peacekeeping forces to disarm the Tamils militant 
group (LTTE) and pave the way for a referendum in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces. It was welcome by most 
Tamils including some militant groups, but refused by the 
LTTE and they engaged in a major assault against the peace 
keeping forces. The accord also provoked the Singhale&e 
nationalist JVP into a bloody compain of terror against the 
UNF Government, nearly all government institution, education 
and business activity was disrupted. Under Political 
pressure in both Sri Lanka and India, the IPKF were with 
drawn In March 1990. The war resumed between the LTTE and 
Sri Lankan security force. Mr. Ranashighe Preodaaa the 
former President tried to talked to the Tigers and armed 
15. Raaario Samaboria, op.cit., p. 125. 
them during the later part of the IPKF'a stay in Sri 
16 Lanka - But it is unfortunates that he also assassinated 
in May 1993 by a suicide bomber, earlier in 1991, Rajiv 
Gandhi was assassionated by the LTTE. 
But in the first-ever peace move since a lO days 
ceasefire in January 1991 started by the People's Alliance 
(PA) Government headed by Chandrlka Bandaranaike Kumaratunga 
in 1994. Since she took office last August, Mrs. 
Kumaratunge has made numerous concessions to the Tigers . 
She has unilaterally reopened the land route to the Jaffna 
peninsula eased fishing restrictions, posted, six teams at 
foreign observers to supervise the truce, disregarded 
ceasefire violations by the LTTE and sent essential items 
including generators, to the North . In return LTTE have 
b^gun negotiations with Colombo but have insisted that the 
government lift the economic embargo completely, implement 
its promised rehabilitation package worth Rs. 40, billion 
and agree to a permanent ceasefire before discussions on 
19 political issues begin 
Bangladesh : 
Bangladesh is bounded by India from three sides-north, 
east and West with a common border. In the South and East 
16. The Hindu, 3rd July, 1992. 
17. The Hindustan Time, New Delhi, 1 Sep., 199A. 
18. Ibid. 
19. LTTE'S Games", The Times of India, New Dlehi, March 10, 
1995. 
near Chittagong and Cox's Bazar she has a little boundary 
with Burma with a coaaon borjer of 176 miles. In South it 
has the Bay of Bengal with a coastal boundary. 
Bangladesh also faces threats from within like other 
South Asian countries. These are due to socio-economic and 
political instability. 
As the socio-economic problems in concerned it is 
because of its back wardness. It is one of the least 
developed countries of the world with a percapita GNP is 
about »190 US. The economy is basically agrarian that atiH 
absorbs 55.27% of the toa1 GDP^^. 
There is not much industrial development, its economy 
is so much dependent on the agricultural sector that any 
fluctuations in agricultural out put particularly two main 
crops-rice St Jute easily tend to distabilise the total 
economy. The annual growth rate is insignificant to cope 
with the economic problems arising out of both internal or 
external causes. 
Bangladesh over population of 110.7 million (1989) 
resting on a stagnant economy has posed severe economic 
threats to the existence of Bangladesh in the form of 
draconian poverty rising unemployment, increasing dependence 
on external aid and so on. 
20. (1987 estimate) Asia Year Book, 1991 and World 
Development Report 1991. 
Si 
According to an official report prepared for the aid 
meeting for aid to Bangladesh consortium in Paris in 1990, 
more than 50% to 60% of the people in rural areas live below 
the poverty line. In all cities and towns of the country 
there is also sizable number of slum dwellers and 
deprivation 
Poverty in Bangladesh finds in two ways one poor 
another ultra poor. According to one report more than 30% of 
population of Bangladesh are ultra poor who's percapita 
daily calorie in take is less than 1600 calories of average 
2100 calorie". In rural areas many people are without 
be 1ongings. 
There is also a number of landless peasants. They are 
just rootless having no security of tomorrow. Because they 
cannot be expected to contribute to the security. They are 
indiifferent to the state structure and do not care for the 
sovereignty of the country. They drage the country backward 
and make it unfit to compete with the external world. 
The rising unemployment in the country is putting extra 
burden on country's economy. The present economic position 
of the country is not in position to absorb all the 
unemployed youth, that create frustration and ultimately 
21. Ishtiaq Hussain, "Management of National Security 
Problems of Bangladesh in Strategic Analysis", Nov. 
1990, p. 951. 
22. Atiur Rahman,"Missing Dimension ot Poverty : The issues 
of volnerabi1ity and insecurity in Abdul Hafiz and 
Mizanur Rehman Khan (ed.) development, politics & 
security - Third World Context op.cit. p. 97 
turn to violence. 
It's major weakness is the dependence on external aid 
and assistance. Its Annual Development Plan (ADP) is 
totally dependent on foreign aid- Undoubtedly 
interdependece aid is essential for developmental process, 
but it often minimizes the sovereign decision making power 
of the receiver, that can be a hreat to the security of the 
country. In the case of Bangladesh the World Bank backed 
up by the IMF has been the praetorian guard for western aid 
23 donar influence . These two institutions have used their 
leverage through their domination of the aid consortium to 
impose their policy including privatisation of the economy 
and reduction of subsidies on agricultural inputs and tflflrf 
grains. 
Political Threats :- Arising due to political instability is 
another challenge to national security of the Bangladesh. 
Since, independence, Bangladesh is facing a series of coups 
and counter coups. Within a short time span of only tour 
years the country's founding President Sheikh Mujibur Rehman 
was brutally assasinated. The military strongman and later 
President Ziaur Rehman lost his life in 1981. 
After that the country fell into the iron fiat of 
another military dictator, H-M. Ershad ousted through 
people's upsurge on December 6, 1990, and a new torns of 
23. Rahman Sobhan - The Crisis of External Dependence "A 
Study in the Political Economy of Foreign aid to 
Bangladesh", UPC Dhaka, 1983. 
democracy case to existence. Under the leadership of P.M. 
Mrs. Begum Khalida Zia. Now she is facing Political turmoil 
due to mass resignation by opposition parties from 
Parliament as they claimed that BNP government has become 
corrupted and failed in controlling law and order in the 
country. And now they demanded dissolution of Parliament 
and fresh election under the caretaker government. They also 
started mass movement and nation wide strike which has 
parallsed the civil lives. While Prime Minister Begum 
Khalida Zia accused the opposition of disrupting development 
activities and leading the country toward destruction by 
launching negative programmes like hartals and sieges. 
Bangladesh is also facing domestic unrest due to ethnic 
and tribals difference. It is a large ethnically 
homogeneous with a Muslims majority of 87X and Hindu 
minority of 12%, Christian, Buddhist and tribal communities 
comprise of one percent. Since Independence no major ethnic 
or racial violence took place other than upsurge of tribal 
subnationalisation in parts of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
(CHT) and some communal violence in 1992 after domolisation 
of Babri Hasjid. 
The south eastern region of Bangladesh known as 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is inhabited by thirteen 
minority ethnic races that include the Chakmas, Marmas, the 
Tipperas, the Morgans and others. Chikmas alone oonetitH^.P 
nearly 47.89% of the total tribal population of CHT which 
,^ 4 
cover 10* of the total area of Bangladesh 
The tribal Insurgency problem is not new. The Chakmas 
were started fleeing in the mid 1960a when Bangladesh was 
still East Pakistan. At present all these Chakmas refugees 
find themselves in the unpleasant position of not being able 
to return to their original homes in CHTs. 
The tribal insurgency problem began just after 
Indepdnece with the demand of the Chakmas for a special 
status of the CHT. IN 1973 the Bangladesh Jatiya Sansad 
passed a resolution with a majority of votes declaring 
25 Bangladesh a unilingual and unicultural nation states 
Earlier the Sheikh Mujibur Rehman Government had abolished 
CHT Regulation of 190O, introduced by the Britsher tor 
administrative purposes. This government's step developed a 
sense of fear in the mind of Chakmas to their cultural 
entity, detribalization and changing the demographic and 
ethnic balance through Bengali settlement and insufficient 
economic development 
A group of tribal leaders under the leadership of Hana 
bendra Nareyan Larma met P.M. Sheikh Mujibur Rehmanj bvit 
failed to get their demand fulfilled. They organised a 
movement against the Dhaka Government and formed a regional 
24. Ishtiaq Hussain, op.cit. p. 951. 
25. Syed M. Islam, The CHTs in Bangladesh, 1 ntegrational 
Crisis between Centre and periphery in Asian Survey, 
vol. XXI, No. 12, Dec. 1981, p. 1212. 
26. Syed A. Hussain, "Ethnicity and Security of small 
States", South Asian Context in Hafiz and Abdur Rub Khan 
(ed.) Security of small state (BIISS Dhaka, 1987). 
political party the Parabattya Chattargong Jana Sanghati 
Samity (JSS) and another military front named Santi Bahini 
who are fighting against the Bangladesh security forces in 
the area. 
Although the Chakma insurgency in due to domestic 
political factors, but it has acquired an external dimension 
since Bangladesh alleges that the Chinese and Indian 
27 government have supported the tribal rebels . 
As the involvement of Indian government in the Chakmas 
matter, it is due to refugees problems in Arunachal Pradesh 
and Trlpura region. There are now estimated to be some 
45,000 Chakmas in Arunachal Pradesh and about 5500 in 
Trlpura. There are likely to be some more scattered in 
28 
neighbouring areas . Recent Indo - Bangla ties on the 
Chakmas problem has reached to solution and some tribal 
refugees have departed for their home land in CHTs. 
Other than Chakmas problem, the Rohinga Muslins the 
migrants of Arakan region of Hayanmar have created domestic 
unrest in Bangladesh. They fled from Mayanmar due to 
military government's atrocities, now they have settled in 
Bangladesh. 
27. Talukder Maniruzzman, "The future of Bangladesh" in A 
Jayaratnam Wilson and Rennis Datton (ed.) The States of 
South Asia : Problems of National Integration (Vikas 
Pub. House). New Delhi, 1982, P. 270. 
28. "In Search of Home", The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 19 
Oct. 1994. 
Pakistan 
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is flanked in north 
west by Afghanistan, north by the Central Asian Countries 
29 
and China, east by India and South by the Arabian sea 
Politically Pakistan is having a unique feature, which 
is neither democratic nor very Islamic. It is supposed to 
be based on Shariat law of Islam. While of rule in the 
history of the country, and democracy has existed casually. 
In Pakistan the struggle against the dictatorship has 
always been accompanied by a struggle against the 
centralization of nationality rights- That rised from two 
sources : a) the dominated classes and b> dominated 
nationalities. The dominant groups in the dominated 
nationalities consider a federal parliamentary system with 
considerable autonomy for the provincess, with the safe 
30 guard of their interests and democratic freedom. For 
example the break of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971, 
from the United Pakistan, Pushtoonlst's people, struggle for 
same cause. The Baluch nationalist resisted the authorian 
rule of Pakistan's government, because they do not get 
proper Power equation of Pakistan. 
The opposition of the dominant classes, elite of 
29. Manorma Year Book, 1990, Published, Kerala. 
30. Pakistan and Asian Peace, ed. V.P. Chopra, op.cit. P. 
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dominated i^ational i tiea to dictatorial tendencies because of 
nationality oppression in Pakistan state- As long as the 
two go together and the Punjabi ruling class is unable to 
co-opt the dominant classes of the smaller nationalities 
Baluch, Pukhtoon etc- On the other hand imposition of 
military government takes away even a semblance of 
participation on the part of masses and denial of freedoms 
adversely affects their struggle for economic well being and 
tor a dignified existence in society. 
The political instability in independent Pakistan ia 
beat illustrated by the fact of unprecedentai phenomenon of 
rule in the first eleven years by the seven Prime Hiniaters 
one after the other before the Army crack down by General 
Ayub Khan brought the first martial law regime in Oct- 1958. 
In Pakistan, the democracy is still at a experimental 
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stage . It is not in position to handle all domestic 
problems democractica11y. Military still playing its role 
in political affairs of the country. 
Ethnic and Regional Problems 
The social order of Pakistan is baddly disturbed by the 
intra-regional and intra-sectarian conflict- The ethniQ and 
sectarian overtones of the clashes have been mainly a result 
of Mohajiris and Sindhi, Shia & Sunni divide. Createfl 
mostly by Zla-ul-Haq using the "Islamic Card" and 
31. "Dismissal of the Benazir Govt, in Pakistan", Strategic 
Analysis, February, 1991, vol. Xlll, No. 11, P. 1314. 
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propagation ot an Islamic order based on Sunni Principles 
32 for the entire country - Where as Regional feelings, it 
turned to violent because of social inequalities and the 
dominance of politico-commercial classes having an enormous 
concentration of economic resources. Regional aspirations 
and demand for political power for the influential regional 
and ethnic groups have also worsend the situation. 
Pakistan came into existence because of its religius 
identity, but religion could not Unite the distinct 
cultural, linguistic and ethnic group together. As the 
leaders of Pakistan highlighted the strength of Islamic 
Unity which recognised no regional, ethnic or linguistic 
loyalties. While the founder father of Pakistan Mr. Jinnah 
was forced to concede the need of secularism in his first 
address to the constituent assembly in Karachi on August 14, 
1947, he said, "You are free to go to your worship places 
temples or mosque etc, in the state of Pakistan, there is no 
discrimination on the basis of religion, caste or cread... . 
We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are 
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all citizens and equal citizens of one state . 
But, it is unfortunate that the secular stamp given by 
Jinnah was declared as a Muslim state by the right wings 
parties. Soon the religious issue became a point of 
conflict and gravated towards becoming an "identity crisis" 
32. Aabha Dixit, Strategic Analysis, March 1989, Vol. XII, 
No. 12, P. 1051. 
33. Tariq Ali, "Pakistan, Military Rule or people's Power" 
London, p. 42. 
for the va?-iQU5 groups. The demand for autanomy expressed 
itself in a demand for recognising ethnic regions in 
Pakistan. Therefore regional conflict developed in demand 
of new state . This led to the break up the Pakistan in 
1971, and continues to be an explosive problem today, Punjab 
enjoyed the lion's share in terms of power and influence, 
that developed a sense of discriminations and ethnic 
regional Intolerance in the minds of depressed and exploited 
people of Baluchistan, Pakhtoon and Sindh. The breaking 
away of the eastern wing (Bangladesh) made the dominance ot 
Punjab even more striking in conprision with the other 
provincess. Punjab is more inclined to statusqua "than 
other regions of the country. 
Baluchistan 
It is at strategic locations between Afghanistan and 
the Gulf on Oman to the South, and the rest of Paklistan and 
Iran to the West. Baluchistan is a least developed province 
of Pakistan. Its population is hetereogenous; while 
Baluch's constitute about 1/2 population, the other half is 
made up of several other ethnic groups, the Pushtuns, 
Brahuls, Sindhis and Punjabis. The Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan has increased the problems of ethnic and tribal 
diversity. It has led to political parties in Baluchistan 
34. Khalid B. Sayeed, the political system of Pakistan Coup, 
Lahore, 1966, p. 66. 
becoming very factionalised and polarised. To add to the 
simmering tension the arrival of Afghan refugees all of when 
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are Pushtuns have Inflamed. 
On the other side the struggle between Baluch 
nationalists and Punjabi Pathan dominated military 
bureaucratic elite is one of the crystalized difficulties 
that Islamabad face. Although, it provided the bulk of the 
energy requirements of the nation, had more than two 
millions population and even less significant share in the 
politics and administration. However, a strong demand for 
constitutional autonomous raised in mid 70's and took armed 
against the government, which was suppressed by Bhutto's 
government with the military help from Iran and US. Still 
Baluchistan is in search of autonomous status of livelihood. 
The NWFF : The North West Frontier Prlvlnces's alaci 
tribes also created problems to the central authority. The 
Islamisation policy pursued by Zia produced a sectarian 
problem, which has led to violent clashes. In July 1987, 
there were severe clashes in the Parachinar and the Kurraa 
Agency and again in November 1994, the violence erupted in 
Halakand Division, Swat and Bajaur Agency of NWFP by the 
supporters of Tanzeem Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM) 
demanding implementation of Shariat laws in the region and 
35. Salamat Ali, "Baluchistan An upheaval is Forecoast", Far 
Eastern Economic, Review, Oct. 19, 1979, p. 42. 
against the Shia Community of NWFP was brutally crushed by a 
combined forcen of paramilitary organization. 
Thus it is clear that the shortsighted I s lajnisation 
policies of Zia have created more problems of nation 
building rather than solving any. Now it is necessary for a 
democratic government to either give concessions to the 
religious minorities or to again stress the secular 
character of the state in order to save it from ethnic and 
violence. 
Sindh : It is called as 'a' province of permanent crisis". 
Now a days in Sindh, the politics revolve around different 
points of conflict. Sindh versus centre, Sindhis versus 
Mohajir's, Mohajirs versus The Punjabi Pathan Combine, 
Mohajirs versus Mohajir (Political), Shia Versus Sunni etc. 
The genesis of the conflicts lies in the very creation 
of Pakistan, when as new ethnic configuration was imposed on 
a highly pronounced socio-economic stratification that 
prevailed in Sindh. After partition, the city offered 
refuge to the people who left India by force or by choice. 
Although other ethnic groups, like Punjabis, Balochis and 
people from North-West Frontier Province migrated to the 
city in search of employment, the largest ethnic group which 
settled down in the city was the urdu speaking husllas from 
India. The Sindhi's considered this groups to be a threat 
to their language and culture. After sometime this has 
aggravated the ethnic class and regional divide between the 
(lid Sindhis and new Slndhis. Old Sindhis were dominated by 
a socially and politically cognizant ninority of Urdu 
speaking and urban based. They are largely concentrated in 
the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad.. 
As a result of this refugee's domination conflict 
erupted between local and non locals. Sindhis elites fear 
hindrance in career advancement and other economic 
opportuni ties. 
While the Urdu speaking migrants from India have not 
been assimilated into the mainstream of Pakistan. Neither 
they have been assimilated into Sindh. They are being 
discrimnated against in education and employment. They are 
denied of their share in political power. This groups calls 
itself as Muhajir Quom. They are predominant in the Urhftll 
Sindh. They have formed a political organization called 
Muhajir Quomi Movement (MQM). It has become a powerful 
political organization. Sindhis have become hostile to this 
group. Where as the government, instead of resolving the 
grievances of Mohajirs, is trying to suppress them by force. 
Due to this problem a civil war situation has prSftt^ ri ^B 
Karachi -
Another factor, which is responsible for recent 
killings, in Karachi is the conflict between two Huslims 
sects, Sunnis, and Shias. This is the creation of religious 
leaders. Sectarian violence has assumed alarming 
proportions with armed attacks on religious leaders and 
places of worship. Some of the Sunnis have formed a 
militant organisation called Sipan-i-Sahaba party (SSP), on 
the other side some of Shias have also formed their own 
mlitant groups, Tahrik-i-Jafri party. The attack on the 
leader of the Suuni Sipan-i-Sahaba Maulana Azam Tariq and 
assassination of Shia leader, Syed Hussain Shah have added 
fuel to fire 
Karachi violence is attributed to factional fighting 
between the mainstream Altaf faction of the ethnic Mohalir 
Quomi Movement (MQM) and its rival Haqiqi faction. Since 
January 1994 more than 200O people were killed in Sectarian 
clashes. In all these killings, most sophisticated weapons 
are being used, and the gun culture threatens to spread to 
Baluchistan and NWFP. 
Karachi is burning and bleeding. Repression is no 
solution. A dialogue with the MQM and the religious leaders 
alone can end the nightmare through which Karachi is 
passing. 
India 
India occupies a strategic position in Asia,looking 
across the seas to Arabia and Africa on the West and tp 
Burma, Malaysia and the Indonesian Archipelago on the East 
and extending from the Himalayas in the north to the Indian 
36. "Benazir ignore US advice on talks". The Hindustan 
Times, New Delhi, 26 Nov. 1994. 
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Ocean in the South India is Inhabited by various ethnic, 
linguistic and socio-reIigious groups. In terms of area and 
population it is the largest country in South Asian region. 
Its boundary touches all the countries of South Asia, except 
Ma I dives. 
At present India is passing through a period of 
uncertainty and drift that canlead to dangerous 
consequences. The political, social, economic systems of 
Indian polity are facing unprecedented challenges from 
inside as well from ouside. The main crisis of India today 
is multiple, it is political, economic, social and of 
values. The security of the national system is closely 
linked to the security of the sub system which make up the 
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national system . Regionalism, communal violence, growing 
terrorism in Kashmir and Punjab and insurgency in northeast, 
urban industrial unrest, rural tensions crising due to upper 
and lower caste differences, political agitation, social 
conflict and youth unrest, smuggling and spies (ISRO) tribal 
Vs non tribal , hill Vs. Plain peop;le (ubtra khand) etc» 
are of the well known threats to the internal security of 
the country. 
The inequalities and the injustice of socio - economic 
structure is destablising factor. The common people working 
hard, fighting the battle of survival and desirous to 
37. K.M. Mathur, "Internal Security Challenges and Police in 
a Developing Society. RBSA, Publisher, 1989, pp. 1H4-
185. 
participate In the political and decision making process and 
want to improve the living conditions. But India's social 
systems do not allow him to do so, because the democratic 
institution which operate the electorate process and tools 
of governance are hi jacked by the power brokers and the 
operators. The question of even a fair election is in doubt 
as criminalised politics uses money and "goonda" muscle 
power to sway the voters, prevent any just action by the 
police or by the election machinery or even by the 
judiciary. 
The economic and political system is suffering from a 
crisis of legitimacy and crisis of identity, which 15 
disastrous. 
Progressively politics has been criminalised and those 
rising to political power and authority have forced the 
bureaucracy, police and democratic institutions to fall in 
line at the cost of job.s promotions and postings. And for 
the general masses, there is little equality law and justice 
but only that of criminalised action, corruption and 
sefarish the appeal for help to those who wield power. The 
bureaucracy has slowly wilted as the face of polltlP.^i 
demands, as has the police. The only way for official to 
survive is to tactily obey the dictates of their 
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criminalised masters. 
38. Gen. V.N. Sharma, "National Security - More threats 
from within". The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 18 Dec. 
1994. 
The only way for the deprive masses to retain some self 
respect and vent their anger, is ir» violence, insurgency and 
terrorism for underground criminals gangs and terrorists. 
These are the root causes of most of our current 
internal security unrest. 
Law and Order Problems 
Law and order is the main issue of tackling the high 
and low intensity of problems. On the high level, it is 
active insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and North-East and 
terrorism in Punjab, and on the other side are problems of 
law order like civil disorder related to political, socio-
ecnomic, ethnic and religious issues. 
When the lower level civil disorder is not taken 
seriously at is beginning stage it gains permanency and 
takes serious violence shape. The understanding of problem 
at macro level and to search for a solution is the job of 
political leaders and their advisor both government and non 
governmental. While the tackling of law and order at local 
level is depend on the administrator and other law 
enforcing agencies. Generally police forces are handling 
the lower level problems. But, the police, despite its vast 
rising strength of armed battalians under the central Home 
Minstry or under the various states, with thousands of 
crores expenditure is unable to easily control the violent 
masses when the police Itself is subservient to criminal 
39 political masters and their fawning bureaucrates . When 
the violence reached out of control, there may require the 
involvement of Para Military Force or even the Army. But 
the scope of Involvement of PMF and Army should have well 
defined norms and parameters. 
Law and order maintinance is the primary job of the 
police not of the army. It is only when political parties 
and leaders developed undemocratic and criminal methods of 
acquiring power and staying in office, that public 
Institutions, the civil services, the police and business 
houses deteriorated in standards of conducts and corruption 
became rife. Till this corrected, violence in Indian 
society is likely to grow further more 
The Problems of Terrorism and Insurgency 
Terrorist violence has become increasingly frequent in 
recent years. Between 1975 and 1992 there were an average 
of 500 international terrorist attacks a year. Bomblnga 
were by far the most common type of terrorist violence, 
accounting for 60 percent of all such incidents. As the 
terrorist believe in the cult of the bomb and the gun 
violence by all available means. In 24th oct. 1985 on the 
AOth anniversary of UNs, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi said : "Terrorism 
is a major challenge of our time. It has assumed new 
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forms". 
39. Gen. V.N. Sharma, op.cit. 
40. Ibid. 
41. The Times of India, October 25, 1985. 
Terrorism in india is not a new phenomenon, it has a 
history extending over a ce^ntury and more. In the second 
half of the IQth Century, the Uahabis, a puritanical Islamic 
sect steeped in fundamentalism, unleashed a wave of violence 
in India. 
Insurrectionary violence involving acts of terrorism, 
erupted in Nagaland in the early 50s, in Hizoram in 1966, in 
Manipur in the late 70s, in Assam, in 1979 and in Tripura in 
1980, in Punjab since 1984 and in J & K since 1989. 
Extremists subversive activity and other forms of terrorism 
have increased since 1985. According to the Union Home 
Mnistry report for 1989-90 admits that such lawlessness has 
particularly affected the border states of Punjab and J & K. 
The latest manifestation of terrorism has been through 
insurgent an extremist activities in north eastern region 
and the spurt in left- extremist violence in Andhra Pradesh 
and Bihar. In Punjab the security forces continued to mount 
pressure on the terrorists. The People's War Group (PWG) 
based in Telengana region is responsible for the bulk of 
violence. The Targets of attacks included public property. 
In the North Eastern region mostly in Nagalandt 
Tripura, Manipur, Hizoram and Assam are continually rocked 
by violence for which the extremists of various categories 
were responsible. 
Jammu and Kashmir Problem 
It was called by a Mughal emperor as "paradise on 
earth", the beautiful valley of Kashmir has lately been 
rocked by bomb blast, shootings and other subversive 
elements, trained with arms equipments by Pakistan have 
causing havoc in that state. There is intense fear among 
the people. The militants have created tough law and order 
problems for the state administration. 
The remotness of the valley of Kashmir has helped to 
promote a feeling of special identity not only because it 
has discouraged the mass influx of new settlers, but also 
because it has restricted the Kashmir's contact with the 
outside world. Confinement to a relatively small area for 
generations has produced an unusual degree of cultural and 
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racial homogeneity 
The internal security turmoil of J & K did not emerge 
all of a sudden and the external factors have caused the 
escalation to the present level. It is only when developing 
situations are not recognised immediately and steps are not 
taken- When the government does not give any response to 
the grievances of the people, they gain dimensions and 
complexity resulting in a public outcry, agitation and 
ultimately inviolence. 
The state government has lost the popular base because 
of its own weakness and indecision and did not take those 
42. Kaiumuddin, "Kashmir its cultural Heritage", Bombay, 
Asia Publishing House, 1952, pp. 3-4. 
hard decisions which should have taken to curb the military 
at the initial state. 
Conflicting contentions : The respective stand points of 
India and Pakistan on kashmir reflect a conflicting and 
contradictory approach. 
India argues that both legally and constitutionally J & 
K is a part of India since the state acceded to the Union of 
its own free will. The instrument of Accession was signed 
by the Maharaja of Kashmir. Since J & K is an internal part 
of India, there is no dispute as such over kashmir. But 
Pakistan insists that kashir is a disputed issue and not an 
integral part of India. 
A joint session of the Pakistan Parliament adopted on 
Feb. 10, 1990, a resolution accusing India of repression in 
Kashmir and calling for a Plebis-cite. The five point 
resolution, moved by Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan 
expressed solidarity with the people of J & K in their 
struggle for self determination, called upon India to desist 
from Its ruthless attempts to suppress the demand of the 
Kashmiris for self determination". 
It demanded a final settlement of the J & K dispute 
through a fair and impartial plebiscite under the au3picic:S 
of th UN and in accordnace with the resolution of the 
security council and the directives of the UN commission for 
India and Pakistan 
43. The Times of India, 12th Feb. 1993. 
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Apparently under domestic presisure, Ms. Benazir Bhutto 
adopted a hawkish posture. She flatly reiterated that 
Pakistan would not compromise on the right of self 
determination of the people of J & K. 
There are believed to be about thirty subversive groups 
operative in Kashmir Valley. These are part of the 
separatists movement which has gained strength as a result 
of financial and other support given by Pakistan and 
Kashmiris settled abroad. With some available information 
to BSF, there are 40 battle hardened Afghan Mujahideen in 
the valley imparting training to the Kashmiri militants and 
fighting along with them. Besides, there are Sudanese, 
44 Bahranis Pakistanis and Saudi Nationals 
The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) one of 
the most active group based in POK is actively involved in 
violence in the valley. The other groups like the Allah 
Tigers, the Hizbe Islami, the Hizbul Hujahideen and Al Umar 
Mujahideen have been enforcing norms such as observances of 
purdah by women, stopping trade in liquor and closing video 
libraries and beauty parlours. It is believed that these 
subversives are being patrionised by the Jammate Islaaij a 
fundamentalist Islamic Party. Paskistan's Islamic 
Democratic Alliance (IDA) acting in cooperation with the 
Pakistan based Kashmir Liberation Front (KLFI like IDA 
44. The Times of India, 7th May 1993. 
other organisations train Kashmiri Youths in the use of 
arms. Pakistan's Field Intelligence Unit (FlU) and the 
Pakistan Interservice Intelligence (ISI) have been supplying 
arms to militants. 
The allied groups in occupied Kashmir cooperate with 
them. Official reports idicate that several fully armed 
groups of trained Kashmiri youth off ten smuggled into valley 
from the Jaraau border which has several easy spots lor 
crossing over in either direction. 
Some other organizations, like the Islamic students 
league, the Jammat-e-1slami, the Jamiat Tulaba and the 
Mahazi Azadi, have made their existence depending on the 
situation in the state and across the border. 
Besides, the instigations and encouragement by Pakistan 
there are several internal causes of the trouble in the 
valley. The state administration has been inefficient, 
ineffective and also corrupt . According to close 
observers of the turmoil, the present impasses in Kashmir is 
largely the result of a series of ill conceived policies 
pursued by the central government and state administration. 
Political mismanagement and economic neglect are among the 
principal factors that led discontent and disillusionment. 
The interests of the people have been repeatedly disregarded 
45. The Downhill Slide - "Kashmir - Behind the White 
Curtain", Khemlata Waklu on Wakhlu, p. 340-3A5. 
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with the result that their confidence in the democratic 
process has shaken. 
Since independence, Kashmir's economic development is 
not satisfactory because it's share of national resources is 
inadequates, so there is no industrial growth. Many 
important projects, sanctioned, a decade or so ago, either 
remain on paper or have been abandoned for want of funds. 
There has been shortage of drinking water and 
electricity despite the vast natural water and power 
resources. Education has spread, but there is inadequacy m 
employment to the educated youth. Besides, the tourism 
industry which has earned the country's substantial foreign 
exchange is still woefully backward. While Amritsar boasts 
of an international airport, Kashmir has none- These 
def1Icencies, have enabled certain vested interests, both 
within and outside the country, to exploit the situation. 
Besides, economic deficiency, the islamic factor also 
has influenced Kashmiris in their quest for a separate 
Identity. The "Shaheed" factor, and the canonisation of 
Maqbool Butt has been yet another motivating cause tor young 
militant Kashmiri Muslims. 
The lack of political will to face the situation, and 
ineffective dealing allowed the militancy to gain in 
fitr-ength and stature, and at the same time demoralised the 
once effective police force to such an extent that quite a 
few of them established their links with the militants to 
safeguard their life and security. The situations got to 
worse and the climax was reached in 1989 with the kidnapping 
at the then Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's daughter 
Dr. Rubiya Sayeed. The case was handled in such a manner 
that opened a new way of militancy. The kidnapping has 
become an accepted act in J & K. They could tell the people 
that by kidnapping they have been able to bring the Indian 
government to the negotaiting table. This was a golden 
chance for Pakistan in helping the Kashmiri militants. The 
minister of state for external affairs R.L. Bhatia said that 
the government have press reports about setting up ot 
special ISl camps by Pakistan both in Pakistan and POK in 
which about 20,000 Kashmiri militants, besides Afghan 
nationals had been trained 
The J & K Governor (Retd.) Gen. K. V. Krishna Rao said 
tht Pakistan after having failed to grab J & K through open 
wars, has now waged a proxy wars to annex Kashmir. It has 
been aiding and abetting terrlrism by training and arming 
some of the misguided youth 
He also declared that, during the past five years, 
there have been seized more than 20,000 weapons, thousand of 
grenades, lakhs of amunition rounds and other assortment ot 
ammunition which were supplied to militants by Pakistan to 
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create large scale violence 
AS. The Times of India, 5th May 1993. 
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And still the incidents of Utter law lessness, such as 
bomb blasts, arson and destruction of property have become 
frequent. There are more signs of Panic and nervousness 
among the people than of return to normalcy. 
Along with the increasing fear and deep anxiety, there 
is intense anti Indian feeling, which is naturally a matter 
of great concern. For this state of affairs there are two 
main causes. One the endless propanganda by the militants 
by world of mouth as well as through their own furtively 
printed propaganda sheets, besides posters on street walls 
and on poles. Second cause is the administration's failure 
to ensure peace and protection to the people. The 1uoa 1 
people and also the visitors notice the virtual collapse of 
the administration and the lack of confidence in the ruling 
elite. The occasional arrest and detentions without trial 
have caused further resentment. 
Now the people of Kashmir are tired with present 
situation and want peace to return in J & K. 
Punjab 
Punjab has witnessed a spurt of terrorist activity 
during the past few years. Terrorism entered a dangersoue 
phase in 1984-85. Earlier, during 1982-83 scores of 
innocent people, mostly Hindus were killed. In later phase 
Hindus as well as sikhs including women and children, were 
killed, with the use of the latest sophisticated weapongi 
I'.:'•: 
Places of worship were turned by the militants into 
arsenals. The accelerated lawelessness ultimately led to 
military action "operation Bluestar", which became a sore 
point with the Sikhs. The assassination of Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi was a manifestation of militants anger against what 
they described as "oppressive policies of the Union 
Government". 
The Punjab problem is not a current one although it was 
started before partition, when Kartar Singh, the then 
General Secretary of the Akaii Dal, demanded in 1946, a 
"Sikh Home land" for Sikhs in Punjab. 
After partition again demands arose for special 
privilege to Sikhs. Because the terror and suffering 
wrought on the Sikhs by partition made the Khalsa more 
insecure and so more favourably disposed to a seperate 
state. Those who suffered much, the west Punjabi Sikhs were 
more inclinded for seperate homeland 
The migration of Sikhs to East Punjab and the Muslims 
to the West Punjab made the Sikhs a much larger percentage 
of the total East Punjabi population, one third. Most Sikhs 
inhabited a defineable contiguous area in East Punjab. When 
Haryana was formed in 1966 the Sikhs constituted 55% of the 
population, and 62% of the Punjab population. Then th^. 
49. Bhushan Bharat, "The Origins of the rebellion in the 
Punjab", Capital and Class, No. 24, Winter, 1985, 
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leaders of the Sikhs aruged for a separate state on majority 
status. 
Since then several demands carae out and made more and 
more complex, that is resulted current deteriorating 
situation. 
Since the General elections of 1980s, in which congress 
won a confortable majority defeating its main rival, the 
Akali Dal, created fears among Akalis for their survival. 
This reverse led them to adopt agitational measures to win 
back the support of electorate and political power. 
To get mass support the Akalis took the laaue at 
Ananadpur Sahib Resolution, which could be easily termed and 
exploited as aspirations of the Sikhs masses in the 
political, economic and social sphere. This Resolution was 
adopted by the Akali Dal in 1973 at Anandpur SahJh: 
On 13 April, 1982 the Akalis launched their agitation 
to force the government to accept the Resolution and sone 
other demands, in its totality. This movement was given a 
deep reJigious colour as "Dharma Yudh", with its headquarter 
located in the Golden Temple. Of course this agitation was 
in peaceful non-violent manner. But it turned violent m 
due course of time with involvement of some hardliner Sikhs 
who wanted to take the advantage of the Akali movement to 
carry out anti national activities while agreeing with the 
goals contained in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, they aJgQ 
demanded extra ordinary status for Punjab which meant an 
exclusive Sikh State and ultimately the demand for an 
independent Kahliistan. 
To achieve their goals, they advocated militancy and 
violence as opposed to the declared policy of non-violent 
agitation by the Akalis. It was soon there after the 
militant groups established an effective parallel leadership 
ot the movement under Sant Bhindrawale with pronounced 
seperatist and anti national objectives. 
Militant Organisation in Punjab and their Foreign Linkages 
There are several militant organisation which are 
fighting for Khalistan for exmaple NCK, Dal Khalsa, Babber 
Khalsa, Akand Kir tani Jatha. The three most important 
organisations that are militantly Khalistani are the 
National Council of Khalistan (NCK), headed by Jagjit Singh 
Chauhan. The All India Sikh students Federation (AISSF) and 
the Dal Khalsa. 
Bhindarawale also had his own group centred at the holy 
place near Bhatinda called Damdam Sahib where he resided. 
The group has committed a number of terrorist acts. 
The National Council of Khalistan is an umbrella 
organisation which is a government in exile in name only. 
It serves as a coordinating body which distributee 
information promoting the Khalistani cause. The Central 
Organisation operates from Khalistan House, situated in we J 1 
to do Bayswater near Hyde Park in London, It has branches 
in various parts of the world. Funds for the NCK comes from 
Sikh businessmen in Canada, the USA and the UK. Money is 
contributed at meetings in Gurdwaras and by direct 
contributions. After the army action in the Golden Temple 
(operation Bule Star) a much broader cross section of the 
Sikh community were willing to give money to Khalistani 
organization. 
The pro-Kha1istani Groups have sprouted up in various 
parts of the world where Sikhs live. Many Khalistani 
organisation are based in UK including Dr. Chauhan's. 
Another famous organisations is the International Sikh Youth 
Federation (ISYF) founded by a Sardar Jasbir Singh, relative 
of Sant Jarnai1 Singh Bhindrawale after the Blue Star 
operation in 1984. 
Another important centre for Khalistani is Vancouver, 
British Columbia, Canada where more than two third oT 
Canadian Sikhs live- At least three important Khalistani 
live there. One is Surjan Singh Gill. He publishes the 
Indo-Canadlan Times and the newsletter Babber Khalsa. 
In US, Ganga Singh Dhillon of Washington who was known 
to be the close friends of Pakistani Zia ul Haq . He also 
propagated that the Sikhs are a seperate nations and 
maintained contacts with US senators and persons in the 
higher ranks of Pakistan administration 
50. India Today, Nov. 30, 1981, P. 104. Col. 2 
51. White Paper on the Punjab Agitation, Government ot 
India, July 10, 1984, p. 37. 
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As the question of foreign hands in supporting to 
Punjabis terrorists it can revealed with following 
informations : 
In the first phase of secessionists movement, it seems 
most of the arms were supplied either by pakistan or by the 
US. In final phase China also supplied arras through the 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
The CIA and Pakistan intelligence (ISI) were actively 
involved in the training of anti Indian terrorists in 
specialised camps in Pakistan for example in Qasur, Emnabad, 
Gurdwara in Gujranwala distirct, Rahim Yar Khan near the 
Rajasthan border, Attock Fort, Daud Fort and Sheikhpura 
city^2. 
After the completion of training, which included use of 
sophisticated weapons and ammunition and hate campaign 
against India, these terrorists were smuggled into Punjab 
from various points in Jammu, Rajasthan and Punjab for 
carrying out operations. 
Preliminary interrogation of an extremist arrested by 
the army from the golden Temple revealed that he was a 
Pakistani who had supplied specialised detonators to the 
extremists positioned inside the temple, disclosed Lt. Gen. 
K. Sundarji GOC-in-C Western command, at a press conference 
52. V.D. Chopra, R.K. Mishra & Nirmal Singh ed. Agony of 
Punjab U.S. Pak Collusion : The Punjab Theatre - Patriot 
Publisher, New Delhi, 1984, pp. 125. 
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after operation of Blue Star 
Such types of foreiftn support to Punjabis militants 
have made it easy for them to carry on extremist activities. 
Their extremist activities commenced with murder of Lala 
Jagat Narain, a leading public figure, who was a severe 
critic of communal policies of hard line Akalis. Thereafter 
a spate of murder of prominent personalities, Hindus as well 
as Sikhs police offciaJs and random killing of Hindus. 
Their activities also included sabotage and subversion. 
These activities were related with following objective. 
a. Paralyse civilian administration and reduce them 
ineffective. 
b. Carryout subversion in the police force and demoralise 
those who could not be won over. 
c. Create communal rift and mutual mistrust between Hindus 
and Sikhs. 
d. Terrorise all elements and echelons of anti extremists 
force and public figures. 
e. Gain international recognition and support for their 
movement. 
When these activities of extremists reached to its 
height in 1983, the late Prime Minister hrs. Indira Gandhi 
announced the acceptance of some of the religious demands ot 
53. The Telegraph : Calcutta, June 19, 1984. 
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the AUallB, and appointed Sarkariacommission to review the 
centre state relation to please to Sikhs. But these efforts 
of Mrs- Gandhi could not satisfy the Akali leaders. 
Unabated violence continued in the state. The government 
banned Oal Khalsa and All India Sikh Students Federation 
(AISSF). The banning of these organisations created even 
more probleas for the Government- They killed not only 
innocent people but also very important persons- They 
killed Ramesh Chandra the editor of Punjab Kesari, Shri 
Atwal a state Police officer and Mr. Manchanda prominent 
Sikh leader of Delhi-
Uhen all methods to check terrorism failed, the centre 
Government took a drastic step to flush out terrorists from 
the Golden Temple. The military action called "Operations 
Blue Star" took place on June 5, 1984 against the 
Bhlndrauale activities. The army entered the Golden Temple. 
It was a painful but unavoidable act- During the army 
action many terrorists were killed and arrested. Some army 
personal were also killed. The militant Sikh leader Sant 
Jarnall Singh Bhindrawale was also killed an action. Arms 
and ammunition in large quantity were found in the Golden 
temp 1e. 
The "Operation Blue Star" did hurt the Sikh sentiment 
in the country and abroad. In protest against entry of the 
army into the Golden Temple, Khushwant Singh, a noted 
scholar and journalist returned the title of Padam Bhushan 
to the GovernmeTit. Many other highly placed Sikhs also 
expressed their resentment by resigning the posts held by 
them-
However, terrorism was not eliminated, murders of 
Hindus and Sikhs has continued long after the entering fo 
the holy shrine. The assassionations of Mrs. Indira Gandhi 
by her two Sikhs security men was an other repercussion of 
the army operation. 
In July 1985, Rajiv Gandhi and Sant Harchand Singh 
Longowal reached agreement on a number of different Akall 
demands. Chandigarh was to be handed over to Punjab. The 
dispute over Abohar and Fazilka was to be resoivedi A 
commission was to be formed to look into the massacre of 
Sikhs in New Delhi and other places of country after Mrs-
Gandhi's assassionation. 
But this accord could not satisfy some sections of the 
extremists. Meanwhile the election of Vidhan Sabha and also 
Lok Sabha for Punjab were announced. The extremist decided 
to boycotted the election in the state. The election was 
held under the Gun, besides Longowal assassination. Mr. 
Surjit Singh Barnaia took over as Chief Minister. But 
killing and looting was a common thing in Punjab. 
The holding of elections in Punjab in Feb. 1992. has 
given new hope to this troublous state, although Akalis 
boycotted the election- The Beant Singh Government le 
showing courage to takcle the situation and some how succeed 
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in it. It is true that the things have certainly improved 
as far as the law and order situation is concerned. The 
tear of the extremists has receded intowns and villages and 
the self imposed curfew after duck, that has become a normal 
features of life in Punjab, has improved. Economic activity 
that witnessed a down fall during the past five years has 
gained momentum. 
But killings of two ultras in an encounter near 
Bhatinda and arrest of a top militants are once again trying 
to regroup and strike back. The recovery ot one AK - 47 
assault rifle and some ammunition besides some literature 
and diary from their possession, confirmed that the 
54 
militants activities again gaining their bases in state 
The intelligence agencies in Punjab have warned that 
the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) under 
pressure from the Pakistani outfit Inter Services 
Intelligence (ISl) had been very active in reorganising the 
55 
militant movement in Punjab 
Another militant outfit still active but mostly 
outside, the country are Babbar Khalsa, Khalistan Commando 
Force. Khalistan Liberation Force and Bhindrawale Tiger 
Force of Khalistan. Most of these outfits are based in USA 
which have as yet not given up hope and also have been 
lie 
sending funds to buy arras . Now again it is need to revise 
54. Cops fear regrouping of Punjab ultras. The Hindustan 
Times, 10th January, 1995. 
55. Ibid. 
56. ibid. 
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ail TiBCBBsary action by the Panjab Government to deal law 
and order problem with fair and right means to topple the 
rise of militancy in state-
North East Region Problems 
In India's north eastern region, which comprises the 
"Seven sisters'* the state of Assam, Nagaland Manipur, 
Heghalaya, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram- The 
region has a considerably large International boundary with 
China in the North, Bangladesh in the South, Bhutan and 
Nepal in the West and Burma in the East. 
For decades the people in North East states had 
experienced political violence, cultural insecurity and 
economic deprivation, that was sporadic and confined to the 
Naga and Mlzo. But it is the fear of loosing their identity 
as an ethnic group due to demographic imbalance has become 
the major cause of trouble, that has crosed geogrpahlcal 
barriers and engulfed even the perennial peace zone like 
Meghalaya. 
There have been as many as six insurgencies, the well 
known the Naga revolt which continues at present and it has 
C O 
bases in Bagnaldesh and Myanmar . The Mizo National Front 
which captured the main town of Mizo Hills, Aizawal, in 1966 
57. U.L.K. Sarin, "India's North East in Flames", New Delhi, 
1980, p. 12. 
58. Dangerous Developments "Sunday Magazine, The Hindustan 
Time, New Delhi, 21 Aug. 1994. 
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was another powerful movement. The United Liberation Front 
of Assam was a third as was the revolt by Tripura volunteer 
force- Host of these movements such as in Mizoram and 
Tripura have abated or ended as a result of a comibation of 
B9 
negotiation and Indian military force 
In Manlpur, the activities of diverse insurgent groups 
operating mainly from the Imphal Valley. For the first time 
in 1994 came in the grip of ethnic clashes and rise of 
insurgency and witness political killings. Over 45000 
security forces belonging to different Army and para 
military Units were deployed throughout the state, but two 
years long Naga Kuki clashes continued claiming at least 500 
Iives. 
Thti Naga Kuki clashes are due to some different reason 
: One is the political linkages of both the two groups with 
the political parties, who give direct and indirect support 
to these groups. Another is the domination of Naga majority 
over to Kuki minority, Nagas of Manipur want to creat a 
greater Nagaland with the combination of four districts Qt 
Manipur which is not acceptable for Kukis of Chandel 
District of Manipur. Another main cause is the collection 
or illegal money and tax by the NSCN with the Kukis these 
are responsible factors of ethnic conflict between the Nagafi 
and Kukis. 
59. Ibid. 
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As insurgency problem is concerned, Manipur, in the 
insurgency history of the region faced for the first tine in 
i99A, when Armed Naga under-ground men ambushed and killed 
29 security personnel at Yangkhullan area in the states 
Sanpati district bordering Nagaland . 
According to official records there were at least 30 
ambushes or encounters between armed security men and 
underground activists belonging to different organisations 
in different parts of the states 
While the National Socialists Council of Nagaland is 
active in hill districts particularly in Chandel and Ukhrul, 
the United Nations Liberation Front (UNLF) the oldest and 
well organised underground outfit in Manipur has beoooe 
agile both in the hills and valley in the state 
Other under ground organisations like People's 
Liberation Army, Kuki Defence Force, People's Revolutionary 
Party of Kangleipak, Kuki National Army and other two 
stepped up their activities 
The problem with the Mizo or Naga concept of 
nationality lies in there extension beyond their respective 
60. "94-A Year of Insurgency for Manipur", The Hindustan 
Times, 6 Jan. 1995 
61. Ibid 
62. op.cit. The Hindustan Times, 6 Jan, 1995. 
63. Ibid. 
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crystalleized zone. The Nagas claim that there are 
altogether 32 tribes, of whom only 16 live in Nagaland, 16 
others in the Neighbo uring Indian states and Burma* 
Unification of all the Naga inhabited areas is a very 
sensitive issue in both Nagaland and Manipur. 
The Mlzos are also scattered over Mizoram, Manipur, 
Cachar as well as Burma and Bangladesh. The territorial 
unity and solidarity of the whole Mizo population continue 
to haunt the people since the days of transfer of power 
In Tripura, the tribal reaction against the dominance 
of the Bengalese settlers is generally as the root cause for 
the emergence of extremist movement there. The Tribal 
National volunteers (TNV) have stepped up their extremist 
activities and intensified violence. They are based in the 
CHTs in receiving help from MNF and Bangladesh. Un-checked 
immigration in Assam and some other states also complicated 
si tuatlon. 
The Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is very 
active in the North Eastern states and giving every 
assistance including training to insurgent groups there. 
GOC in C, Eastern Command and Lt. Gen. R.N. Batra, 
64. "North East in the Main Stream, Problem of identity", 
Manorama Year Book, 1989, Kerala. 
65. Ibid. 
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said that the IS I had been providing training to the NSCN in 
Nagaland, the ULFA in Assam and PLA in M.anipur as well as to 
certain elements in lower Assam in some neighbouring 
• . 66 countries 
The Army had been making every effort to keep it in 
check through its operations and deployments. But the 
porous border with Bangladesh and Myanmar had compounded the 
task. 
Because of the remotness of these areas there is some 
insensitivity among the bureaucracy and political leadership 
of centre and states to understand their grievances and 
aspirations. The belief that the problem of insurgency haa 
solved in Nagland, Hizoran, Manipur or Tripura could be 
unrealistic. It has no doubt been contained in some of these 
areas but the problem is far from being over. 
Assam : 
Assam is bounded by Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh in the 
North, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Manipur in the East, 
Tripura, Bangladesh and Heghalaya in the South and west 
Bengal in the West. It provides access to Bhutan and 
Bangladesh and the state of the North East which were part 
of Assam earlier. All these areas are highly prone to 
infiltration by Bangladeshis and to some extent by the 
66. "ISI training Ultras in North-East", The Hindustan 
Times, New Delhi, 18 Dec. 1994. 
people of Nepal through West Bengal and Bhutan. In addition 
there has been infiltration of Cheap Biharl labour into 
Assam like any where else in India. 
All these things created security threat for Assam from 
China, Mynamar and Bangladesh. The threat from Bangladesh 
directly is nominal, but threat to internal security is 
aainfied due to the presence of large number ot immigrants 
from that area which is still continuing. It created fear 
among the real inhabitants for their deprivation. So the 
real problem of Assam was related to foreign nationals, 
settled in Assam during the post partition period. So basic 
demands of the Assamese were that all foreigners must be 
deported to their country and their names must be removed 
from the electoral roll. The international borders along 
Assam must be sealed to check infiltration. 
And Government must issue identity cards to Indian 
voters in Assam. All Assam Students Union (AASU) and Assam 
Gana Sangram Parishad (AGSP) gave agitational shape to these 
demands by which the whole administration was paralysed. 
Their target was to distrupt the movement of oil as well as 
law and order situation. In view of the serious nature ot 
agitation the central government made efforts to come tp 
some sort ot settlement with the agitation leaders. Despite 
al 1 the efforts no agreement could be arrived on 
identification and deportation of foreign nationsl in Assam. 
The AGP Ministry of Mahanta could not deal with tfie 
l^ i 
problem of foreigners effectively. The Centre also found it 
difficult to detect and disenfranchise thousands of 
foreigners. The sealing of the Assam Bangla border was also 
a difficult task. These facors damaged the credibility of 
the AGP Government. And the failure of the Assam Accord 
created another serious problems of militancy. The two 
militant organisation the United Liberation Front of Assam 
(ULFA) and All Assam Bodo Student Union (ABSU) came to 
ex istence. 
ULFA : it was formed in 1979 at Sibsagar by Rajiv Rajkhowa, 
Parash Baruuo, Pradeep Gogoi, and Gulab Baruo for Swadhln 
Aaom (Independent Asom State). They started kidnapping 
killings and extortions at large scale, which ruined the 
economy of the state and made a mockery of the state 
government. 
The centre Government had no other option except to 
deployment of Army to flush out ULFLAs, The "Operation 
Bajrang" launched to flush out the militancy from the area, 
but it could not fully control in the area. Subsequently 
election was held in June 1991 and a new Congress(l) 
government headed by Hiteshwar Saikia assumes office. Bv 
then the ULFA had become very active. The army was again 
called to assist the state government and "Operation Rhino" 
was launched it was also accompained by a massive public 
relations drive so that the local public could be won over 
there by making thing smooth for the army. In D e c , 1991 
the ULFA announced unconditional and unilateral ceasefire. 
ABSU : ABSU started its agitation because of socio economic 
backwardness feeling of insecurity due to long oppression 
and deprivation, non implementation of tribal welfare 
programmes etc. 
They launched their movement in March 1987, since then 
they have been holding rallies bundhs and indulged in 
violence arson, bomb blasts, blowing up of road and railway 
bridges, vehicles and railway bridges, vehicles and 
derailments of trains. In 1988 ABSU, under Upendra Bharma 
demanded a fifty fifty division of Assam the state goverment 
rejected demand of division of Assam. Violence took the 
deadly shape in which hundreds of people lost their livee^ 
But after blowing hot and cold both the government and 
Bodo militants came to negotiating table, and on 20th Feb. 
1993 the six year old Bodo ethnic issue was settled with the 
signing of an accord on the creation of a Bodo land 
fi 7 Autonomous Council with legislative powers 
But violence once again erupted in raid - 1994 in the 
region of Bodo Autonomous Council (BAG). In QarpetS; 
Bengali speaking Muslims were massacred by Bodo militants, 
has proved that unti 1 1 the problems fit 0V4t.Siri^ fS f^l"^  
grievances of the Assamese people are not solved, the 
violence cannot be controlled in state. 
67. The Times of India, New Delhi, 21st Feb. lyQa. 
Naxalist Violence : 
Violent activities of Naxalists and extremists are 
continued in Andhra Pradesh Bihar, Mazhdya Pradesh Orissa, 
West Bengal, and these violent acts posed a serious threats 
to the internal security of the country. The root cause of 
rising the Naxallism is dissatisfaction, disillusionment, 
inequality and exploitative social system. The non-
imp 1 emntation of land reforms is one of the major factor for 
Naxalist hostility against the state governments. Their 
battle against the opperssive social economic order is more, 
anarchie and rebellious in style as well as In substanoe l>1 
creating lawlessness disorder and chaos. If the sitaution 
is not takcled effectively, it would be create more serious 
and violent situation, which could threaten the very 
foundation of our national security. 
After surveying all these problems we can say that 
there is not very bright picture of current internal 
security scene in India, but there is no need to react in 
anger or panic. India is a large country and its democratic 
institutions and administrative structure, however weak, 
have been able successfully absorbs shocks without giving up 
democrative form of government or disintegrating. 
Now taking as a whole domestic unrest in 3AARC 
countries we find that secessionist demand ot ethnic 
minorities has created dangerous situation. PrtUiStrtfl-, 
India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are multi ethnic societies. 
which are facing separatist or autonomiat movemerit for a 
very long time. These are the Tamil in Sri Lanka, Chakmas 
in Bangladesh, Baluchis, Sindhis and Mohajir in Pakistan and 
Sikh. Kashmiri and Naga, Bodo, etc. in India. 
Chapter - 4 
Security Maintenance in the SAARC 
Member Countries 
The shrinking of our worid has paradoxically broadened 
the perceptual parameters of the term Security. Security is 
the predominant concern of very nation which generally 
implies territorial integrity, stability of the government 
and realization of other national and international 
interests and safe-guarding of the life and property of 
their citizens from any threat external or internal which 
can danage their national core values. There are many 
threats to the security of nation, which come in diverse, 
ways and forms, varying in range and intensity of violence 
and pose risk to the security in diversified manner. it has 
come to be realized that the manifold dimenaiona of security 
demand a more cooperative approach to tackle the threat. 
There are several views on the security of South Asia. 
But these views differ from state to state keeping in view 
their domestic policies and geo-political locations. This 
Is particularly true for the periphery states. While India, 
as a core state, is inclined to evolve a security frame URffe 
15 regional terms, the periphery states tend to be guided by 
intra-regional rivalries leading to trans-regional linkagea. 
Pakistan's security frame work is conditioned by its rivalry 
towards India and by the Afghan problems. Nepal and Bhutan 
have the problems of weak buffer states sandwiched between 
India and China and linked traditionally to the dominant 
regional powers in South Asia. Bangladesh almost surrounded 
by India, is faced with a different set of propositions, 
Sri Lanka and the Maldives are islands republics whose 
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Orientations are bound to be governed not only by their 
status as South Asian states, but also by the Great Power 
Policies in the Indian Ocean-
As the national security of SAARC countries is 
concerned, it is more complicated because of their border 
disputes, inter- state conflicts, terrorism and secessonist 
movement (aided and abetted by outsiders) problems, ethnic 
violences as well as potential of nuclear capability in the 
region. 
Except border deputes between India and Pakistan, the 
terrorism and seccessionist movements have threatened the 
national security of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh. These are as such : the problem of Punjab, 
Kashmir and North East Insurgency in India; Tamil problems 
in Sri Lanka; the Chakmas in Bangladesh; Baluchi, Sindhia, 
Mohajir in Pakistan. All these problems are fast assuming 
grave dimensions, so there is need to take serious fit^p h¥ 
the responsive state governments. 
Combating Terrorism : 
The state which usually in the threat of terrorist act, 
responds to terrorism in various ways. The primary 
objective of such response is to protect the lives, 
properties, the socio economy and political structures, 
values and institutions which are often at jeopardy because 
of terrorist attacks . 
In the contemporary international order, the nation-
state- building, which is a source of binding to nations 
together, is facing a major challenge in the form of 
terrorist activities. This is because discrimination and 
deprivation of minorities in the state- It is clear that in 
containing such problems the governments must address the 
issues that account for the grievances as such. So to 
tackle terrorism problems a government should consider 
economic, social and political issues along with security. 
Chakma Problem : The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) 
constitutes the largest tribal region of Bangladesh was in 
the midst of undeclared war between Chakma terrorists and 
state authority- It was created due to government's 
rejections of the demands for regional autonomy as well as 
separate home land for the CHT's people. Initially it was 
suggested to them to forget their separate identity and 
2 become Bangalees and subsequently government adopted a 
military option for combating terrorism conducted by the 
Shanti Bahini, a military and guerrilla, wing of the 
regional political organization the Parbatya Chat.t.ap.rSffi i^ rtHR 
Sanghati Samity (PCJSS). And for the last eighteen years 
the successive governments as a part of Ouunter t«nOJf-is| 
operations, deployed three brigades of 24th Infantry 
1. Delwar Hossain, Combating Terrorism, "BllS Journal", 
Vol. 15, No. 3, 1994. P. 283. 
2. Amena Mohsin and Bhmitra Chakma, "The Myth of Nation 
Building and Security of Bangladesh, The Case of CNT", 
Paper Presented at a Seminar at BlISS, Aug. 1992, P. 18. 
Division of Bangladesh Army wil.h support of Bangladesh 
Rifles (BDR), Armed Police Battalion and Armed Ansar 
Battalion in the region of CH'T^. Between 1980 to Dec. 
1991, 952, non-tribal and 188 tribal civilian people were 
killed as a consequence of violence . Although at several 
times the government of Bangladesh initiated political 
dialogue and undertook different development programmes like 
CHT Development Board, the special Five Year Plan for CHT 
and the creation of local District councils etc. but maior 
progress towards the solution of problem could be achieved. 
The installation of democratic form of government In 
Bangladesh has opened new hope and recent developments 
demonstrate the viability of the non-coercive measures in 
resolving the CHT issue. 
The government has put special emphasis on political 
methods for resolving the problem of terrorism in the 
region, with the support of all apposition parties such as, 
Awami league, Jatiya Party and Jamaat. The recentlv 
established Parliamentary Committee on the CHT held several 
rounds of peace talks with the PCJSS delegations led by 
Jotlndra Bodi Priya Larma a fire brand Shanti Bahini 
activist . These resulted in the signing of tripartite 
agreement on the repatriation of Chakua refugees tram infj;^ -. 
3. Dhaka Courier, 8 July 1994, P. 9. 
A. Mizanur Rahman Shelley (ed.) The Chittagong Hill Track 
of Bangladesh, the Untold Story, Centre for Deve I opiaerit 
Research, Bangladesh, Dec. 1992, P. 124. 
5. Deiwar Hossain, Op. Cit. P. 295. 
Repatriation of the Bangladeshi tribal refugees from 
India began in a phased manner marks an end to their eight 
years in exile. The first batch of refugees left Sabroom in 
South Tripura to return to their home land via Ramagarh in 
Bangladesh- The successful completion of repatriation has 
not only opened the prospect of resolution of refugees 
problem with India but also indicated how a complex problem 
with terrorist manifestations can be resolved through the 
political negotiation rather than military option. 
The Tamil problem in Sri Lanka : 
The Tamils in Sri Lanka have been degraded and 
humiliated during the past three decades. Discriminatory 
laws deprived them from jobs and business opportunities. 
Reacting angrily to the oppressive measures adopted against 
them, the Tamil Tigers started a violent campaign for an 
independent home- land called Tamil Ee1 am in the northern 
and eastern part of the country. It has been manifested in 
ethnic violence between the Tamil and Singhalese turning 
into a civil war between the Tamil militant organization 
LTTE and Sri Lankan force. 
In July, 1986, President Jayewardene proposed a formula 
for resolving the ethnic crisis-a three-tier structure ot 
local government. A boundary commission was also proposed. 
But his effort could not succeed because of the persistent 
violence in the north eastern region. 
Then President Jayewardene sought help from India tn 
fight LTTE, and on July 27, 1987, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and 
President Jayewardene signed a peace accord in a bid to end 
the ethnic conflict. The IPKF was constituted to ensure 
implementation of the accord. 
But the accord misfired. The militants indulged in 
large scale violence and reprisal killings. And after the 
withdrawal of IPKF the fighting broke out between the Sri 
Lankan Army and the LTTE. Mr. Premadasa has shown greater 
willingness than any of his predecessors to reach an 
agreement with the Tamils. He had set a Parliamentary 
Committee evolve a peace package, but Tamil separatists 
continued their activities. 
In August 1994, the People Alliance Party (PAP) formed 
the government and put serious emphasis on resolving this 
crisis. Prime Minister Chandrika Kumaratunga announced a 
partial lifting of the economic blockade on the war bound 
Northern Province of Sri Lanka in the first ever peace move 
since a ten days cease-fire in January iQyl> 
Following up on her offer of the "hand of friendship" 
to the LTTE, Mrs. Kumaratunga said, "The people of North 
have been badly affected by the embargo. The Government 
wishes to assure the people that it intends to remove, a6 
tar as possible, hardships caused to the normal continuation 
of their daily life. Our government in its quest tor a 
suitable political solution and in its efforts to end the 
war that has had disastrous results on the life of the 
people and on the economy, would do all that is necessary to 
rebuild confidence and trust between the government and the 
Tamil people . While on the otherside the LTTE supremo 
Prabhakaran demanded that the government hold an inquiry 
into the beheading of an LTTE leader Mai 11 and lift the 
embargo and open a safe land route through Sangupiddy. 
Thus the latest peace move offers the best chance for 
peace in Sri Lanka since the ethnic problem blew up in 1983. 
Moreover, the timing la fortuitous. Prabhakaran realizes 
that the Tamils are weary of deprivation and war. 
Militarily the stalemate continues and in recent months it 
is the Sri Lankan Army which has claimed more successes than 
the LTTE- Finally Kumaratunga's move in partially lifting 
the economic embargo in Jaffna with-in days of her swearing 
has given the indication that she is serious about solving 
the ethnic problem, unlike her three predecessors. The 
Tiger's official response calling for unconditional talks 
has been equally heartening. 
Kashmir Issue : J & K is the most terrorist affected state 
in India. Recently the government of India has taken P^ rtft^ TI 
significant steps in tackling the militancy problems in 
Kashmir. First is the release of the three prominent 
leaders, Mr. Shabir Shah of the people's league, Syed Ali 
6. Embargo on LTTE - held province, partially lifted" The 
Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 1st Sep. 1994. 
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Shah Geelani of the Jammati-e-islami and Mr. Abdul Gani lone 
of the people's conference, is a new hope that the long 
delayed political process in the state will receive and 
added impetus in the coming months. This is a significant 
development and a distinct gain for those- Who have been 
urging that a political dialogue should be set in motion 
with a view to speeding up the electoral process in the 
state. 
In September 1994 the State Government issued a 
notification asking the delimitation commission to commence 
its work. 
Operation Shanti : Coordinated operations against the 
militants by the Army and the Rashtriya Rifles have helped 
restoring normalcy in the troubled Doda district. This 
welcome change came after a troubled period which witnessed 
a number of curfew, heavy casualties among security torcea, 
looting and killing and migration of a number or famxlieB tO 
neighboring Hlmachal Pradesh. 
The various operations launched by the Army under the 
code name Operation Shanti as part of a three Pronged 
strategy under which militants were cornered troro thp 
An&ntnag district in the Kashmir valley, which adjoins Doda 
and Sarthal in Jaromu and from the lower hills of Doda. The 
militants found themselves in a hopeless situation and were 
now on the run. 
Development Package : Besides taking political measures, 
the centre has also worked out an economic package and 
planed administrative changes in J & K to bring back the 
state to normality. 
The centre has also approved Rs. 750 crores for the 
state from the planned funds and Rs. 20O crores more are 
expected to be cleared soon primarily to fund 
infrastructura1 projects like the building of roads, 
bridges, schools and expedite power projects. 
A committee of secretaries and other senior officers of 
the central government headed by the cabinet secretary has 
been visiting the state from time to time to make an 
aaseasnent of the law and order situation and oversee 
developmental works there. 
The centre has cleared the state governments proposal 
to allow horticulture in private lands for which liberal 
loans would be provided under the employment assurance 
scheme. 
On Feb. 22, 1994, both Houses of Parliament unanimously 
adopted a resolution that the state of J & K is, and shai 1 
remain, an integral part of India and reiterated the Indian 
peoples resolve to resist any attempts at separating it from 
the rest or the country. It called upon Pakistan to vacate 
the areas of the state it had occupied through aggreaalonai 
It noted with concern Pakistan imparting of training to 
terrorists in camps in Pakistan and POK, and its supply of 
W^dpQne and assistance in infiltration of trained militants 
in order to create disorder and disharmony. The resolution 
pointed out that India had the necessary will and capacity 
to counter efforts aimed at attacking its Unity Sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. 
North East Insurgency Problems : 
The whole parts of north-east are under the separatist 
threat. The first political dissidence movement came from 
Naga Hills people in 1956. After that similar demand came 
from Mizos in 1964, Manipur in the mid-Seventies and since 
Eighties Assam under the drive provided by ULFA & Bodo. 
The insurgency turmoil has taken hold in Arunachal Pradesh 
and Tripura also. The insurgency problem in north- east is 
caused of political, social and economic deprivation and 
ethnic identity. At the initial stage of insurgency the 
political, administrative and military authorities could not 
deal effectively. 
The Army and other PMF were deployed a number of times 
for counter insurgency and anti terrorist operations. In 
Assam the Army carried out operations "Bajrang" and "Rhino". 
To tackle insurgency the Army used a number of division 
(during Rhino) to break ULFA networks on the ground. The 
major improvement during Rhino was better intelligence, 
improve civil military interface and overall command and 
control, with stress on psychological warfare operations. 
To tackle the insurgency problem and to bring the 
alienated societies into national main stream the 
ailitaristic solution is not only sufficient but the 
government should have follow the policy to solve the socio 
economic and political problems which are the root causes ot 
insurgency. This would include : 
1. Establishment of covert contact with insurgent groups 
by control intelligence agencies with a view to : 
a) soften extant inimical attitudes, 
b) Establish reliable lines of communications for 
the initiation of a dialogue at the appropriate 
time, 
c) split the insurgency into manageable proportions 
for effective neutralization through application 
of minimum force. 
2. Launch a concerted drive to generate a aodern infra 
structure to enhance the quality of life in keeping with 
standards achieved in other more developed parts of India. 
This should include = 
a) Development of Surface communication to the remotest 
parts. 
b) Provision of modern medical facilities 
c) electrification to reach out to every village. 
d) A comprehensive network of educational facilities to 
create a society with the capacity to provide its own 
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manpower needs to meet the challenge of deve I opnient. 
3. Introduction of a comprehensive economic and industrial 
package, that would contribute directly to the growth 
of the region. 
4. Well before the counter insurgency operations are put 
into action, the government must draw up a pragmatic 
and ga^in full rehabilitation programme, for the 
misguided insurgents, those are neutralized by the 
Army. 
In January 1994, the intelligence coordination network 
setup in the North Eastern region has gradually begun pay 
dividends with the law enforcement agencies now in a 
position to often pre-empt the tactical moves of underground 
insurgent organizations . 
In Meghalaya, the intelligence techniques have got 
maximum success with the dreaded Achik Liberation Matgrik 
Army (ALMA) completely devastated and compelled them to 
surrender. 
Similarly, another under ground organization, the 
Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALO, operating in 
the Khasi Hills has been on the run with nine ot it's hard 
core leaders in police custody under TADA. 
In the beginning of 1995, a high level meeting or ail 
7. Striking N.E. insurgency at its roots. The Hindustan 
Time, New Delhi, 20 Aug. 1994. 
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heads of police of the seven North Eastern state was held, 
to formulate an action plan to tackle various problems 
including insurgency facing the region. 
Director General of Tripura Police B.J.K., Thampi said 
that besides the ongoing insurgency problems in the region 
the modernization of state police forces close coordination 
among the police of the N-E states, supply ot related 
information, problem of security personnel, preparations of 
backgrounds for a specific information about various under 
ground militant out fits has thoroughly discussed in the 
meeting . 
A senior Union Home Ministry official said that 
considering the growing support being received by various 
rebel outfits of the N - E region from across the border, 
the centre had taken special initiatives with the 
Bangladesh, Myanraar and Nepal Governments to impress upon 
them India's serious concern and to obtain their 
cooperation. 
Bodo Accord : Both the Assam Government and All Bodo 
students Union reached on agreement table and in February 
1993, an accord was signed. The objective of the Bodo 
accord has been stated as the provision of maximum autonomy 
to the Bodos with the framework of the constitution. A 
8. The Hindustan Times, 18 Jan., 1994. 
Bodoland Autonomous council (BAG) is contemplated consisting 
of 40 members of 35 are to be elected. It has given powers 
to make laws, rules and orders for application with in the 
BAG area on 38 subjects. 
But the government cannot be a fuiproof guarantee for 
peace in Assam. As the problems of outsiders and grievances 
of the Assamese people are not solved- The recent massacre 
of Bengali speaking Muslim in Barpeta by the Bodo militant 
has again alarmed the sensitivity of ethnic problem. 
For decades, the centre has struggled to evolve a 
strategy for the entire region. Its knee-jerk reaction is 
not limited to Bodo militancy but can be seen in every maloi 
conflict that has racked this lush green land, generously 
endowed by nature, watered by powerful rivers, home to hills 
and plains, jungle and fertile farms and sanctuary to dozen 
linguistic and ethnic groups. 
Pakistan Crisis ; 
At present Pakistan is in the midst of intra-regiona1 
and inter-sectarian Gonflict, that is because ot 
discrimination and non-fulfillment of their long standing 
demands. 
Despite prolonged military operations in Sindh, the 
agitation by the Sindhis as well as the Muhaiir Quoml 
movement (MQM), has not abated. Glashes between Shia and 
Sunni organizations continue with increasing severity and 
the tribais in NWFP are in ferment because their political 
and economic aspirations have not been met. 
Aa in the Baluchistan the intense perceptions of 
repression and deprivation and desire to asset their 
political and economic rights led to revolt against the 
centre. So there is need to try and incorporate the 
Baluchis Into the national mainstream. Schemes should have 
devised for improving the economic social and cultural 
levels of the people. There is need to be made feel master 
of their natural resources. 
Now a days Karachi has become the killing fields of 
Pakistan. Ethnic violence has reached the proportion at a 
civil war. 
With t>»e gang war and killings between two ethnic 
factions continuing in Karachi, the Benazir government has 
intensified efforts at dialogue with MQM to restore peace in 
Pakistan's biggest port city. 
Since the withdrawal of troops from Sindh in October 
1994 over 2000 people have been killed in the violence S^HP^ 
the army launched a cleanup operation in Sindh province on 
June 19, 1992 to eliminate dacoits, saboteurs and 
terror i sts". 
Ma. Bhutto has entrusted the job of holding 
negotiations with the MQM which represents the mtevp^t.s f|| 
the Moha j i rs. 
But MQM'a Farooq Sattar, who is leader of the 
opposition in the Sindh Assembly suggests, "contact between 
the highest leader ship of both parties is essential for the 
9 
success of dialogue" . 
Mr. Altaf Hussain the founder of MQM blamed Benazir 
government and Army for large scale violence in Sindh. He 
said, since the Army is against the Muhajirs no political 
leaders, Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif if included dare 
sympathize with them- He demanded that injustices could be 
removed, to some extent if the Muhajirs were given a 
. 10 
separate province 
Ms. Bhutto has imposed emergency to control violence 
and order to take vigorous action against the culprits, even 
though the violence is not stopped. And now the impartial 
democrative government and devolution of real political and 
administrative power will take. Pakistan back from the 
brink of fissiparous tendencies and turmoil. 
As the question of maintenance of regional security in 
South Asia is concerned. We have to go through several 
different ways to explain that objective. These are as 
foilows : 
1. He gemonics it Deterrence 
2. Nuclear weapons Free Zone or Denuclearizations. 
9. The Hindustan Times, 18 December, 19Q4. 
10. ibid. 
3. Confidence Building Measures. 
4. Economic & Trade Cooperations. 
5. Social Development, 
6. Regional Cooperation. 
1. Hegemonic and Deterrence : 
In every regional system, there may be two sorts of 
hegemons : one powerful outside states and powerful regional 
states. Both have the capacity to impose peace by the 
deployment of superior capabilities. It may rest on 
military or economic capabilities or both of them. 
South Asia, with its geopolitical and strategical 
location, attracted outsides big powers to involve in the 
regional affairs. Britain, U.S.A., Soviet Union it uh^ fl?^  
have from time to time, intervened in regional affairs. 
More or less, all have attempted to bring primarily India 
and Pakistan together to avert polarization and war in the 
sub continent. But their attempts were geo-political 
motivated. Since 1947, the extra-regional powers were 
involved continuously to bring their type of peace to the 
region. Britain and USA from 1948-63, the Soviet Union from 
1064, 1969, Iran from 1969-79 and US since 1980^^ Britain as 
an influential member of European community and USA with its 
11. See Kanti Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, "Cooperative 
Security and South Asian insecurity" in Jaune Nolan 
(ed.). Shared Destiny, Cooperation and Security in 21st 
Century (Washington D.C., Brookings Instutions tor the 
coming) for a brief recovery of this history of outsider 
involvement in the region. 
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military and economic superiority have had greater 
involvement in the region. The Soviet Union and China 
possessed the military attributes ot a hegemon although 
12 their economic and discursive power was limited . But trom 
1947 to 1989, no one was in a position to play hegemonistic 
role in South Asia due to their cold War rivalry. But after 
the end of cold war and the collapse ot Soviet Union its 
major successor, the Russian Federation, is surrounded by 
enormous internal political, economic and social problems 
which prevent her to play an active role in any other region 
except the Balkans. The US with its military, economic and 
political superiority remain the only super power. The US 
•ay be overextending itself, but it is to use Joseph. Nye's 
13 
nicely ambiguous phrase, "bound to lead". However China 
is already a quasi-superpower in Asia, and no region in this 
continent can escape the shadow of Chinese military power. 
The US claims to desire peace and stability in South 
Asia because it is anxious to stop if not roll back nuclear 
proliferation worldwide. It finds that Indo-Pak conflict on 
the Kashmir issue could lead to war and even escalate to 
nuclear war. As Uashington observed that the Indo-Pak 
crisis of 1987 and 1990 could have turned into nuclear war. 
12. Stephen Clarkson Shows how even at the height of its 
involvement with India, the Soviet Unjion had little 
intellectual impact on Indians. See, his "The low 
impact of Soviet Writing and Aid on Indian Thinking and 
Policy", Survey 20 (Writer 1974), PP. 1-23. 
13. Joseph s. Nye, Bound to lead. The Changing Nature ot 
American Power (New York Basic Books, 1990). 
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They havB pressed forward US diplomacy to co someth'.ng about 
proliferation and on Kashmir "dispute which they find as the 
, . . 1 4 primary cause of tension 
The principal deputy assistant secretary of state for 
South Asian affairs under Clinton administration. Mr. John 
Malott has said "In the aftermath of the cold-war as far as 
South Asia is concerned, the Clinton administration has the 
15 following objectives : achieving regional stability and 
nuclear non-proliferations, promoting democracy and respect 
for human rights, encouraging economic reform and obtaining 
greater access for US trade and investment, countering 
terrorism and narcotics, preserving unhampered maritime and 
naval transit rights and addressing global issues such as 
population growth, AIDS, refugees and environment, "And the 
primary interest of the Clinton administrations is to reduce 
tensions and prevent a war between India and Pakistan. As 
the Kashmir dispute is concerned, the US position governs 
1 Fi 
with three basic principles . First, the US considers all 
of Kashmir to be disputed territory on both sides of the 
line of control. Second, the issue should be settled 
peacefully between India and Pakistan. Third the United 
States is prepared to be helpful in this process. 
14. Seymour Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge ", The New Vorker, 
29, March 1993, for the View that the nuclear dimension 
of the crisis and the prospect of war has been 
exaggerated by Hersh and the authors of critical Mass. 
See C. Raga Mohan "Claims on 1990 crisis Disputed." The 
Hindu,I 18 Feb., 1994, which cities various US Policy 
makers in and outside the region to this effect. 
15. "US ready to help settle Kashmir issue". The Times ot 
India, 20 May, 1993, New Delhi. 
16. Ibid. 
I -^ -
Ms. Lynn & Davis, US undersecretary of state for Arms 
control and International Security Affairs has said : " We 
are embarked on a step by step approach to cap, reduce and 
then eliminate from South Asia weapons of mass destruction 
and ballistic missile delivery system," She further urged 
1 f^ 
India and Pakistan to commit : 1) to a no first deployment 
pledge or ballistic missiles, 2) Not to produce fissile 
materials for nuclear weapons, as a steptowards the global 
fissile, material cutoff convention, and 3) Not to test a 
nuclear device in advance of a CTB comprehensive test ban 
treaty. She also explained that, both India and Pakistan 
could quickly assemble a small number of nuclear weapons and 
each is acquiring ring or delivering weapons of mass 
19 destruction to the other's population centre. While both 
have fought three times and future conflict risks quickly 
escalating into nuclear war". 
Recently US under Secretary of STate for Political 
Affairs Peter Tarnoff also made clear that the Clinton 
administration will continue it's non-proliferation goal 
20 
with India and Pakistan 
Beijing's stand on various regional quo conflicts such 
as Kashmir and on India's internal problems especially in 
17. "US to eliminate N-arms in S. Asia", 11 Dec. 1994. The 
Hindustan Times, New Delhi. 
18. Ibid. 
19. ibid. 
20. "US to continue non-proliferation efforts in S. Asia", 
The Hindustan Times, 13 Jan., 1995, New Delhi. 
21 the North Eastern regiona has recently been enOQUPftSmg i 
China's Interest in peace is related to its border and 
bigger anbition to become the third or forth largest 
economic power- For this it has becone necessary to reduce 
tensions in and around its borders. Therefore, Beijing has 
engaged India in a process of confidence building including 
22 force reductions along the border 
As the hegemonous status is concerned, it can bring 
peace in three ways; It nay through, superior power deaand 
peace, with the threat ultimately that economic and military 
power can be applied to achieve goal, or they may promise to 
underwrite a peace by economic and other rewards. ONe more 
view is that It is the power to make and enforce. The "rules 
of the game". Which encourages or constrain certain types 
of behaviour. The ultimate threat may be the threat of 
economic sanctions or denial and military coercion. 
It is doubtful that both US and China will combine to 
put military or economic pressure on South Asian countries. 
Because they have a parallel interest in a peaceful, stable 
21. Diplomatic relations between India and China were 
relaxed in 1976 and both countries resumed trade 
relation. Indian Foreign Minister Bajpayee visited 
Beinlng which led to the reopening of border talks and 
in June 1980 Beijing declared Kashmir to be a bilateral 
problem between India St Pak. See Rose mary foot the 
Sino-Soviet complex and South Asia, in bary Buzan, 
Gewner Rizvi, Rizvi, Rosemary Foot and Nancy Jetly South 
Asian Insecurity and the GReat Powers (London HacmillaTl 
IQ86). 
22. On India - China confidence building measures, see Kanti 
Bajpai and Bonnie Coe, "Across the High Himalayas t 
Confidence Building Measures Between India and China 
After the Cold War, "A paper for the Hehry L. Stimaon 
Cenre, Washington, D.C. 
14c 
South Asia, but they are differed on nuoJear proliferations 
issue. The US is against, proliferation. It opposes the 
spread of nuclear weapons and nissiles. It finds 
proliferation as a powerful device of destablisation in the 
region. No doubt China has signed the NPT but renains 
soften on proliferation, arguing that while it opposes the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction, states must too go 
according to their security needs. Thus China by adopting 
this policy of continues nuclear exercise and also helping 
Pakistan's nuclear and Dissiles programnes. 
At present China is in a process of becoaing a first 
rank global power, so it is not at hegeaonically placed in 
relations to South Asia. Since a long tine China has been a 
Pakistani ally and has a substantial arns relationship with 
Islaaabad. On the other side its relations with India are 
improving and both the two countries have instituted a 
confidence building measures (CBM) process, have started 
serious talks on border dispute and troop reductions along 
the border, and have liberalized border trade and opened 
their border for trade. China has reassured India on 
Kashmir and India continues to reassure China on Tibet . 
By giving its diplomatic friendship and arms relationship 
with Pakistan, improved rations with India, and the wish for 
23. Haroon Habib, "Kashmir Issue should be solved 
Bilaterally", The Hindu, 28 Feb. 199A. 
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a peaceful and stable ilouth Asia, Beijing desires to play a 
role in •oderating Isla»abad*s stand on various India-
Pakistan issues. 
Recently Chinese President Jiang Zeain, during his 
talks with Pakistani President Farooq Ahnad Khan Leghari, 
favoured the estabiishaent of nuclear weapon freazone in 
South Asia and supported efforts to promoted South Asian 
regional cooperation. Being a close neighbour of the South 
Asian nations, China supported such efforts and it wanted 
O A 
the region to "maintain peace, stability and development" 
As the economic factors were getting much importance in 
international relation and hence, promoting "detente and 
seeking development" are becoming the world's mainstream 
trends. Therefore, China hoped as he said, the countries in 
the region would on the basis of the five principles of 
coexistence develop good neighbourly nations for common 
25 progress 
But the US dominance in the world politics restrains 
China to play a modest role in South Asia. US does not want 
to give-up its leadership in South Asia to China, which is 
the greatest threat to the US power in the 21st Century. 
Recently, US diplomates John Mallott and Robin Raphel 
have announced that the primary interest of the Clinton 
24. China Favours N. free Zone for South Asia", The 
Hindustan Time, 4 Decmber 1994. New Delhi. 
25. Ibid. 
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adBiniatratioTi in South Asia is to reduce tensions and 
prevent a war between India and Pakistan. It in a part of 
Washington's effort to move back to what it finds as a aore 
balanced and more mediatory position between India and 
Pakistan. In addition the us has offered to peace itself in 
resolving the Kashmir dispute, and clarified that any India 
Pakistan agreement on Kashmir should take into account 
Kashmiri opinion . But US has taken tough step on non-
proliferation issue. It imposed economic sanction on India 
(1970-82) and Pakisan (1979-80) for their refusal to sign 
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty CNPT). Again in 1990 
Pakistan came in to grip of US sanction under Pressler Act, 
because of Pakistan's Nuclear Programme. In 1992, US 
imposed sanctions for two years against Indian Space 
REsearch Organization (ISROS) and Russian Space Agency 
Glavkosmos on Cryogenic rocket technical deal and put 
pressure on India not to deploy the short range Prithvi 
missile and also stop all further development of the medium 
range Agni missile. US also took the lead in urging other 
Western powers to call on India to give up its missile 
27 programme. All these efforts of the US may bring peace anu 
stability in South Asia, but it depend on India and Pakistan 
how they response. 
Other than extra regional powers, India's Hegemonous 
26. USIS entitled "Raphel offers South Asian Overview for 
Senate Panel, A Feb. 1994. 
27. The Hindustan Times, August, 30, 1994. New Delhi. 
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Power Position inside South Asia also determine a PactJ 8c 
security in S. Asia. This predoninant position is due to 
its size, population, natural resources, ailitary capability 
and geo-political location and econoaic power deterained 
peace and security in South Asia. With respect of the 
smaller states in South Asia, India enjoys a militarily and 
economically hegemonic position. Over the years many 
disputes have irked their relations but India and other 
smaller states have not resort to war. Undoubtedly Indian 
military and economic power is so vastly superior to the 
power of any combinations of smaller states in South Asia 
that no one is in a position to confront New Delhi for long^ 
Other than military and economic power India has 
partially succeeded in articulating a vision of its role 
which was accepted by the smaller states, that is Nehru's 
non-alignment and Panchsheel bigger than a purely regional 
dominance. Besides these two policies India has been more 
successful in its insistence on bilateralism. It la 
bilateralism that has prevented a gang up of smaller states 
against India and has limited the intervention of outsiders 
in regional affairs. New Delhi has a series of agreement 
and treaties with Bangladesh, Bhutan Nepal, Pakistan Sri 
Lanka and Maldives. There are two types of treaties and 
agreements relating to specific issues e.g. trade, transit, 
migrants, territory and borders and general purpose 
agreement are to seek to regulate the nature of the overaJ1 
relationship e.g. the Indian Bangladesh treaty of 1972, the 
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India-Bhutan security treaty of 1949, the India - Nepal 
treaty of 1950. The India-Pakistan Tashkent and Si«la 
agreeaents of 1966 and 1972 respectively and the India Sri 
28 Lanka accord 1987 etc. 
Naturally India's predoainance and occasional 
•anifestation of its strength, even though at the concerned 
countries, request have aroused suspicions and proapted 
criticism as welt as cynical coaments. 
Soae knowledgeable and experienced observes of the 
international scene hold the view that India is bound to 
play a bigger international role in the years to coae. Dr. 
Henry Kissinger said on Septenber 12, 1988, that "India will 
assuae over the next decade soae of the security functions 
now exercised" by Washington in Asia. He feels that India 
will seek to be the strongest country in the sub-continent 
and will atteapt to prevent the eaergence of any other ma lor 
29 power in Indian Ocean or South East Asia . 
Deterrent Peace : 
Deterrence also has becoae an instruaent in 
aaintenance of peace and security. After the second world 
war, nuclear deterrence played a major role in restraining 
28. Bajpai Kanti, "Pathways to Peace in South Asia", B U S S 
Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1994, PP.131. 
29. "A Memo to the next (US) President", News Week Sep-Oct. 
1992. 
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both the two super powers from resorting to war. Although 
India's relations with its smaller neighbours are called 
hegemonic, the relationship with Pakistan is closer to the 
deterrence. Since 1971, both the two sides have maintained 
an uneasy deterrent peace. With the nuclearisation of the 
sub-continent. South Asia is moving toward a deterrent 
system based on conventional and nuclear threats. As 
deterrence is not in a position to bring stability in South 
Asia, so India and Pakistan need to incorporate confidence 
building measures (CBM> and arms control into their military 
relationship. 
Glenn Synder has declared that deterrence. Works 
through denial and punishments 2 One can deter by 
convincing a potential attacker that one has the will and 
means to deny it a tangible military obiective, and one can 
deter by convincing a potential attacker that one has the 
will and the means to impose unacceptable levels of 
punishment 
In the case of India Pakistan, deterrence has operated 
at the conventional level and turning towards the nuclear 
level. At the conventional level, both countries have opted 
for a combination of denial and punishment. Both have built 
up various forms of static defence along the border breaking 
30. Glenn Synder, Deterrence and Defence, Toward a Theory of 
National Security Princeton, Princeton University Presa, 
1961. 
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thiough ami gaining territory or turning towards key nerve 
centres. But since 1971, they have attempted to refine 
"offensive defence" posture's which are postures of 
punishaent. 
At the nuclear level several different option are 
31 
adopted in India, one can identity the following : 1) "All 
horizon Strategy", this involves an ambitious progranae 
geared eventually to face all types of threats nuclear but 
also conventional from far and near rivals. 2) MiniauB 
deterrence it does not hick the possession of nuclear 
weapons, but it advertises their availability, and both two 
countries have declared their nuclear potential. 3) Short 
order-weaponisation, recessed deterrence and nuclear 
32 increaentatisn . In general there may be non-weaponised 
deterrence. A Non - weaponised posture is one in which the 
components of a deliverable weapon have been or are near to 
being assembled with the confidence. that when device ie 
fully assembled it will reach to target. These postures may 
or may not require any test, computer stimulated testing may 
31. B. Kanti, Op. Cit., PP. 135. 
32. George Perkovitch's article "A Nuclear Third Way?" 
Foreign Policy, Fall 1993, on short order weaponization, 
Jasjlt Singh, Director IDSA, New Delhi, is the author of 
the nation of recessed deterrence", Manoj Joshi of the 
Times of India has referred to India's missile and 
nuclear tests as technology demonstrators, "Joshi seems 
to suggest that an incrementa1ist programmes consists of 
progressively ordered demonstrations of technological 
cometens nay be enough todeter. 
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Mr. Nawaz Sharif's statement regarding Pakistan's 
nuclear capability have confirmed, the reality What India 
had been trying to convinced the world. When Pakistan has 
already acquired the nuclear capability, it nuclear 
programae in future could be used in alliance with other 
nuclear power. The strategic land Scape is continued to 
change in Central Asia, but one can see Iranian Pakistani, 
Chinese strategic cooperation- This could include a Nuclear 
Kazakhistan that would in effect surround India-Pakistan 
would feel more secure about its position via-a-vis India 
and both China and Pakistan would benefit from the attendant 
change in South Asian Balance of Power. 
At this juncture the only nuclear weapon acquisition 
remains an option for India to deter nuclear weapons for 
both national security and regional stability. 
But the transparent nuclear environment in South Asia 
has developed consciousness for a dialogue on confidence 
building measures (CBM) and arms control as a means to 
stabilize mutual nuclear postures. CBMs and arms control are 
a means of stabilizing deterrence and they can confirm that 
capabilities are tried to deterrence postures and not to 
33. The key questions regarding short order weapon!sation 
for deterrences are how quickly should one be able to go 
from an unassembled to an asssembled, deliverable 
weapon, how many of these should a country posses, what 
targets will they threaten counter value or counter 
force (convention or nucclear weapons), where should be 
different comraponents be stored in disparsed locations 
or not, who will ble them in in shalter sitautions. 
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first strike postures and they can ojtiaw practices, 
deployments and systens which aay be seen as aggressive 
rather than defensive; they can help define each side's 
provocabi1ity and commitaent, and if deterrence is likely to 
fail, they can provide structure for crisis aanagenent 
South Asia is in process of CBM India and Pakistan have 
35 
agreed to various aeasures . But they have yet to start a 
serious a m s control process. It is necessary for both two 
countries at the conventional and nuclear level and in 
respect of the nuclear, both have to turn away froa 
ambiguity to overtones. But, it is not so easy a process, 
because of some problems. First, some conventional arms 
control measures, such as force level and deployments are 
linked to internal security requirements. Second, India's 
concerns regarding Chinese conventional and nuclear 
capability will have to be accommodated . Even inspite of 
these problems if India and Pakistan reach to stable mutual 
deterrence at the strategic levels based on conventional and 
nuclear weapons, there remain the problems of deterrence at 
the sub-strategic level. 
The Asia-Society reported that, "Politically a non-
weaponised deterrence regime has something for everyone. It 
3A. Kanti Bajpai, op.cit., PP. 138. 
35. Moonia Ahmad, Karachi University, "India-pak CBMs and 
the Normalizations Process", Glob,e Febn., IQQa, PP. a?" 
59. 
36. India should keep N. option open. The Statesman, 4 March 
1994. 
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allows New Telhi and Islamabad to maintain the same levels 
of mutual deterrence they enjoy today. It does not force 
two reluctant governments to reverse their nuclear 
programmes or sign the NPT, both of which are politically 
risky propositions under present circumstances. For 
Washington's a non-weaponised deterrence regime would 
achieve the Clinton Administration's goal of capping India's 
37 and Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. 
Non-Nuclearisatln in South Asia 
The threat and dangers inherent in the very existence 
of nuclear weapons are Universally recognized. Therefore, 
it is need of a rational approach towards ensuring the 
survival and prosperity of mankind by seeking both de-
nuclearization, where nuclear weapons and associated 
Infrastructure already exist, and non-nuclearization of the 
regions and areas where they have not spread so far. In 
both of them, non-nuclearization would be a more easily 
attainable ob.lective than denuclearization as historical 
fact is that de-militarisation is more difficult to achieve 
than non-militarisation. Non-nuclearization has been sought 
by individuals and states, through three types of mechanism 
(i) Voluntary renunciation by individual states (ii) 
establishment of nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) and (iii) 
37. "Deter without weapons?" N.C. Menon, The Hindustan 
Times, 11 February, 1995. 
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the Treaty of non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons (NPT). 
As the matter of non-nuclearization in South Asia is 
concerned, India constitutes the solitary example of a state 
which has voluntarily abstained from acquiring nuclear 
weapons inspite of demonstrated capability do so. It is 
really an only viable approaches to resolve the conflicting 
and contradictory demands of sovereignty and national power 
(with nuclear weapons representing absolute power) on one 
aide and threat posed by nuclear weapons to the very 
survival of the human race on the other. 
The second approach to non-nuclearization has been 
through regional measures of nuclear weapon free zone. The 
predominant factor leading to the development of Interest is 
the concept of nuclear weapon freezones (NWFZ). There has 
been a complete absence of nuclear Weapons from various 
areas of the globle where suitable condition exist for the 
creation of such zones to spurt the nations concerned from 
the threat of nuclear attack or involvement in the nuclear 
war, to isake a positive contribution towards general and 
complete disarmament and thereby to strengthen international 
38 peace and security 
In South Asia the proposal for Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone was first proposed by Pakistan, especially just after 
38. UN comprehensive study of the Questions of NWFZs in al1 
its Aspects (New York, 1976), P. 29. 
India's nuclear expulsion in May 1974. Pakistanis proposal 
came up before the 29th Session of UN General Assembly. In 
its explanatory menorandum Pakistan stressed the urgency and 
39 
need for establishing a NUFZ in South Asia . Pakistan 
pleaded that since all the countries of South Asia had 
already proclaimed their opposition to the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons or to the introduction of such weapons into 
the region, this common denominator could form the basis of 
an agreement to establish a NUFZ in South Asia. Pakistan 
considers this proposal as complementary to Indian Ocean 
Peace Zone proposal. This signifies the assumptions that 
with drawal of naval forces of the super powers would not 
make the Indian ocean a peace zone as this would also 
require regional detente, denunciation of nuclear weapons by 
the Indian ocean states and mutual and balanced force 
reduction among the key regional states 
During the discussion in the general Assembly on 27th 
of Sept. 1974 the Pakistani delegate Mr. Ahmad said; " Other 
countries of South Asia have also proclaimed their 
opposition to the introduction of nuclear weapons in to the 
region or their acquisition.... Pakistan feels that this 
common desire of al1 states of South Asia needs to be 
translated into a formal arrangement. Ue are confident that 
all members of the UN that desire to promote a climate at 
39. Tiwari, H-D. (Dr. "India and the Problem of Nuclear 
Proliferation", New Delhi, 1988, PP. 108-
40. Rais Rasul, B., "The Indian Ocean and the Super Powers", 
New Delhi, 1987, P. 169-
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peace in South Asia and atl those that like as feel 
concerned at the prospect of nuclear proliferation will 
welcone, the proposal to declare, the South Asian region as 
nuclear free zone . Before and after the nuclear explosion 
of 1974, India constantly proclaimed that it would use 
nuclear energy only for peace full purpose. Mr. Jaipal on 
Indian representative in discussion said on NWFZ issue. 
" any proposal to establish a NUFZ in any part of the 
world is an important question as it would engage the vital 
interests of all the countries in the zone. It would have 
been natural, therefore, for the countries in the proposed 
zone, first to discuss among them selves the necessity for 
NUFZ, this has not happened**. 
India further asserted that it would be undesirable for 
the General Assembly to declare a particular area in the 
world a nuclear free zone without the prior agreement of the 
countries in the area. While regarding India's views on 
NWFZ Mr. Jaipal again said, "We have supported the 
establishment of such zones only when the states within the 
zone have agreed among them selves and where suitable 
conditions exist for their establishment . 
The Indian view is that South Asia is only a subregion 
and an integral part of the region of Asia and the Pacific, 
41. UN Document A/PV 2247 (New York 27 Sep. 1974) PP> 42. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid. 
50 it is necessary to tike Into account the st.'curity 
environment of the region as a whole . No doubt India 
supported the idea of NWFZ, but with sone reservation. It 
stated that suitable conditions should exist in the region 
and all the countries should adhere to it. In India's view, 
the South Asian countries are surrounded by the nuclear 
weapon states or countries belonging to their alliance. The 
existence of nuclear weapons in the region of Asia and the 
pacific and presence of foreign military bases in the Indian 
ocean have complicated the security environment of the whole 
region. In this situation the establishment of NWFZ in the 
sub region of South Asia is in appropriate . India, again 
reaffirm its stand that the whole world should be free of 
nuclear weapons. Subregionalisation would not only be in 
consistent with the global approach to the question but 
would also change it from a universal to a subregional or 
regional concept 
In June, 1990, Pakistan again proposed for five nations 
conference on NWFZ in South Asia. This proposal had been 
given high priority by the then US President Mr. Gsorfje 
Bush. Besides India and Pakistan, the US wanted to involve 
Russia and China in an effort to find a regional 
settlement . India maintained its position on nuclear non-
hh. UN Comprehensive Study in NWFZs, op.cit., PP. 28. 
45. Tiwari, H.D. op.cit. PP.110. 
A6. "Disarmament Year Book", 1977, <New York 1977) PP. 181. 
47. Ram, N. "India's Nuclear Policy; the Basic issues at 
stake", in Frontline, 28 Feb., 1992, P. 39. 
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proliferation, P.M. P.V. Narsiraha Rao said, that "this 
sensitive issue could not be discussed in a vaccum. He 
argued Mr. Bush to take up the issue in a larger world 
perspective, Rao made it clear that the Pak's proposal was 
inadequate since India shared a border with China which has 
nuclear weapons. So at this juncture the whole idea of a 
nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia has become aeaning 
less after the Pakistan's confirmation that she does possess 
all essential components of the nuclear bomb which it can 
asseble in a moment. 
Pakistan has used nuclear ambiguity to its fullest 
advantage. China already is having nuclear weapons, so in 
this context of mistrust and uncertainty a nuclear weapons 
Free zone will be a misnomer in South Asia 
Thus, the problem of non proliferation has to be solved 
outside the spheres of NWFZ and NPT. An alternative has to 
be searched with the consensus of all the countries in the 
region and other nuclear weapons states to attain non-
proliferation. Any voluntary, honorable, equitable 
arrangement which has a long term perspective and is in the 
benefit of human kind would be the only solution to non 
pro 1 iferation . 
Pakistan from time to time has put several proposals, 
48. Hiremath, Jagdish R. "Nuclear Option; Ambiguity is 
useful. The Hindustan Times, 29, January, 1992. 
49. Ibid. 
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mutual renunciation, a nuclear weapon freezone in South Asia 
and .joint signing of the NPt. On the other side India has 
made one proposal which is comprehensive nuclear 
disarmament. Bhutan had also proposed for nuclear weapon 
free zone along with Nepal . India has reitrated that the 
proposal for establishing a Nuclear weapon free zone should 
not be imposed from outside but it should come from with in 
the concerned region. More over Region, a geographical 
concept, is hardly recognized by the long range guided 
nuclear delivery system's of nuclear have states. So there 
should not be a limited approach to the question of freedom 
from nuclear threats and dangers and therefore, the whole 
World should be declared a nuclear free zone 
The third mechanism for non-nuclearisation is a 
coroporate attempt at a global plane in the form of the NPt. 
The NPT intended to incorporate the two obiectives of non-
nuclearisation as well as de-nuclearisation. It is 
unfortunate that both objectives have totally failed, 
because of its discriminatory treaty setting the haves apart 
from the have notes, perpetuating the asymnentry, rather 
than seek progressive non-nuclearisation as well 
denuclearisation of the globe. Where as the India's policy 
regarding the NPT la concerned in South Asia, it has always 
denounced the use of nuclear technology for destructive 
50. Rasgotra, M.K. "Nuclear Option, "Indian Express 29 Nov. 
1992. 
Bl. Tlwari, H.D., op.cit., P. IIA. 
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purpose and has worked for comprehsTivie global nuclear 
disarmament India found that the treaty unsatisfactory and 
riddled with many loopholes. Consequently India refused to 
sign the NPT. 
Confidence Building Measures <CBM) : 
Confidence Buiding Measures (CBM) can play a major role 
in reducing mistrust and enhancing security. There are two 
52 fundamental requirements for achieving succcess of CBM 
1. They must flow from and form part of, a constructive 
and cooperative political relationship; and; 
il. they must try to recognise and address the 
legitimate security concerns of all countries 
equally. 
The process of CBM negotiations can start earlier to 
make the two political commercial cooperation and CBM, an 
interactive process to reinforcing mutual trust and building 
a better, more stable paradigm of peace cooperation and 
security At the same time premature attempts at CBMs without 
adequate political cooperative could increase mistrust and 
53 thereby prove counter productive 
The European states have produced the better and 
appreciable basic parameters of CBMs, that can apply in 
52. Singh Jasjit, "Politics of Mixtoust and Confidence 
Building" India and Pakistan Crisis of Relationship (ed) 
Jasjit Singh, Lancer, Pub. Ltd., 1990. 
53. Ibid. 
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other region with the hope of good success. The European 
security framework since Second World War has been framed on 
a bileteral centrality of adversarial relationship is an 
essentially bipolar political military order. Thus the 
security issues ultimately evolved in an east-west context, 
and each of alliance bloc operated in a bilateral framework. 
Confidence building measures (CBMs) in South Asian 
region can begin only when there is a genuine atttempt at 
reducing mistrust and a foundation of mutual recognition of 
realities of the situation and address the concerns of each 
other. In Europe, CBM could start only when both sides 
recognised each other's nuclear capabilities and accepted 
the establishment of a state of mutual deteppenoe. The CBM 
advanced to relaxation of tensions when both sides agreed 
that they could not win a nuclear war and should not 
therefore initiate it and that it is not even possible to 
use conventional war as a tool of politics (Gorbachev-Kohl 
joint statement, in June 1989) . The relaxation of tension 
gained further credibility when a closed society become more 
open, more pluralistic and less authoritarian. 
In South Asia there are a large number of CBMs which 
should be initiated to enhance the overall security 
environment in the region and towards meeting the legitimate 
54. K. Subrahmanyam, "The Nuclear issue..." India and 
Pakistan" crisis and Relationship (ed.) jasjit Singh, 
Lancer Pub., Ltd. 1990 PP. 93. 
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^RCUT'ity concern of all states. Some of them, requiring a 
serious consideration by India and Pakistan for discussion 
negotiation implementation on bilateral bases are : 
Military Arrangements : 
The first, step in CBM was initiated on 17 December 
1985, When the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Raiiv Gandhi 
proposed and Pakistan President General Zia - ul - Haq 
accepted for signing an agreement not to attack each other's 
nuclear facilities. The agreement was signed in December 
55 1988 during the Mr. Rajiv Gandhi visit to Islamabad. . The 
accord, provides for exchange of locational data on nuclear 
facilities, including nuclear powers and research reactors, 
fuel fabricators, uranium enrichment, isotopes separators 
and reprocessing facilities. The installations covered also 
Include any other facility with fresh or irradiated nuclear 
fuel and establishments, storing significant quantities ot 
radio-active materials. Each side will inform the other on 
January first, every year of th atitude and longitude of 
its nuclear installations and facilities. 
The crucial clause binds the two nations to refrain 
from undertaking, encouraging or participating in any action 
aimed at causing the destruction of or damage to any nuclear 
instalations or facility of the other country. The two 
55. Subrahmanyam, K. "The Nuclear issue" India and Pakistan 
ed. Jas.iit Singh, PP. 94. 
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gOVeT^nments have reaffirmed their coBmlttment l.o "durable 
peace and the deveiopnent of friendly and, of proudly and 
harmonious bilateral relations". They stressed the role of 
CBMs in promoting relations on mutual trust and goodwill. 
Conferaing to the refreshing winds of change. Ms. Benazir 
expressed more than once, her desire to establish friendly 
relations with India and to facilitate the restoration of 
peace in the subcontinent. 
In 1089, both countries reach on agreement to cooperate 
with each other in tackling the problems of terrorism, drug 
traffIcing, smuggling and illicit border crossing. They 
tried to find out an amicable settlement of Siachen Glacier 
56 problem but did not succeed . in 1991 the then Pakistan 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made the proposal for the three 
plus two conference on the nuclear weapons issue. He also 
stated "we are prepared to adopt measures aimed at mutual 
and balanced force reduction of forces consistent with the 
principle of equal and undiminished security at the lowest 
level of armaments . It was agreed that the reductions it 
under taken by both sides would constitute a CBM. It WQulri 
help reduce the ever present fear of renewed hostilities and 
ensure deterrence at a lower level of force. On viable 
example of a conventional force reduction agreement for 
South Asia could be based upon the 1990 Paris Treaty which 
56. Conflict and Cooperation in South Asia, prakash Chandra 
International Relations, 1992, Archana Pub. New Delhi, 
PP. 445. 
57. Vohra, A.M. "Public Diplomacy Con Aid Ido-Pak Ties", The 
Times of India, 17 March 1992. 
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lays the ground3 for force reductions in Europe. This would 
require both India and Pakistan to thin out troop 
deployments along the borders as well as carry out over all 
troop and weapons reduction within measures instituted to 
achieve military transparancy. 
In May 1990 India proposed a package of CBMs which was 
discussed by the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries in 
July, 1990. These included and non-military measures like 
exchange of informations about military positions and army 
delegations; an agreement on non-violation of air space by 
military air crafts and ceasing of hostile propaganda aimed 
at inciting subversion and secesion. In January 1991 both 
countries exchanged the instruments of ratification of 
Treaty signed in Dec. 1988, regarding non-attack on each 
other's nuclear instalations. In April 1991 the Foreign 
Secretaries of two countries met at New Delhi and reached an 
agreeemnt on advance notification of military exercises and 
on preventing violations of air space. 
In subsequent months the two countries also reached an 
agreement on chemical weapons and agreed to hasten the 
process of exchanging data on the locations of nuclear 
facilities. Along with these positive steps Pakistan 
continued efforts to internationalised the Kashmir issue in 
violation of Simla accord and even called for a bandh in the 
country on the Kashmir issue. 
Other than military related CBMs the political CBMs are 
also taken in resolving disputes. 
The Kashmir disputes has been discussed in bilateral 
talks between India and Pakistan on numerous occasions, in 
many diffferent forums and by officials of widely differing 
rank and importance. After the end of 1965 war both the two 
countries signed Tashkent Declaration. Is provisions called 
for direct talks between the two countries in regard to 
their common problems, and meetings were held in Rawa1 Pindi 
between the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan on 1-2 
March 1966, Though both sides failed to agree on the 
Kashmir's inculsion on the formal agenda, however talks were 
abruptly terminated 
The second attempt came, in the form of Simla agreement 
in 1972, which provided a new turn in their relations. 
Under the agreement both two countries agreed to settle 
their difference's through bilateal negotiations in peaceful 
manner, and they expressed faith in the principle ot 
peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of each other, withdraw the forces to thier 
respective international borders and to respect the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of each other. Both 
two countries also agreed to cooperate in the economic, 
cultural and scientific field. 
58. Das, Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, PP. 374-75. 
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The third occaBloTi waa the aeries of talka between 
1986-89 over the Siachen Glacier dispute, but could not 
reach any settienent. 
Indo-Nepal treaty of Peace and Fridnship of 1950 was a 
historic treaty signed by the Indian Ambassador in Kathmandu 
Mr. C.P.N. Singh, and the Nepalese P.M., Rana Mohan Shamsher 
S. Bahadur. The treaty permitted Nepal to import defence 
equipment from India. The treaty stipulated "neither 
government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the 
other by foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat 
the two governments shall consult with each other and devise 
efffective counter measures". It was in pursuance of these 
provisions of the treaty that prevented the establishment ot 
diplomatic relation between Nepal and China. India also 
59 trained Nepal's armed forces and supplied them with arms 
The treaty of friendship of 1950 was again renewed in 1983, 
1987 & 1991, but Nepales government opposes some of its part 
because of change of world scenario. Most significantly 
even though Nepal has strived to balance China against India 
in the diplomatic game, Nepal could not succeed but follow 
the India line on all security issues affecting South Asia 
in a polycentric World order. India had for more than two 
decades been pursuading Nepal to agree to a eoinroQn 
endeauvour on water resources development and proceeding 
with hyd1e multipurpose proiects on common rivers. 
59. Chandra Prakash, op.cit., PP.567. 
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Bhutan is a buffer state between China and India, 
having a significant strategic locations which determines 
the security of the region. Bhutan agrees to be guided by 
the Indian Government with respect of its foreign relations 
under Article VI of the Treaty 1949. Bhutan could get 
military hardware and other defence items, through India 
only with the support and approval of India. 
On the other hand Bhutan has accused India of 
encouraging the people of Nepal's origin frooi Nepal as well 
as India to crose into Bhutan and haaper the process of 
60 
national integration . However, the Indian government has 
repeatedly made it clear that it would not allow the Nepali 
speaking people of India to agitate against a neighbouring 
country, and assured the king of Bhutan all possible 
assistance, including communication and logistic to bolster 
his kingdom's law and order machinery. 
The Indo-Sri Lanka relations reflect that the strategic 
and political dimensions of their security frame work have 
been rapidly changing on the basis of emerging patterns of 
relations between them. 
The intensification of the ethnic turmoil since 1983 
created a situation in which Sri Lankan government had to 
sign the Indo-Lanka agreement in 1987. Which allowed the 
60. Chandra Prakash, op.cit., PP.578. 
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Indian forces to enter in Sri Lanka with the specific goal 
of restoring peace and tranquillity in its strife-torn areas 
and also prevented Sri Lanka to nake its Trinconalli part 
available for nilitary use to extra regional powers in a 
manner deleterious to India's naritirae and other interests. 
Intially the Indo-Sri Lanka accord brought Sri Lanka in the 
fold of mutual security system and strengthened Indo - Lanka 
relations. 
Where as Bangladesh's security is concerned it is the 
product of its domestic vulnerabilities, the challenges of 
nation building, the tribal sub nationalism in CHT, the 
environmental challenges the high population growth rate and 
its divergent perception and position on the issues of 
61 
mutual interest vis-a-vis India . A section of the public 
opinion in Bangladesh, including the government, subscribes 
to the view that the India factor overshadows the rest of 
external water settlement and the transfer of Tin Blghd 
through the Indo Bangladesh Agreement of 1974, have been 
62 
striking examples . As the Supreme Court of India in its 
judgement favoured the transfer of Tin Bigha to Bangalde&h 
and it has given to Bangladesh on lease for 999 years, this 
should be followed to remove the last hurdle in the 
iiapl ementation of 1974 Agreement. This would open fresh 
avenues of mutual trust and cooperation in other fields. AS 
61. Karim, M. Iqbal "Security, Perception of Bangladesh" 
Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIII No. 11, Feb. 1991-1 1275. 
62. Ibid. 
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B.G. Vergese observed "Indian has much to achieve trom 
Bangladesh, than the additional cusecs of water in lean 
season or some mud flats in the Sunderbans and there would 
be a whole host of mutually beneficial trade betwen them. 
But the idea does not appear to have crossed the mind of 
policy makers. Here to diplomacy could secure development, 
communication national integration and security which is one 
of the most vulnerable parts of the country 
As far as Maldives's security is concerned, it is 
visualised that for all practical purposes, its political 
stability and interests be protected and promoted within the 
frame work of the SAARC and India should be more inclined to 
do so as a consequence of the commonalities of interests in 
the Indian Ocean. While India has already protected 
Maldives government from a coupd'etat in 1988. The SAARC 
countries Heads of states also condemned the attempt and 
also strongly criticised that these acts of violence which 
disrupted the peace and security of a member state", and 
extended their full support and solidarity with the 
government of Maldives". . 
Taking as a whole, in the intra-regionai perspective it 
can be specaluted that South Asia is an Indo-centric region 
to that extent India is capable of playing as a central 
actor in these South Asia on account of its tangible 
63. Vergnese, B.G. op-cit., 33. 
64. Joint Press Release, Fourth SAARC Summit, Islamabad, 
1988. 
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elements power and performance. The Indian objectives have 
not only been to strengthen defence preparedness but also to 
support the cause of non-interferences and non-aggression", 
in the region. While its neighbours are avoid any public 
commitment to the Indian security system but their own 
security policies are based upon the assumption of an Indian 
65 gurantee against any extra regional aggression 
Economic & Trade Cooperation 
The leaders of the South Asian nations have often 
underlined the need for economic cooperation in the region. 
But nothing much has been achieved in practice, except the 
creation of South Asia Preferential Trade Arrangement 
(SAPTA) in April 1993. Some cooperation on a bilateral 
level already exists, mostly under the government to 
government agreements and those between apex chambers. But 
bilaterEil economic cooperation offers limited scope interms 
of economic gains. 
The Brandt commission report on international 
developmental issues, while recommending some remedies for 
the economic ills of the developing countries, has suggested 
that "regional and subregional integrations should be made a 
prime instrument of economic growth". . 
65. Rose & Geo, "The Super Power in South Asia" Orbis A 
Journal of World Affairs, 22(1), 1978-79, P. 381. 
66. Dr. Bhat T.P. "Cooperation for Economic Development", 
South Asia - Stability & Regional Cooperation (edi) 
Agwani, Ray, Mukherjee, S. Kumar & S.D. Muni, M. it D. 
Printing Press, 1983. 
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South Asia contains nearly one fifth of the world 
population and a quarter of the population of the developing 
world. Thus, South Asia is the combination of all Third 
World features, such as least developed, producers of 
primary commodities, seeking export markets for industrial 
goods, and Island and land locked developing countries. So 
it provides the challenge of bringing together in the 
process of development the most primitive to the most modern 
modes of production. It constitutes, a challege to work out 
a dynamic strategy of multilateral transfer of technology, 
experience and knowledge across different levels of 
development. This is a challenge that has to be faced in 
view of the increasing threat to the security of the region 
from US imperisalism in a nuclear space age. In this 
context it responsibility of all member countries of SAARC 
to bring together for the security of region. 
In the field of economic strade the South Asian 
countries signed bi-lateraly and combined (SAPTA) agreement. 
First we take up bi-lateral agreements, signed by 
member countries. India as a biggest partner among South 
Asian countries have dominant position. It appears as an 
important market for the rest of the countries. 
India has a number of economic arrangements with Bhutan 
and Nepal. India concluded a Treaty of Friendship with 
Bhutan in 1949. Where by the Buutan agreed to be guided in 
its foreign relations by New Delhi. In the economic spheres 
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Indi^L rendered enormous help to Bhutan, it provided aid, and 
made available necessary technical knowledge and personnels 
for the development. In 1991 both countries signed an 
agreement on civil vialations to provide legal frame work 
for operations of air services between two countries. And 
again agreed for the exploitation of hyde1 potential of 
Bhutan and India and work on two new giant hydei projects 
Chukha Phabe 11 and Chukha Phase 111. Infact India forms a 
vital life line for Bhutanese economy and security. 
As the Treaty of peace and Friendship of 1950, between 
India it Nepal, on trade issue both countries agreed to 
exempt from custom duty and qualitative restriction, on 
basic commodities such as agricultural and universal 
produce, timber, raw wool and etc. 
India is the most substantial contributor of Nepal's 
development, providing Rs. 200 crores to Rs. 250 Crorea as 
grants for economic project. In addition it helped to Nepal 
in the construction of the Tribhuvan Rai Path linked India 
and Nepal. It also helped in execution of various 
hydroelectric projects. 
The trade treaty was renewed in 1983, and extended for 
five years. Under this treaty both the two countries 
cooperate with each other in controlling unauthorised trade. 
India provided certain facilities for the movement of oargfj 
from Nepal through India. India committed to long term 
purchase of the whole or part of power generated from the 
17' 
proposed 3600 MW Karnali hydro-electric proiects. 
India's relations with Nepal got severely strained 
towards the close of March 1989 due to differences between 
the two over the signing of new trade and transit treaties. 
While India insisted on a consolidated treaty, Nepal 
67 insisted on two separate pacts . As a result of this 
controversy the earlier Indo - Nepal Transit Treaty of 1978 
lapsed and the their relatios got strained due to shortage 
of diesel, petrol, coal and other essential goods in Nepal. 
After the assumption of power by the National Front 
Govern«ent In Idia effort were nade to iaprove relations 
with Nepal and both countries agreed to provide lor 
reopening of land customs stations for transit points 
between the two countries and to reactivate the fifteen 
transit points which were in operation earlier. Nepal 
agreed to restore tariff preference for Indian goods and to 
renove-
In 1991, the Prime Ministers of the two countries held 
a sumlt meeting at New Delhi and concluded five agreements. 
Two of these were related to trade and transit, another 
related to extend certain new facilities to Nepal with 
regard to her exports to India and agreed on the taping of 
potential of water resources for mutual benefit and agreed 
to work on a number of multipurpose projects. 
fi7. Prakash Chandra, op.cit., PP. 568. 
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Instead of these econoaic arrangements indeed, both 
Bhutan and Nepal, (particularly Nepal) are uncomfortable 
within the extent of functional and economic relations with 
India. They fear exactly what New Delhi counts as an 
advantage, namely, the penetrations of their societies by 
officials and non-officials Indian and Influences on their 
go 
policies as a result of that penetration 
India's relations with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka on 
economic and trade issue are differ not like Bhutan's Nepal 
because both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have managed to keep 
the density of exchange at very lower level. While 
Bangladesh and India could cooperate for more extensively on 
economic, ecological and rivers issue in particular. No 
doubt both two countries tried to stregthen their bonds and 
concluded a number of agreements in the field of social, 
economic and culture, similarly in the field of science and 
technology, both are agreed to cooperate to each other. 
Sri Lanka and India too can do more on economic issues. 
It can use Indian technical expertise and assistance in 
developmental process. But both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 
have managed to keep a distance functionally and 
economically from New Delhi which reflects their 
geographical and geo-political position. 
68. Kanti Bajpai - op.cit., PP. 142. 
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Despite restrained relations between India and 
Pakistan, both sides have worked to the economic advantages, 
the Indus Rivers Treaty (i960) and the Salal Dam agreement 
(1978), and the AGreement of 1989 in which both have 
intensified their cooperation in economic, medical and 
cultural field and to relax travel facilities for the two 
peoples in each, other's country. They also agreed to 
exchange delegations of business, cooperate in a agriculture 
etc. Pakistan agreed to give a boost to private sector 
trade with India by expanding the list of items to be 
imported from 249 to 700. But Pakistan fears that 
dependence arising out of functional and economic exchange 
because it feels that India's resources will render exchange 
unequal. It has therefore, systematically dismantled 
^'conomic Interaction inspite of numerous formal agreements 
signed after the Simla agreement (1972) and the last of 
which is contained in the SAARC. Preferential Trading 
Arrangement (SAPTA) signed in April 1993. 
Private Initiative : Despite continuous uneasy political 
alliances Indian businessmen are forging ties in the other 
South Asian Countries- More than any other member country, 
it's India the dominant economy, which is going out with 
products, investment and technology. 
The most effective alliance has been in the garment 
export business- Since western markets use a quota system 
to limit access to garment exports from developing 
countries, Indians are going to Nepal and Bangladesh, which 
1 7 5 
enjoy UBl-eatricted entry Into Europeiin Markets and where 
quotas for the US are available. 
Azlzul Haque, a managing director, Huque Fashion 
limited of Bangladesh said, that Indian are coming here as 
collaborators and putting in money, basically to exploit our 
quotas. Significantly, 65 percent of our exports are 
69 garments" - One such company is Delhi based continental 
exports Private limited that exports garments worth Rs. 12 
crore from Bangladesh using mostly Indian raw raatrials, 
while its export from India are only worth Rs. 8 crore 
The spread of inter-region trade is not due to SAARC 
but lobbying by trade and industry associations and the 
companies own efforts. Joint Busines Councils have been set 
up apart from country specific desks at the chambers ot 
commerce. The FICCI, PHDCCI team and the Metro-po1itan 
chamber of commerce and industry (MCCI) all are working to 
give incentives to businessmen. 
According to commerce ministry, about 23 Indian Joint 
ventures are operating in SAARC countries, and nineteen ara 
looking for exploiting markets and cheaper inputs across the 
borders. The total investment in the joint ventures, whose 
figures are available la around Rs. 2000 crore. The most 
69. South Asian Trade, Private Initiative" India Today March 
31, 1993. 
70. Ibid. 
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prominent project is Ceat's Rs. iO-5 crorea joint ventures 
71 
with Colombo based Associated motor ways 
Several other Indian projects are operational or coming 
up in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal, for example, in Sri 
Lanka, Ashok Leyland assembles conmercial vehicles. Jay 
Engineerig works sells sewing. Machines and electric fans, 
voltas is into specially drilling and Ranbaxy Laboratories 
is setting up a joint venture for antibiotics. 
In Bangladesh, TELCO is installing a bus and truck 
assembly plant and Birla Technical services is putting up a 
Rs. 2A2.5 crore gas based sponge iron unit. 
In Nepal, Dabur has come in with a herbal product plant 
and Dalmia India Private limited is setting up an instant 
food plant. 
Companies in SAARC countries are realising the benefit 
of cooperating rather than competing while Indian and Sri 
Lankan Tea fight it out in the international market. Four 
Indian companies are on the other sides of the Palk strait 
too. The rational Indians help the Lankans boost yields 
which are a third of that of South Indian network in Ueat 
Asia and the West. Tata tea, Harrisons Halayalam, A.V. 
Thomas 8c Company limited and The Assam Company of Indlft 
limited have together turned around lOO sick tea gardens in 
71. India Today, op.cit., PP. 95. 
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Sri Lanka. CUS India limited, of the Murugappa group has 
72 taken on gardens and a processing unit for CTC tea 
To circumvent trade restrictions, ways have been found 
legal and illegal. Where as Pakistan allows 571 items to 
import from India, but barred items such as stainless steel 
product, auto components, and tyres as well as many consumer 
goods and durables are routed through Afghanistan and are 
lapped up despite the higher prices. 
While the trade route to Pakistan is round about, Sri 
Lanka is increasingly opening up. Having started economic 
reforms over a decade ago, the Lankan now have the 
confidence to compete with the bigger Indian lnriHStF^; 
The economic reforms programmes in the SAARC countries 
have provided considerable impetus. Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
India are currently under IMF-led economic adjustment. Which 
has meant among other things, that 100* foreign owner ship 
73 is allowed in most industries . 
Sri Lanka is also getting the benefits. Foreign 
investment is thrice than that in India despite civil war 
situations. The country also allows non-taxable 
repatriation of profits and has little red tapism. 
Nepal joined the subcontinental prestroika with the 
instllation of democratic government. The Maldives 15 
72. Ibid. 
73. India Today, op.cit., PP. 96. 
offering offshore banking facility to woo investors, 
especially in its booming tourism sector. Bhutan also is 
considering coming out of its economic isolation. While 
India has reduced recently custom duties on import of 
capital goods. 
The SAARC cooperation has a tremendous scope. The 
export realisation of tea and raw .lute for Bangladesh would 
be highr if it sold in the region. Sri lanka will get 
better prices by selling coconut oil in the region. Buying 
wheat from pakistan instead of the US would have cheaper for 
India, Pakistani preference to buy Indian textile machinery 
because 30 percent cheaper than European or Japanese models 
and delivery time is a shorter. The Faisalabad chamber at 
commerce has already asked the Pakistan government to relax 
import rules. 
The biggest hurdle in realising the economic potential 
is political "India has outstanding issues with everybody 
else in the region", says a senior diplomate in New Delhi, 
" It will have to take the initiative. The Indo-Nepaleae 
trade pact could be follow as an example. 
Pakistan is looking to wards the WEst While the Karachi 
based SAARC chamber Prefers to forge a chambers with the 
central Asian republics and other Muslims states in West 
Asia. 
Another deterent is the fear of Indian economic 
hegemony. In Bangladesh, eggs from India flooded markets 
13^: 
from Khalna to Syihet making local producers RO on egg 
breaking sprees. BUt after the visit of Bangladesh Prime 
Minister Khaleda Zia to India, proposed more concesions to 
Indian goods, promoting Shaiful Alam Pradhan, Chief of the 
light wing Jatiya Ganatantrik Party to say " bangladesh will 
74 become a permanent market for India 
The future way, however is cartelisation and collective 
bargaining for access to the global markets such s GATT 
(named world Trade Organisation (WTO)). A model could be the 
ASEAN, which uncaged the economic tigers that some of ite 
member countries were and in the process itself became an 
economic grouping instead of a political military one. But 
Indian captains of industry are not too optimistic of SAARC 
becoming an economic bloc. T.K. Bhaumik, Assistant 
Secretary General of PHDCCI, says "There would be so many 
clashes between the participating countries that 
75 
carte 1isation won't work" 
The South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) : 
The Seventh Summit of SAARC held in Dhaka in April 1993 
was a land mark in the field of economic cooperation in 
which every member countries leaders took concerted 
initiative to strengthen economic and other links, specially 
in the context of the sweeping change on the global scene. 
74. India Today, op.cit., PP. 96. 
75. India Today, op.cit., PP. 96. 
The agreement on SAPTA was signed by the SAARC council 
of ministers at the concluding session of the summit. 
Mr. P.V. Narsimha Rao, at the session stresses the need 
for evolving meaningful policy approaches to deal with the 
world wide trends in regional cooperations, economic 
groupings and trading blocks as witnessed in Western Europe, 
North and South America, ASEAN and Asia Pacific region. 
These trends had important implications for economies like 
those of SAARC countries which were adopting "outward 
oriented" policies . 
He also said that "Our collective economic strength and 
weight as a mega-market of over one billion consumers and 
the pooling together of our abundant and manifold talents, 
skills and resources will alone enable us to be a serious 
player in the global economy we must make a renewed effort 
to break down the trade barriers and jettison and irrational 
past which created and sustained these barriers 
Mr. Nawaz Sharif in his speach endorsed the framework 
document of SAPTA and suggested early completion of the 
formalitles. 
The creation of SAPTA by the SAARC countries shown a 
right path to cooperation in the field of economy and trade. 
But its success is dependent only upon India and Pakistan's 
76. "Rao Urges SAARC to life trade barriers". The Sunday 
Times of India, New Delhi, April 11, 1993^ 
77. Ibid. 
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relations, that how much they give important to mutual 
cooperation in economic field. As Sri Lanka's foreign 
minister Lakshman Kadirgamar expressed his country's stand 
on the present state of the relationship betwen India and 
Pakistan and future of SAARC. He said that "putting in to 
force the SAPTA under the SAARC umbrella is very important 
for member countries - But SAARC initiative in this field 
is not satisfactory. SAPTA involves exchange of lists of 
commodities by the seven SAARC countries. Six have done 
this but one country is remained to do so, therefore, all 
seven are not able to move, because part of understanding 
is that discussions and negotiations can start on those 
79 
commodities only after all seven are in". 
Thus we find that, while other trading blocs and groups 
of nations in the world are moving rapidly towards economic 
trade and South Asian countries are still at the stage of 
preferential trade arrangement and even there they hawe nftt 
got very far. 
Social Development : 
The Social condition of the South Asian peoples is in a 
alarming position, where poverty has increased visibly. The 
gap between the poor and disinherited on the one side and 
the rich and privileged on the other is widening every dQ¥: 
78. "Lanka minister regrets delay in SAPTA", The Times of 
India, New Delhi, 9 February 1995. 
79. Ibid. 
Inflation is rampant and prices are rocketing. Health 
hazards are increasing, not only because of industrial 
pollution but also because of authorities inability to 
provide people with primary amenities. Medical facilities 
are going beyond the reach of more and more people. 
Drinking water is becoming even more scare every day than it 
has been in the last many years. Transportation in town and 
country side is daily becoming more difficult. Curruption 
is so widespread that it has practically become a way of 
life all over the sub-continent. 
All these alarming situation more or less have 
influenced the security of the nations. The SAARC member 
countries have taken individually and combined steps to cure 
these problems. 
Population Policies : 
A large and rapidly growing population with a limited 
natural resources has caused severe short terms and long run 
economic problem of SAARC countries. The population 
explosion has resulted in reduction of social benefits, such 
a lower expenditure on education, health serivces and other 
welafare and security measures. Its rapid growth in these 
countries is causing environmental hazards and global 
warming, a matter of great concern to human kind. 
For tackling the rapid growth of population, there is 
need to provide family planning services which is a dirent 
way to reduce fertility and bring the birth rates down, but 
i8o 
It l3 onJy short run method. Investing in people and 
educating them and making them aware of the social evils is 
a long run measure which however, give concrete results as 
in the case of Sri Lanka. In the context of SAARC region 
the implementation of population control measures should be 
stringent and made compulsory. It is unfortunate that in 
SAARC countries the programmes are not properly planned-
For instance in India mostly family planning programmes are 
conceptually ineffective because they started at the wrong 
end by sterilizing women who were 35 and already mother Qt 
five or six children 
The SAARC member countries should adopt China's 
population policy, in tackling their population growth 
Q 1 
problem . And focus on younger generation of girls, who 
should be provided schooling facilities and capacity to 
earn. This would enable them to avoid early marriage and 
have access to knowledge of family planning and restrict 
fami 1y size. 
The SAARC countries would have a much higher GNP growth 
rate and require greater effort in the mobilization QT 
development resources in order to keep pace, with the other 
regions of the world. Otherwise they would not be able to 
80. Ashish Bose, Demographic Density of India, 1991 CensuB, 
B.H. Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 1991, P. 52. 
81. In China, Couples having more than one child without 
permission may be fined and lose job and apartments. he 
late remarriage is advocated man and women are married 
only after attaining the 25 years and 21 years 
respecti ve1y. 
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provide food clothing, housing and health facilities besides 
meeting the basic needs of the additional people. Thus 
SAARC region has no option other than a significant 
reduction in the population growth rate. 
Poverty : 
Poverty in third world countries has been increasing 
for the last two decades as the general social conditions 
are deteriorating. SAARC region accounts for about half of 
world poverty which is reflected in the extrenly low per 
capital income levels and also its low rate of growth. 
Poverty is basically one of the low productivity of labour, 
i.e. low real per capita income. Poverty and slow growth of 
real incomes in these countries have been coexisting with 
widespread and persisting unemployment and underemployment. 
Poverty and rapid growth in population reinforce each other 
in a number of ways. Low wages, especially for women, 
inadequte education, high infant mortality etc, are all 
linked to poverty which in turn contribute to high fertility 
rates and thus to rapid population growth 
Most of the SAARC countries have introduced several 
measures before the sixties to tackle, the poverty problem, 
but these programmes have not achieved expected results and 
the basic needs of the poor are yet to fulfilled. 
Chakravarty has shorted out various poverty allevation, 
82- World Bank, World Development Report, 1991, Oxport 
University Press, New York. 
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programmes adopted by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka and felt that these programmes could not achieve 
desired results with modest econoaic growth due to rapid 
83 population growth 
In, India, the poverty alleviation measures were 
started during the 7th Five Year Plan i.e. 1974-79; but the 
oil price hive in 1973 and the consequent problems had 
shattered and diluted the spirit of the measures. But the 
government has been trying to reduce the poverty level by 
various measures and in the course three policies were 
framed for immediate and effective results. These were 1) 
Minimum Needs Programme (MNP), 2) Wage employment programmes 
such as Food for work Programme. National Rural Employment 
Programme (NREP) and Rural Landless Employment Gurantee 
Programme (RLEGP) and 3) Integrated Rural Development 
Programme (IRDP). Under the MNP, the government tried to 
Improve the living standard of poor by providing the basic 
requirements, such as food, drinking water, roads and other 
infrastructure. NREP and RLEGP were introduced to provide a 
wage employment in the rural areas for landless labourers 
and the other poor farmers. The government planned to 
create opportunities for self employment under IRDP. But 
unfortunately all these programmes could not achieve 
expected results due to various handicaps in implemntationt 
83. Sukhamoy Chakravarty, "Development Strategies for Growth 
with equity, the South Asian Experience", Asian 
Development Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1990, PP. 146-156. 
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In Pakistan also the poverty allievation measures were 
adopted through programmes such as Rural Works Pi^ogramme 
(RWP) and People's work programme <PWP) which was replaced 
by Rural Development Organisation and IRDP. Rural 
Development Programme, (RDP) was formed by merging of IRDP 
and PWP. But these programme did not make any significant 
contribution to the reduction of poverty. 
In Bangladesh, the Rural Uorks Programme (RWP) and Food 
For Work Programme (FFWP) were adopted for the benefit of 
the rural poor and landless population. Grameen Bank 
Programme which was introduced in 1978 was successful 
ingiving access to financial resources which was the main 
constraint in productive employment. 
Sri Lanka also is more concerned to the welfare of the 
people. Its expenditure on social service was to the tune of 
50% of its GDP. The quality of life improved considerably 
by the provision of certain basic needs such as free 
education, free health services and the like. 
Ail these countries efforts in eradication of poverty 
were a little success. But some are having good success 
report such as Grameen Bank and the Begum Khaleda Zia's Dai1 
Bhaat programme of Bangladesh, the literacy Mission, SEWA 
rtnd WWF of India, Janasaviya of Sri Lanka, "Atolls" in the 
Maldives the small Farmers Project in Nepal, the Health 
ProRramme in Bhutan and the Agakhan Rural Support Programme 
in Pakistan®'*. 
But past exprience revealed that modest growth 
performance has not been able to make any impact on the 
eradication of poverty. Therefore, public action through 
provision of basic needs is the only option to be pursued 
continuously to reduce the poverty. If state involvement is 
effective in areas such as healths availability of food at 
subsidized prices, primary education with special reference 
to females, the incidence of poverty may decline. 
Economic Reforms : 
The relatively slow economic growth along with rapid 
population growth has sharply increased gap between the 
SAARC and other regions like ASEAN 8c EU, owing mainly to the 
05 
macroeconomic policy differentials . These countries 
pursued an inward oriented policies for a long time with a 
strong emphasis on public sector. Having recognised the 
limitations of this development strategy most of these 
countries pursued reforms programmes to make their economies 
outward - looking and market oriented. These countries 
aimed at opening their economies by strengthening marU^t. 
forces and providing greater role for the private sector. 
In South Asia, the economic reforms were first started 
by Sri Lanka in 1977 which were accelerated in 1989. 
84. V. Jayanth, "Tackling Poverty in South Asia", Hindu, 26 
Nov., 1992. 
85. S.P. Gupta, "Global Economic Development, The South 
Asian Outlook", The Financial (Express, 26 Nov. 1992). 
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Bangladesh nationalized its industries in 1972 and started 
reforms from 1977 and 1982 openly declared privatization. 
Pakistan implemented several measures during the eighties 
which were designed to boost exports. Foreign investments 
began to be encouraged by the turn of the present decade. 
India started its economic reforms very late about 1990. It 
is observed that too many government controls and too large 
a public sector have led to development of an inefficient 
production structure in India. Imports policies were 
liberalised for maximum production and open general licence 
was widened with the inclusion of additional items. 
Despite reforms , the degree of openess differs between 
countries to countries. Bangaldesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan 
Qg 
and India also recently has encouraged foreign investment 
In Pakistan these reforms have been showing positive results 
in recent times irrespective of the considerable strains on 
balance of payments and domestic fiscal position. In Sri 
Lanka the stimulant of trade liberalization in 1977 ran out 
of stream after causing initial surge of production in 
simple labour intensive activities. In recent times. Its 
economy started responding vigorously to the efforts like 
liberal import licensing regulations. its economic growth 
reached six percent in 1990. 
It is to be pointed out in this context that India's 
86. Sukhamoy Chakravarty, "Development Strategies for forth 
within equity South Asian Experience", Asian Development 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1990, PP. 146-156. 
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trade perfomance seems to be contradictory in the sense 
that its trade is not significantly determined by world wide 
events, and it does not share the major complaints of fellow 
J 1 • . . 87 developing countries 
Unemployment : Unemployment and underemployment have 
increased in SAARC in recent years. It is out come of an 
increase in size of labour force not matched by an equal 
increase in employment opportunetie6< KdUQdted unemployment 
indicates that secondary school leavers are affected mostly 
in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka while in India, unemployment is 
large among highly educated people than among secondary 
88 
educated . The increase in the brain drain in these 
countries reflects the unemployment of the highly educated 
people. Though unemployment is a serious problem in Hale 
due to the flood of immigrants from the atolls, labourforce 
participation rates in Maldives as a whole have been 
89 
significant . The unemployment in Bhutan is not so much 
but their labourforce appears to be increasingly at the same 
rate as their population growth. 
If the available manpower in these countries can be 
utilized efficiently it will become an asset for the South 
Asia. Because the role of edcuated labour force is crucial 
87. Kishore G. Kulkarni, "Has international trade benefitted 
LDSS - India's Case", Margin, April -June, 1992, PP. 
235-244. 
88- UNESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the 
Pacific,1988, Bangkok. 
89. World Bank, The South Asia Regional office. The 
Maladives, An Introductory Economic Reports, Washington 
D.C. Dec. 1980. 
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for the industrial developaent of any country and the 
success story of Japan and South Korea is partly attributed 
their labour skills. The low level of productivity can be 
checked by building up a country's human capital, by 
investing in education training and health facilities by the 
public authorities. 
Regional Cooperation : 
Given the Primacy of military power and the tendency 
for greater external interventioniam in regions where 
Qonflictual structures dominate, there is need for regional 
consensive building. In view of the constant oonfllctB 
between the countries of South Asia the leaders have brought 
the prospects of cooperation between countries of the South 
Asia. Thre are a number of factors impel the countries of 
90 the South Asia to cooperate with each other 
Firstly, the growing rivalry between two super powers 
and China encouraged the outside powers to intervene is the 
affairs of South Asia. Secondly, the economic backwardness 
of the regional countries and their realisation ot 
improvement in their bargaining power vis-a-vis the 
developed countries only they attain self reliance thj-PUgh 
mutual cooperation. Thirdly -- the ecological 
considerations also demand greater cooperations among the 
90. Chandra Prakash, op.cit. PP. 453. 
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countries. Because there are a nuaber of probleas which can 
not be solve single handed if the countries of region not 
cooperate. For exaapie, the probien of soil soliaity in 
Bangladesh caused by tidal waters of the Ganges river 
system. 
Fourth, the presence of the nililtary bases in Indian 
ocean also pose a serious threat to the National Security 
of the region, so the states of the region must realise that 
the division among then is bound to be exploited by outside 
powers. 
Thus the process of development and concretisation of 
the idea of South Asian regional cooperation was first 
initiated by General Ziaur Rehman the then President of 
Bangladesh in May 1980. In the course of the several 
meetings of Foreign Secretaries of South Asian states at 
Colombo (1981) in Kathaandu (1981, Nov.) in Islamabad (1982) 
and Dhaka (1983), many doubts and suspiciouns were clarified 
and foundation of purpose-ful South Asian region cooperation 
laid. 
On December, 1985, the seven South Asian leaders have 
launched the world's most populous regional grouping wH.t^ l 
the hope that it would improve the security environment in 
the region and cooperation among them in the eoonamiP aTlfl 
cultural fields will result in a better life of their 
peoples 
91. SAARC Ushertn New Era", The CSR, Burning Topic, Jan 
1986. 
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On the final day of their first, ever two day sunnit in 
Dhaka, the Heads of state or government of BanRladeah, 
Bhutan, India the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
adopted a charter giving birth to the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Dhaka 
declaration conmitting their countries to the concept of 
regional cooperation. 
Putting aside their differences, the seven South Asian 
nations pledged to redouble their cooperative efforts and 
pave the way for a new era of inter-state relations in the 
quest for peace stability and prosperity in the region. 
The SAARC will seek to promote intra-regional 
collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic 
cultural, tehnical and scientific fields, the Charter also 
provides scope, for cooperations among themselves in 
international forum on matters of common interests and to 
cooperate with international and regional organizations with 
similar aims and purpose. 
The declaration expressed concern at the deteriorating 
international political sitaution and alarm at the 
unprecedented escalation of the arms race particularly 
nuclear weapons. In this context the leaders called upon 
nuclear weapon states to urgently negotiate a comprehensive 
test ban treaty leading to the complete cessation of 
92 testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons". 
92. Ibid. 
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The suBDit reaffiread its deep conviction in the 
continuing validity and relivance of the objectives of the 
NAM as an laportant force in international relations. Bound 
by connon values rooted in their social, ethnic, cultural 
and historical tradition the nations expressed their 
determination to ensure that their individual and regional 
strengths, their potential as a huge aarket and their 
substantial hunan and national resources were utilised for 
the benefit of their people and for enhancing their national 
and collective self reliance. They expressed conviction 
that their countries which had made inportant contribution 
to the enrichment of huaan civilization, could together play 
their due role in international relation and influence 
93 decisions which affected then 
The suanit drew attention to the deteriorating econoalc 
and social conditions which had retarded development 
prospoects in South Asia and other developing countries. 
They expressed concern at the diminishing capacity of 
international financial and technical institution t.P rPSpflTlfl 
effectively to the need of the poorer countries and 
regretted that the spirit of multilateral oooperation h^A 
begun to falter and weaken". 
The declaration reaffiraed the commitnient of the seven 
nations to the Charter of the United Nations constituted the 
93. Ibid. 
Bost inportant forua for resolution of all issues affecting 
international peace and security. A aajor decision taken 
was to concert their views on the ongoing discuBsion on new 
international econoaic order and the iaproveaent of the 
world trading systea through GATT taking particularly into 
the account the interest of least developed among developing 
nations. 
The formation of SAARC evoked mixed reaction. King 
Bhutan described it as "a aanifestation of our collective 
uiston and political will to bring about meaningful regional 
cooperation inspite of the differences on foreign policy and 
94 security perspective". On the otherhand President Zia of 
Pakistan expressed apprehensions about the dorminant 
position of India, which could deter the fulfilment of the 
objectives and deals of SAARC. Siailar aisglvings were 
95 entertained by other saaller countries . This 
alsunderstanding developed because of India's domination. 
Therefore, it is need for India to try to allay these 
feelings by demonstrating both by words and deeds that she 
will always be ready to enter into constructive and mutually 
beneficial cooperation with such countries as may seek it. 
Banglaore Summit (1986) : 
The meaber states of SAARC in Bang lore in November 1986 
called for the expansion of regional oooperatlftns tR 
94. Chandra Prakash, op.cit., P. 459. 
95. Ibid. 
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economic areas and rededicated the«selves to work for peace 
and stability In the countries afflieted with nistruat and 
96 
suspicion and the scars of the colonial era . All leaders 
agreed to take action against terrorism and drug abuse and 
expressed their concern over lack of progress towards 
disarnanent. Rajiv Gandhi appealed the nations of the 
region to ensure that their territory would never used as a 
sanctuary for terrorists any where in the region. 
Other decisions which were taken, the creation of a 
Secretariate in kathaandu and agreeing to launch a "South 
Asian Broad casting ProgranBe" covering both radio and 
television, a valuable instrument in rousing South Asian 
. 97 
consciousness 
Kathnandu Summit (1987) : 
This summit provided a renewed thurst and direction to 
the future course of cooperation in South Asia. As for 
common denominators in the region al1 South Asian nations 
share identical views on various global and regional issues. 
All are non aligned and have anti colonial, anti aparthied 
and anti protectionist orientation, and all subscribe to 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. All accept the UN 
98 
resolution declaring the Indian ocean as a zone of peace . 
The Kathmandu summit looked towards a political issue, that 
Q6. The Times of India, 11 Nov., 1986. 
97. Haq, Shamshul, " Beyond Bangalore in South Asia, Journal 
Vol. 1, No. 1 July-Sep., 1987, P. 7. 
98. Baral, Lok. Raj., "Constraints on South Asian Regional 
Cooperation in South Asia Journal Vol2., No.l, July Sep. 
1988. P. 14. 
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of suppression of terroriaa in the region. It also come to 
sign the regional convention on suppression of terrorisB. 
The convention specifis the offences that could be 
considered as acts of terror and not political for the 
purpose of extradtion. However as both legal experts and 
political coaaentators have pointed out, nere signing and 
ratification of the conventions will not achive objective. 
It would still require a genuine desire and political will 
Q Q 
to curb the nenace of trnasporting terrorism . Besides 
tackling political issues such as terrorism and drug 
trafficking, it has come to exercise, a perceptible 
influence on bilateral relations. 
Islamabad Sumnlt (1988) : 
The Islamabad summit was held for "peace, security, 
prosperty and cooperation" in South Asia. The seven heads 
of the state and government pledged to move forward with 
mutual trust and confidence rather than be guided by any 
legacy of doubt and suspicions. They expressed concern at 
the high incidence of drug production, trafficking and abuse 
and decided to declare 1989 as the SAARC year against Drug 
Abuses in order to focus attention on drug related problene 
facing the region . They stressed the need of measures at 
National level to fully implement the regional conventions. 
99. Sharma, L.K. "From Kathmandu to Islamabad**, op.cit. P. 4, 
100.Chandra, Prakash, op.cit., P. 461. 
on suppression of terrorisa. They called for a prespective 
regional plan with specific targets of meeting basic needs 
to be met by the end of the century in core sectors such as 
food, clothing, shelter, education, primary health care, 
population, planning and environmental protection . It 
was a welcome effort to establish South Asian food Security 
Reserve and a major break through in the common enedeavour 
of the governmetns of member countries to assist each other 
in food emergency situation. 
The notable feature of the summit was the relaxed 
relationship between India and Pakistan. Indian P.M. Mr. 
Rajiv Gandhi inveiled at the inaugural session a South Asian 
Charter that included a war on poverty through increased 
trade and economic exchanges covering agriculture to 
industry, free flow of information and unhindered travel in 
the region by people of member countries. 
Male Summit 1990 : 
This summit did not mark any material progress towards 
regional cooperation. It signed a convention on Norcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substnaces to deal effectively with 
the menace of drug abuse and suppression illicit traffic in 
the region. 
Colombo Summit <1992) : 
The summit was scheduled to take place in 1991 but due 
101.Ibid. 
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to absence of soae heads of the state it was post poned and 
again held in Dec. 1992. In Coloabo declarations the 
leaders caae out strongly for a United Souh Asian approach 
for liberalising trade in the region, formulating joint 
action on the environment and coabating natural disasters. 
It also set its face firaly against the West linking aid 
with huaan rights. The declaration sought to ensure that 
SAARC does not aerely reaain an acronym to the people of the 
region. 
Dhaka Summit (1993) : 
South Asia entered a new era, with the adoption of the 
Dhaka decclaration seeking to pul 1 down traide barriers in 
the region. The two day suaait of SAARC endorsed the South 
Asian Preferential Trade Agreeeant (SAPTA) for the 
liberalisation of trade aaong the seven aember nations. 
The declaration, adopted unaniaously by the heads of 
state or governaent attending the suaait said the "tiae was 
now opportune to provide a further dynamic impetus to 
activities in the core of economic social and cultural 
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cooperation in the SAARC region". 
The declaration endorsed an integrated prograane of 
actions (IPA) on eradiction of poverty in South Asia, trade 
manufacture and services, the environaent, population, 
102."SAARC Suaait endorse : SAPTA" The Tiaes of India, 
April 12, 1993, New Delhi. 
shelter, children, youth, disabled persons, woaen 
development, science and technology, terrorism, drug 
trafficking. Security of small states, people to people 
contact, association of SAARC speakers and parlaimentarians 
and South Asian Development Fund (SADF). The declaration 
also touched on international political economic 
development 
The above discussion has proved that over the years, 
the SAARC countries have relised the need of Co-operations 
and SAARC has now become a reality but a question arises, 
how successful 1 will it be ? The succeess of any regional 
organistion lies in the extent to which there is political 
under standing between its member states. Moreover, 
political conflict between the member states should be non-
existent or at a sufficiently low level so as to not impair 
regional cooperation. yet political conflict in South Asia 
is at a high level, for example, Tamil problem in Sri Lanka 
is causing considerable strains in the India Sri Lanka 
relationship, similarly Pakistan's support to the Kashmiri & 
Sikh terrorists, the nuclear problems, Kashmir and the 
Siachein issue have all soured India-Pakistan relations. 
The consequence of such high levels of political conflict is 
that regional cooperation with in SAARC frame work can only 
take place In peripheral areas. Until such political 
conflicts are resolved therefore, SAARC willnot become a 
body which facilitates meaningful regional cooperation. 
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The concept of security has undergont; drastic changes 
in the recent years. It has coae to acquire ever greater 
ambiguity as it has been realized that the nanitoid 
dimensions of security demand a more cooperative approach to 
tackle the threats, and it is appreciable that by many ways 
both the developed and the developing world are encountering 
problems, some of them strikingly similar. 
Security is a primary concern of every state which 
generally implies territorial integrity, stability of the 
nation and realizations of national interest and safeguard 
of the life and property of their citizens from any threat, 
which can damage their national core values. There are many 
threats to the security of a state which come from diverse 
ways and pose risk to the security in diversified manner. 
The concept and nature of security differs from state to 
state and time to time keeping in view the domestic policies 
and geo-political locations. 
As far as SAARC countries national security is 
concerned, it is more complicated because of their border 
disputes, inter- state conflicts, internal disturbances, 
terrorists and secessionist problems, ethnic and sectarian 
violences as well as nuclear threat. 
National Security of SAARC countries is threatened from 
extra-regional powers, the emergence of China as a nuclear 
power state, presence of big powers military bases in Indian 
Ocean and the fall out of a possible nuclear conflict at the 
J0 4 
global level. The interventionary activities of developed 
countries are also posing threat. The econonic» social and 
political backwardness of SAARC countries has becoae a 
source of exploitation in the hands of strong powers as well 
as the Monetary organisations like IMF and World Bank, which 
amount to a bridgement of their right to decide their own 
ways of econoaic, political and social developaent. 
The other threat is from the inter-state conflicts, and 
•utual apprehensions in the region. India and Pakistan have 
fought three tiaes and nobody can coapletely rule out the 
possibility of these two countries engaging in an arned 
conflict again. So it is said that peace and security of 
this region depends on India & Pakistan relations. 
National Security of SAARC countries is also such 
threatened from within. The ethnic, sectarian violences and 
destructive forces have taken whole region in their grips. 
The insurgency probleas in Kashair & North Eastern region, 
Naxalist's probleas, coaaunalisa and castisa in India, the 
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, the Chakaas's probleas in 
Bangladesh, the terai and hill tribes in Nepal, the Nepali 
origin problen in Bhutan and Baluchi, Sindhi - Mohajir and 
sectarian violences in Pakistan etc. all are fast assuaing 
grave diaensions, so there is need to take serious steps to 
tackle these probleas by the responsible country. 
In the changed world scenario, South Asia has started 
experiencing the realities of a new poly centric world. 
J05 
South Asia is one of "the such region which is in the midst 
of several security probiens. But the inclination of extra 
regional powers for increasing interdBpendancB and 
cooperation in various fields would prove the way of 
stability and socio economic development, that would lead to 
wards peace and tranquillity in the whole region. However a 
•ultl polar international order would undoubtedly make 
interstate relations in this region more complicated because 
of all the seven member countries of SAARC are passing 
through different stages of development and nation-state 
buiIdlng. 
There are several differences between India and 
Pakistan which give rise of misunderstanding between them. 
Pakistan finds it difficult to reconcile itself to India's 
pre-eminence in South Asia, its policy maker emphasis that 
Pakistan can never accept such a situation. 
India & Pakistan still remain trapped in the nightmare 
of enmity and tension. The two countries could have settled 
down to good neighbourly co-existence with commonalities of 
languages and cultures fostering mutual sympathy trust and 
understanding. The important thing is that since 1947^ 
India and Pakistan not only maintains bitter and 
antagonistic postures against each other, but also fought 
three wars. The root cause of differences between India and 
Pakistan is mainly Kashmir dispute as well as aiding^ 
abetting to terrorists who are creating troubles in Indian 
states. 
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KashBir issue is the key for Pakistani leaders tc 
divert public attention fron doaestic politics and that is 
why this issue is kept alive by Pakistan. 
Mostly, all peace loving countries have urged both 
India and Pakistan to resolve their outstanding probieas 
bilaterally with in the Simla Agreement. Instead of helping 
in solving Kashmir and other disputes Pakistan is 
continuously aiding and abetting the militancy in Kashmir. 
Recent statement of Ms. Bhutto, that she will continue to 
help Kashmiri militants and she will not hesitate in using 
nuclear weapon against India for Kashmir, has again 
contributed to a deterioration of India Pakistan relations. 
Another trouble maker is the potentiality of nuclear 
capability. So in this situation both countries have to 
revise again their nuclear policies in favour of non-
mi 1itary uses. 
Taking as a whole the intra-regionaI perspective, it 
can be speculated that South Asia is an Indo-Centric region 
to the extent that India is in position of playing the role 
of a central actor in South Asia on account of it tangible 
elements of power and performance. The Indian objectives 
have not only been to strengthen defence preparedneaa for 
traditional military role but also to support the cause of 
non interference and non aggression in the region. India's 
neighbours on the contrary avoid any public commitment to 
j() / 
the Indian security policies are based upon the assumption 
of an Indian guarantee against outsider aggression. 
Instead of playing a big brother role in South Asia, 
the present situation deaands for India to adopt new 
orientations and approaches in matter of her relations with 
neighbours and to prevent the extra-regional involvement In 
South Asian domestic affairs and their covert linkages with 
the neighbours. 
At the policy level, India must take some internal 
decisions in such areas where it can make positive offers to 
its neighbours in the economic, environmental and 
developmental fields. Secondly, wherever possible India 
should abandon the Indo-Centric stance as long as it does 
not negatively affect India's security, political and 
economic interests. Thirdly, while keeping technical and 
specialized factors in mind, issues related cooperation with 
neighbours should be decided upon taking the overall 
political objective of mutually beneficial relationship with 
neighbours, as the overriding factor. 
With Pakistan, India should make an unconditional offer 
of totally free trade. India tries to make a clear offer of 
reasonable commissions on water sharing and delimitation of 
the maritime boundary. 
Regarding India's relation with Bangladesh, India may 
remove tarrif and non-tarrif barriers against Bangladeshi 
goods for which there is domestic demand. On water disputes 
India would sign agreements for periods of three to five 
years each time. Supply of water should be subject to 
review at the end of each agreement period. But minimal 
quantities of water should be assured to Bangladesh instead 
of controversial negotiations every year. India must have a 
similar approach on water resources management and trade 
matters with Nepal. 
If India can work out these arrangements in favour of 
its neighbours, it will generate positive pressure and 
create the necessary atmosphere of mutual trust and 
confidence for regional cooperation. Though political and 
strategic matters are not discussed at the SAARC summit. 
India should make some concrete suggestions about creating a 
suitable security environment in the South Asian Region. 
India should examine possibilities of establishing a South 
Asian security forum in which al1 members of the SAARC 
affirm their commitment to democracy, requirements of 
economic development and non-resort to force in resolving 
disputes. The five principles of Punchsheel may be affirmed 
as the basis of this regional security arrangement. 
As the domestic unrest in South Asian countries is 
concerned, it is on the rise from past several years. The 
major problem is that of ethnic minorities, which has taken 
a ugly shape of secesslonism. Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh are multi-ethnic societies, which have been 
facing separatist or autonomist movements for a very long 
^'•jv 
time. Tho authoritarian regines which are aoro-othnic in 
character, such as in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are 
greatly responsible for alienating the allegiance of the 
minority groups. But the crux of successful managenent of 
the varied ethnic demands lies in an equitable econoaic 
distribution and development which is lacking in developing 
societies. Increasingly, autonomy or separate state hood is 
visualized as the most satisfactory way for the fulfillaent 
of their aspirations by the ethnic minorities. 
The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka should teach each one 
of these countries that the majority coaaunitles cannot 
prescribe to large minorities a restricted form of existence 
in the same society, that deprived of their legitimate 
aspirations and demands, large minorities will fight back, 
and their struggle will become militant if political 
settlement of political issues is delayed beyond a 
reasonable span of time. If minorities are located in 
territories of their own, and if they can be mobilized on 
the basis of cultural, linguistic nationalism, their 
struggles are likely to turn into armed ones and they would 
demand autonomy or even independence. To pre-empt these 
developments, national leaders have to adopt the reasonable 
demands of minorities in time and integrate the moderate 
elements in minority communities in to the political 
process. 
Particular care needs to be taken to see that political 
issues involving cross national minorities do not lead to 
21 0 
conflict between the neighbours concerned. It is neceaaary 
that South As..a acquires a regional pool of knowledge about 
the dynamlca of cross national ethnic ninorities. Policy 
makers and opinion makers should be able to anticipate 
future conflicts and take pre-eaptive measures well in time. 
As a first step in this direction, it is necessary to set up 
a South Asia Institute of Ethnic Studies which should be 
manned by scholars from al1 regional countries and which 
should initiate studies of actual and potential ethnic and 
minorities issues that may generate inter-state tensions and 
conflict. Only on the basis of well informed insightful 
studies can policies be formed to pre-empt conflict or 
resolve them when they can be controlled with relative ease. 
South Asian elite must learn that, they gain nothing 
and stand to lose a lot by trying to get involved in one 
another domestic issues and conflicts. Elite of individual 
countries will no doubt have their political and Ideological 
persuasions. They will like these persuasions to prevail in 
neighbouring countries too. But the dynamics of political 
change generally belongs to domestic societies, though these 
are often Influenced by external forces. In the present 
phase of political development in the South Asian Countries, 
each political society is in midst of several problems, some 
big, others small, each must traverse its own politipdi VQ^^ 
to arrive at destinations each must define for itself. 
Outside intervention can only distort the dynamics at 
political change. The elements released by outside 
21 1 
intervention nore often than not play Into tite hands of the 
powers that be. Not only do changes desired by the 
interventionist outsider not come off, bilateral relations 
cone under severe strain. Conflict situations promptly 
buiId up. 
In the contemporary world order of inter dependency no 
country can afford to remain isolated from world community. 
In this environment neighbouring countries and co-existing 
with them find a higher priority in a nations policy. It la 
historical fact that neighbourly amity is true key to 
national peace and security and well being of a country. 
With this distinct shift from self dependence to 
interdependence, credible neighbourly relation build upon 
mutuality of interest, trust and faith are assuming a very 
significant dimension. These are the significant 
determinants which led to South Asian countries to form a 
regional organization for the socio economic political and 
cultural ties which is now known as South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 
In a global scenario characterized by centripetal 
trends of regional associations for economic cQoperatioTij 
the South Asian region remains stultified. Compared to the 
achievements of organisations like, the ASEAN, NAFTA, APEC 
and EC, SAARC remains stuck in general discussions. 
However, SAARC*s achievements in facilitating unanimity 
regarding drug trafficking, terrorism and other contentious 
bilateral issue can not be ignored. SAARC could also most 
beneficially be utilized to advertise each country's 
economic, industrial and technological progress to bring 
about greater cooperation in these fields and this is where 
India could play a most vital role. 
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